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Abstract 
Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow in Emerging Market Firms: An Empirical Analysis 
Free cash flow overinvestment stemming from agency conflicts and moderators of this 
relationship have been empirically confirmed in several studies for developed markets. Research 
on emerging market firms has however produced less coherent results. While it can be argued that 
these incongruities are a consequence of the samples analyzed and the methodologies applied, they 
might also be rooted in the theoretical underpinnings: Agency theory originates from developed 
market research, consequently assuming an institutional environment as well as firm 
characteristics different from those observed in emerging market companies. 
This study empirically evaluates the investment behavior of a sample of emerging market 
firms with a methodology that specifically allows a test of the agency-based explanation of excess 
investment. The findings support overinvestment as a function of free cash flow, thereby 
confirming the free cash flow hypothesis in emerging market firms. Additionally, the results 
propose that this relationship can be negatively moderated by corporate governance mechanisms 
as well as ownership concentration; suggesting (similar to developed market firms) a principal -
agent conflict motivated overinvestment. Debt as a “traditional” way to mend this agency problem 
can however not be confirmed. Furthermore, the study provides empirical evidence for a 
moderating effect of the institutional environment on the free cash flow overinvestment 
relationship via its interaction with firm characteristics. This proposes that the two are interrelated 
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Firm investment is key to future growth and firm value. Making the “right” investment 
decisions is therefore essential for long-term success. In perfect capital markets, firm investment 
is independent of internally generated cash flows or externally available capital and solely 
determined by its marginal value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Since the perfect market 
assumption does not hold, it has previously been theorized and empirically supported that finance 
and investment are indeed interrelated (Love, 2003). This relationship is motivated by diverging 
interests of firm stakeholders, which can create agency conflicts. These increase the firm’s cost of 
capital (monitoring costs), distort investment (Jensen, 1986), and in turn negatively affect firm 
value (Dechow, Richardson, & Sloan, 2008). The incentive to invest beyond an optimal level – 
overinvestment - stems from the fact that all stakeholders are utility maximizers. Consequently, 
firm insiders (managers and majority shareholders) do not always act in the best interest of 
outsiders (minority shareholders) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Insiders might grow a firm beyond 
its optimal size for personal benefits, such as elevated power by control over larger resources 
control (Stein, 2003). The agency problem is especially prevalent with the existence of free cash 
flow, where excess cash is invested in negative net present value projects instead of being returned 
to shareholders (Stulz, 1990; Jensen M., 1986). Empirically, the relationship between free cash 
flow and overinvestment has been supported in several studies in developed markets (Richardson, 
2006; Degryse & de Jong, 2006; Pindado & de la Torre, 2009). Research on emerging market 
firms has yet to fully evolve (Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016; Chunyan & Yuehu, 2010; Wei & Zhang, 
2008).  
When exploring this topic in an emerging market context, it is important to consider that the 
characteristics of emerging market firms are very different from those underlying the “traditional” 
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agency theory (originating from U.S. and U.K. research), where shareholders are assumed to be 
dispersed, and overinvestment is consequently attributed to shareholder – manager conflicts.  The 
ownership structure in emerging market firms is comparatively more concentrated (Dharwadakar, 
George, & Brandes, 2000). It has been argued that large block holders have increased monitoring 
and control abilities, resulting in excess investment reduction (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999b).  On the other hand, majority shareholders can act as entrenched 
managers similarly leading to principal – principal agency conflicts and overinvestment (Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, & Triantis, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).    
Extant empirical studies on emerging market firms suggest a presence of free cash flow 
overinvestment. The literature is however heavily concentrated on one geographical region (Asia) 
and applies diverging methodologies, which are not always fully suited to establish excess 
investment as a result of agency problems.   
This study applies an accounting-based approach based on the work of Richardson (2006), 
which specifically captures unexpected investment over a large sample of emerging market firms, 
and is thus better able to test the agency-conflict based explanation of free cash flow 
overinvestment. The results show that there is a positive relationship between free cash flow and 
excess investment and that this relationship is stronger for positive free cash flow values. The 
findings, therefore, propose that firms with free cash flow tend to overinvest; thus, providing 
support for the free cash flow hypothesis in emerging market firms.  
With a free cash flow – excess investment association established for emerging market firms, 
the study further looks at (potential) moderators of this relationship.  Extant research in this regard 
has shown that debt (Jensen M., 1986; Stulz, 1990), and corporate governance (Richardson, 2006; 
Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008; Holopainen, 2006; Munisi, Hermes, & Randoy, 2014; Jameson 
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& Puthenpurackal, 2014) can be negatively related to excess investment in developed market 
firms. Literature on emerging market firms has produced less coherent empirical results about the 
overinvestment-debt and the overinvestment-corporate governance nexus (see Chai, 2013; Chen, 
Sun, & Xu, 2016; Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan, 2011; Taghavi, Khodaei Valahzaghard, & 
Amirjahadi, 2014; Carrasco, Johnson, & Nunez, 2005).  While the findings can certainly stem 
from the diverging research methodologies applied, they could also have theoretical 
underpinnings. Extant literature tends to treat the agency theory as a universal theory and thus 
assumes that it is invariant to the specific institutional setting of the issue investigated (Bowe, 
Filatotchev, & Marshall, 2010). A growing body of literature in international business has however 
repeatedly confirmed that there appears to be an interaction between a firm’s institutional 
environment and its strategy and actions (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2007). Researchers have therefore 
argued that the agency theory might have to be extended to enhance the understanding of firm 
practices, because firms are embedded in a local framework and affected by institutional context 
(Zalina & Yusof, 2016; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006).  
In select contemporary studies, finance scholars have commenced exploring the impact of 
certain country-level corporate governance variables on overinvestment (Francis, Hasan, Song, & 
Waisman, 2013; Love, 2003; Wurgler, 2000). In emerging markets, governance is often weak and 
the institutional context can be much different from the one underlying the traditional agency 
theory. As a consequence, measures applied in developed countries might have had different 
effects, be less effective, or even ineffective.  
Empirical research exploring the impact of institutional environment on firm behavior from a 
financial perspective is rather scarce. Some studies have indicated that there are country-specific 
differences in the level of firm corporate governance and the ability to enforce financial contracts.  
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Both are interrelated to the institutional environment and can thus affect firm investment (Djankov, 
Hart, McLeish, & Shleifer, 2008; Kaplan, Martel, & Stromberg, 2003).   
This study, therefore, analyzes the determinants of free cash flow overinvestment under 
consideration of the firms’ institutional environment.  
In particular, the results attest a relationship between debt and overinvestment; its direction is 
however, contrary to developed market firms, positive. This suggests that in emerging market 
firms, the introduction of debt in the capital structure does not have the same monitoring - and thus 
mending effect - on overinvestment as observed in developed market firms. 
 Furthermore, the findings propose that corporate governance is (similar to developed markets) 
able to negatively moderate the free cash flow overinvestment relationship in emerging market 
firms. The extent of the moderating effect, however, varies in different institutional environments. 
In weak legal and regulatory environments, the effect is smaller; in stronger institutional 
environments it is larger. Corporate governance and government effectiveness therefore 
complement each other. 
Finally, ownership concentration is found to have a negative effect on the free cash flow 
overinvestment relationship. The effect is stronger in weaker developed markets. This supports the 
previously theorized elevated monitoring and control abilities of large block holders. It also 
proposes that overinvestment in emerging markets might be predominantly driven by principal – 
agent conflicts (similar to developed markets).  Moreover, it suggests that market development 
and ownership concentration are substitutes, in the sense that owners can replace the monitoring 
function otherwise carried out by the financial markets to curb overinvestment.  
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Combined, the findings provide some empirical evidence that agency theory might not be 
invariant to the institutional environment and that its underlying assumptions should be considered 
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I) Introduction 
I.1) Introduction to the Research Problem 
 
The firm, as a portfolio of its investments, will only increase its worth when investment is 
efficient (Shapiro, 2005). Realized projects without a marginal contribution will destroy firm value 
(Titman, Wei, & Xie, 2004), as company resources are miss-allocated and squandered for 
suboptimal use.  
Under the theoretical assumption of perfect capital markets, firm investment is neither 
dependent on internally generated cash flow nor the availability of external funding, but rather on 
the marginal value it provides. Accordingly, firm investment and available free cash flow are 
unrelated when there are no information asymmetries, no frictions in raising external capital, and 
no moral hazard present in the market (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). For investment activity this 
would mean that whenever positive net present value projects are available, the firm is able to raise 
the required capital in the external markets, and – vice versa - any cash flow in excess of what is 
necessary to fund projects with marginal value is returned to investors; or put differently: in perfect 
markets, finance is irrelevant for the “real-world” investment decision (Love, 2003). 
Since the assumption of perfect capital markets does not hold, researchers have theorized and 
empirically supported that finance and investment are in fact interdependent and that external 
capital is not a perfect substitute for internally generated funds. Based on the existence of 
information asymmetries between different stakeholders of a firm, Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
theorize the presence of agency conflicts. This can lead to investment in projects that do not have 
marginal value for the firm, instead of excess cash being returned to investors (Jensen M. , 1986). 
This is because all stakeholders are utility maximizers with conflicting interests. When free cash 
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flow is available, insiders (managers or majority shareholders) have the ability to invest in projects 
for individual benefit without baring full costs; causing overinvestment.  
 Due to its negative effect on firm value, scholars have previously proposed several moderators 
– debt and corporate governance - of the free cash flow overinvestment relationship to curb 
inefficient investment (Dechow, Richardson, & Sloan, 2008; Jensen, 1986).  
The overinvestment hypothesis and moderators thereof have been empirically supported in 
several studies (Richardson, 2006). Research in this area is however highly concentrated on 
developed economies.  
With the increased importance of emerging markets in driving trade, investment and global 
growth, the question that naturally arises is whether and to what extent emerging market firms are 
also prone to overinvestment of free cash flow, and what factors can potentially moderate that 
relationship. Research on emerging market firms is however still scarce and has yet to fully evolve 
(Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016; Chunyan & Yuehu, 2010; Wei & Zhang, 2008). 
When exploring this topic in a developing market context it is further important to consider 
that the characteristics of emerging market firms, as well as their environment, are very different 
from those underlying the “traditional” agency theory and thus the overinvestment hypothesis 
(which stems from U.S. and U.K. research).  From a theoretical perspective, it can be argued that 
overinvestment in developing markets might not be driven by the same agency conflicts underlying 
developed market firms (Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 1999). Consequently, the application of 
agency theory as a universal theory, invariant to the specific institutional setting a firm is operating 
in, might not be able to fully explain the emerging market firm behavior (Bowe, Filatotchev, & 
Marshall, 2010).  
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Empirical analyses to test the free cash flow overinvestment relationship as well as its potential 
moderators in emerging market firms are still scarce and have limited geographical reach. They 
further frequently fail to consider the specific institutional environment, apply varying analytical 
approaches, and have produced mixed - in part contradictory - results. Prevalent work on this topic 
is also mainly concentrated on China. 
To extend prior research, the following study will therefore empirically evaluate the investment 
behavior in a sample of emerging market firms with a methodology suited to test the agency-based 
explanation of excess investment. Furthermore, factors affecting excess investment are analyzed 
and the effect of institutional environment on free cash flow overinvestment is assessed. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section II provides the theoretical 
framework, section III develops the hypotheses, section IV describes the research methodology, 
and section V presents the empirical results. Sections VI and VII conclude the study, by discussing 
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II) Literature Review 
II.1) Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow  
 
 
II.1.1) Drivers of Firm Investment 
There are two strands of research in extant literature to explain the free cash flow - excess 
investment relationship. The first one is based on the work of Myers & Majluf (1984). It 
particularly looks at the firm’s ability to pursue investment and attributes investment inefficiencies 
to information asymmetries between firm insiders (managers) and outsiders (investor). Because of 
those market imperfections, investors will price the risk of not having full information into their 
required returns; making external capital comparatively more expensive. Hence, firms that are 
forced to raise external capital might have to refrain from investing - even when positive net 
present value projects are available. On the other hand, firms with available free cash flow will 
increase overall investment activity because of the relatively lower cost (Richardson, 2006), 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1988).  
The second approach focuses particularly on whether the investment creates value for the firm 
and attributes inefficient investment to the existing agency conflicts among different stakeholders 
of the firm (Jensen M. , 1986). These agency problems arise due to the existence of information 
asymmetries, which allow insiders to maximize their personal utility rather than that of the outside 
shareholders (see section I.1.2). As such this theory makes information asymmetries a necessary, 
yet not sufficient condition for excess investment to occur. The argument can be further 
underscored by extant research on this topic which shows that ineffective investment exists even 
when there are no financing constraints (Richardson, 2006), (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997), (Kaplan 
& Zingales, 2000).  Consequently, this study will be based on Jensen’s (1986) line of argument 
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and will evaluate agency conflicts triggered by information asymmetries as the potential reason 
for overinvestment of free cash flow.  
 
I.1.2) Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow – the Agency Perspective  
Modern firms can be characterized by an inherent separation of ownership and control, where 
principals (owners) engage other people (agents) to act on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
In the presence of information asymmetries and under the assumption that all stakeholders of the 
firm are utility maximizers, it can be argued that owner agents (managers) will not always act in 
the best interest of their principles (shareholders); creating agency costs in the form of residual 
loss.  Managers might, in fact, have an incentive to pursue projects with a negative net present 
value or be motivated to refrain from investment with a positive net present value (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). While the latter is a result of risk aversion, stemming from the managers’ attempt 
to avoid loss of wealth by investment in projects deemed “low risk” (Easterbrook, 1984), the 
former is driven by the managers’ quest to increase resources under their control and consequently 
their power. The elevated power will in return augment their utility (Stein, 2003).  Instead of 
returning cash to shareholders, managers might, therefore, have an incentive to overinvest in 
projects that have no marginal value to the firm (Jensen M. , 1986).  
The overinvestment problem is especially prevalent when a firm produces free cash flow (i.e. 
cash flow in excess of what is necessary to fund all projects with a positive net present value). 
When managers use excess cash for investment projects as opposed to debt, they are - to a degree 
- detached from the pricing and monitoring mechanisms of the market, where investors would 
otherwise demand a positive contribution to firm value and price the risk of a project into their 
required rate of return (Easterbrook, 1984).  
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It has previously been argued that these principle-agent conflicts can be mitigated by the 
presence of large shareholders, who are in a better position to monitor management action as 
opposed to dispersed, small stock ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1999b). Large block holders also have a better ability, and possibly higher motivation, to control 
the action of management. As such, higher ownership concentration might reduce overinvestment. 
However, their presence can give rise to another set of insider versus outsider agency conflicts; 
those between equity holders.  
Conflicts between shareholders arise from a misalignment of interests between controlling and 
non-controlling shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). A deviation of cash flow rights from 
control rights thereby gives the controlling shareholders an incentive to expropriate minority 
shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Schleifer, 1999). Controlling shareholders, 
particularly when involved in managing firms, have the ability to employ company assets to satisfy 
their own interests (Stulz, 1988); which lets them maximize utility.  This is because they only bear 
a fraction of the costs of any non-monetary benefits that accrue to them (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 1999). Similar to managers, controlling shareholders might, 
therefore, have an incentive to invest available cash flow beyond optimal levels for personal 
benefits, such as growth or diversification (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1999b). These principal – principal conflicts have previously been associated with inefficient 
strategies (Wurgler, 2000; Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003) and 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Mitton, 2002). 
The distortion of firm investment caused by agency conflicts between various stakeholders of 
the firm can thus lead to agency costs, growth beyond optimal levels, and negative effects on firm 
value (Jensen M. , 1986;  Jensen & Meckling, 1976; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
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Vishny, 2002; Lins, 2003;Titman, Wei, & Xie, 2004; Fairfield, Whisenant, & Yohn, 2004; 
Richardson, & Sloan, 2008).    
In a developed market context, the free cash flow - overinvestment relationship has been 
modeled by Stulz (1990) and was empirically supported in multiple studies across different 
industries, time periods, and sample sizes. 
Pawlina & Renneboog (2005) analyze a sample of 985 non-financial UK firms listed on the 
London Stock exchange over the period of 1992 to 1998. The results suggest a very strong 
relationship between investment and cashflow. Similarly, Richardson (2006) attests a positive 
relationship between free cash flow and overinvestment for U.S. non-bank firms, with a 
concentration of excess investment in firms with the comparatively highest level of free cash flow. 
His work evaluates 58,053 firm-year observations over the time period of 1988 to 2002. Examining 
135 Spanish exchange listed, non-financial firms from 1990 to 1999 Pindado & de la Torre (2009) 
also find a positive relationship between free cash flow and over-investment. Similarly, Degryse 
& de Jong (2006) suggest that cash flow and investment are interrelated by evaluating data from 
132 Dutch non-financial companies listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange from 1993 until 1998.  
Theoretical and empirical research on excess investment is predominantly focused on 
developed countries. Shares of these firms are generally widely held with few –if any - block 
holders, which leads to an inherent examination of the overinvestment hypothesis from a principle 





8 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
II.2) Emerging Market Firms and Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow 
 
With the increasing importance of developing markets in the global economy the question that 
naturally arises is whether and to what degree overinvestment of free cash flow is also present in 
emerging market firms, which share some characteristics of developed market corporations but are 
different in others.  
As mentioned above, developed market firms can be described by a dispersed ownership 
structure. This does not necessarily hold true for emerging market firms, where broadly spread 
equity is rare (Zalina & Yusof, 2016; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Schleifer, 1999). Ownership 
in emerging markets appears to be much more concentrated (Dharwadakar, George, & Brandes, 
2000). Empirical analyses suggest that emerging market firms - in general - are frequently family 
owned or have only one (few) majority shareholder(s). In firms with concentrated ownership there 
also appears to be little separation between ownership and control, with management being related 
to the family of the controlling shareholder (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). In a detailed 
analysis of the ownership structures across all emerging markets, Claessens & Burcin Yurtugolu 
(2013) show that in East Asian countries the largest direct shareholders typically hold about 50% 
of equity. They can often be described as wealthy families and are typically involved in firm 
management. In some of the countries (e.g., India and Malaysia) there is also sizeable ownership 
of institutional investors and state ownership.  In Latin America the largest shareholders own 
between 50% and 60% percent of equity. Family ownership is similarly very typical. In some Latin 
American countries – namely Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Peru – financial and non-financial 
company ownership is also prevalent. Studies from African and Middle Eastern countries (Turkey, 
Kenya, and Tunisia) also confirm concentrated ownership and a divergence of cash flow rights.  
Similar results have been attested in other, less recent emerging market studies. La Porta, Lopez-
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de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) and Lins (2003) show that the majority of companies in 
developing economies have very concentrated ownership with at least one block holder or holdings 
of more than 50% by the largest three shareholders. This suggests that the ownership structures 
remain relatively constant over time.  
It has previously been theorized that ownership concentration stems from increased difficulties 
and costs of enforcing agency contracts (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). Less 
developed product, labor, and takeover markets in emerging economies make owner control over 
management difficult (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). Furthermore, the threat of having sensitive 
information exposed with little legal protection often prompts the hiring of related family 
members, where a trust relationship already exists (Yeung, 2006). Concentrated ownership is 
consequently a substitute control mechanism in an environment that lacks market monitoring 
mechanisms as well as the protective property rights and can, as such, have a dampening effect on 
excessive investment in an emerging market environment.   
On the other hand, the circumstances in emerging markets, in particular the absence of external 
control mechanisms (Morck, Wolfenzen, & Yeung, 2005) and minor shareholder protection, can 
foster conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders because extracting 
firm resources for personal benefit is comparatively easier. From this perspective it can be argued 
that extant concentrated ownership combined with increased information asymmetries as well as 
weak legal and regulatory environment can prompt overinvestment of free cash flow in emerging 
market firms (Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 1999) as a result of majority – minority shareholder 
conflicts (see section II.3.3).   
In addition to principal – principal conflict driven excess investment, principle – agent conflicts 
might also foster overinvestment in developing market firms. This is because inefficient market 
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controls and inadequate constraint mechanisms can incentivize emerging market firm managers to 
obtain private benefits through investment beyond justifiable levels. These benefits can either be 
monetary or non-monetary; to include increased resources under control, feelings of 
accomplishment, or higher social status (Lei, Mingchao, Weing, & Yu, 2014). Furthermore, 
emerging market managers are often not sufficiently compensated and thus seek growth through 
investment to obtain additional benefits (Liu & Ouang, 2007). Moreover, they are able to realize 
private benefits as a result of lacking oversight. Compared to their developed market counterparts, 
emerging market managers might, therefore, be particularly motivated to overinvest as a result of 
private benefit driven agency conflicts.   
Agency theory further suggests that conflicts and thus agency costs are higher with lower 
availability of growth opportunities for companies (Jensen M. , 1986). In comparison to developed 
markets, emerging market firms have historically shown higher growth rates. This gap has widened 
from the early 2000s to 2009, but then narrowed until 2015, where the relationship was reversed. 
Currently, emerging market performance exceeds developed markets once again (IMF, 2017).  An 
analysis of emerging market firm (sales) growth rates over a 10-year period also shows that 
companies headquartered in emerging markets grow about twice as much as their developed 
market complements (Atsmon, Kloss, & Smit, 2011). It can thus be argued that the potential of 
overinvestment of free cash flow might be less pronounced in emerging countries as there are 
comparatively more growth opportunities available. Emerging market firms have however recently 
experienced phases of dampened growth, which might make overinvestment relatively more 
likely. Furthermore, studies show that emerging market firms tend to have a much lower dividend 
payout ratio (39% as opposed to 80% for developed markets for the period analyzed) and a much 
higher growth in fixed assets (12% as opposed to 7%), which can also be indicative for additional 
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investment activity. Consequently, the question of whether investments are “justified” by a 
positive net present value or made for other reasons remains (Atsmon, Kloss, & Smit, 2011).  
 
The preceding section shows that there are several theoretical arguments supporting the 
overinvestment hypothesis for emerging markets; evolving empirical research in that regard seems 
to further point to the existence of free cash flow overinvestment. The existing studies, however, 
are not encompassing and show some (methodological) weaknesses. In the following section, they 
will first be briefly described and then evaluated: 
Analyzing 865 Chinese publicly listed firms over the time period from 2000-2004 Chen, Sun, 
& Xu (2016) attest sensibility of over-investment to free cash flow. Furthermore, for the sample 
analyzed, over-investment is found to be more prevalent in firms with free cash flow. Chunyan & 
Yuehu (2010) similarly show that Chinese companies with free cash flow tend to overinvest. Their 
analysis is based on seven years of data from 2000 to 2006 and evaluates 5030 firm-year 
observations of non-financial institutions.  Wei & Zhang (2008) look at 994 corporations in eight 
East Asian economies over the period from 1993 to 1996 and attest cash flow sensitivity of 
investments for the data analyzed. Similarly, Cai (2013) finds a positive relationship between free 
cash flow and overinvestment for a sample of 1411 firm-year observations of companies listed on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchange from 2003 to 2010.   Taghavi, Khodaei Valahzaghard, 
& Amirjahadi (2014) examine 121 firms listed at the Tehran Stock exchange over the period from 
2008 to 2010 and conclude a significant relationship between free cash flow and over-investment. 
Similarly, Fatma & Chichti (2011) find that Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis holds for a sample 
of 35 Tunisian firms over the timeframe from 1999-2008.  
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The above analysis shows that the studies are largely concentrated on Asian (Chinese) firms. 
This is where most firm year observations are presented. A thorough evaluation of a large sample 
of emerging markets however, has yet to be carried out. Furthermore, the timeframe of the analysis 
is focused on, or prior to, the first decade of this century, with most of the data being obtained 
from the early 2000s. More recent literature, covering longer time periods to capture any dynamic 
effects, and those evaluating data from a larger sample of firms from different geographical areas 
are missing. Additionally, the methodologies applied to assess whether overinvestment of free cash 
flow is present vary across studies. Some of the approaches utilized have previously been criticized 
for merely establishing investment as a proxy for free cash flow, thus being unable to specifically 
measure overinvestment. They, therefore, fail to truly test the agency conflict explanation of excess 
investment. While Chen, Sun, & Xu (2016), Cai (2013), and Chunyan & Yuehu (2010) measure 
overinvestment following an approach put forth by Richardson (2006) - where regression residuals 
are used as proxies for inefficient investment and regressed on free cash flow as well as other 
predictor variables (see section IV). Wei & Zhang (2008) derive their methodology from the 
models used by Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson (1988) and Hadlock (1988) where asset scaled cash 
flow is regressed on an investment variable amongst other variables (Tobin’s Q) and interaction 
terms. Taghavi, Khodaei Valahzaghard, & Amirjahadi (2014) determine the existence of 
overinvestment based on a modified version of Richardson (2006), whereas Fatma & Chichti 
(2011) use a three-stage least square simultaneous model with free cash flow risk and leverage as 
dependent variables. Furthermore, the majority of studies which follow Richardson’s overall 
approach, do deviate in regards to the specific variables included in the model or calculation 
thereof.     
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Despite the divergence in applied methodology and scope of analysis, the empirical results 
seem to overall support the notion that overinvestment of free cash flow might also be present in 
emerging market firms. Furthermore, the studies that specifically apply a methodology to test the 
agency problem as the cause of overinvestment (Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016; Cai, 2013; and Chunyan 
& Yuehu, 2010) can confirm the free cash flow hypothesis. Consequently, it can be argued that 
there appears to be theoretical and (some) empirical evidence that free cash flow overinvestment 
is also present in emerging market firms.  
 
 II. 3) Determinants of Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow 
 
Because of the negative effect on value, firms (should naturally) have an interest in curtailing 
inefficient investment. Therefore, the question arises whether certain factors can mend the 
overinvestment problem. Previous research in this regard has recognized several determinants in 
a developed market firm context. The following section will describe these factors and evaluate 
them from an emerging market perspective.    
 
II.3.1) Debt and Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow 
Jensen’s (1986) theory proposes that overinvestment of free cash flow can be affected by debt. 
Stressing the agency problem of debt, he argues that the creation of debt without retention (e.g., 
debt issuance to buy back shares) can help reduce the agency cost of free cash flow by reducing 
the funds available to the manager at his or her discretion. Likewise, Stulz’s (1990) model shows 
that financing policies (i.e. the application of debt) can curtail the resources under the manger’s 
control and can thus reduce their ability to overinvest. This theorized relationship has been 
empirically supported for the U.S. and other developed economies: D'Mello & Miranda (2010) 
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find for U.S. listed, - non-regulated, non-financial, - firms that debt effectively reduces 
overinvestment. Similarly, Degryse & de Jong (2006) show that (higher) bank debt has a 
disciplinary mechanism by reducing the availability of discretionary funds to managers; resulting 
in lower investment cash flow sensitivity for Dutch companies.  
Theoretical and empirical research on the moderating role of debt in emerging market firms 
produces less coherent results.   
From a theoretical perspective it can be argued that the concentrated ownership structures in 
emerging markets may render debt a less important monitoring mechanism because controlling 
shareholders themselves have interest and ability to control investment. Furthermore, the 
concentrated ownership structure might primarily give rise to insider - outsider agency conflicts 
(described in section II.2). The introduction of debt may therefore not have the same effect on the 
free cash flow overinvestment relationship. By way of contrast, it can be argued that controlling 
shareholders can be viewed as entrenched managers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny,1999b), creating Jensen (1986) like insider – outsider conflicts.  A reduction in available 
cash might therefore similarly be able to curb overinvestment activity.    
Empirical analyses have produced divergent findings. This can be a reflection of the diverging 
theories, and particular circumstances of the sample firms analyzed. In addition, it can be (partly) 
rooted in the application of diverse methodologies and differing variables to approximate debt (or 
types thereof) when assessing its effect on overinvestment as shown in the following section: 
Chen, Sun, & Xu (2016) attest a negative relationship between debt and overinvestment for a 
sample of 865 listed non-financial Chinese firms. Similarly, Cai (2013) finds short term debt and 
leverage to have a significantly negative relationship to overinvestment. Yuan & Dai (2016) 
identify a negative relationship between commercial debt and overinvestment, but a positive 
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relationship between bank loans and overinvestment in Chinese listed firms. Fernandez’s (2011) 
examines of a mixed sample of 100 firms based in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico from 1997 to 2006. 
and finds a strong, inverse relationship between long term debt and investment. His study also 
shows a correlation between investment and asset maturity, suggesting congruence with the 
overinvestment hypothesis. The analysis is however based on Kim & Maddala’s (1992) random 
effects model for a dynamic panel, and only considers the aforementioned variables. A study 
carried out by Carrasco, Johnson, & Nunez (2005) cannot confirm any relationship between 
investment and debt for Chilean firms. Their methodology is based on an approach motivated by 
Benaventa, Johnson, & Morande (2003) and uses a number of firm-specific as well as 
macroeconomic variables, such as real GDP and interest rate, as control variables.   
In short, while the empirical studies exploring the issue in the context of emerging markets are 
nascent and the reported results are in part inconclusive, there is some empirical evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that debt reduces the excess investment in emerging market firms.  
 
II.3.2) Corporate Governance and Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow 
Apart from debt, finance scholars have also focused on other aspects of the agency conflicts 
and introduced corporate governance as a mechanism to curtail free cash flow overinvestment. As 
described in section I.1.2, the agency cost theory suggests that insiders (managers or majority 
shareholders) with free cash on hand have a tendency to engage in the maximization of self-interest 
rather than maximization of (minority) shareholder wealth (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Stulz, 1990). These agency conflicts are particularly likely to occur in companies with little 
or inefficient governance; where monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms are absent or not 
properly carried out (Render, Gaeremynck, & Secru, 2010; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & 
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Schleifer, 1999). If the management is more committed to financial discipline and shareholder 
value creation, the company shows information transparency, and boards are independent, then it 
is difficult for majority shareholders to use firm resources to their own benefit (Francis, Hasan, 
Song, & Waisman, 2013). Several corporate governance mechanisms have been suggested to 
mitigate the conflict of interests, including board of directors as an oversight and advising 
committee (Munisi, Hermes, & Randoy, 2014), (equity based) compensation structures that ensure 
alignment of management and shareholder goals, as well as the threat of hostile takeovers, which 
would reduce or eliminate the power of the current management (Holopainen, 2006).  
Quality and composition of corporate boards have previously been found to be important 
because of the boards’s role of assisting in the guidance of corporations and their complex set of 
activities in an even more complex environment. Furthermore, independence of board members 
has been considered of high importance for effective firm monitoring, because autonomous board 
members tend to impose stricter policies (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Al-Najjar, 
2009).  
From an agency perspective, it can further be argued that agents are typically risk-averse 
and strive to pursue their own interest (to maximize their utility); and these interests are not always 
in line with those of the principals (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Because of asymmetric 
information between principal and agents, principals have to find ways to motivate their agents to 
pursue goals that are in the best interest of the shareholders. When managers are presented with 
incentives that benefit them more than pursuing their own agenda, they will choose to act in a 
manner that lets them realize those incentives (assuming managers are risk-averse and rational). 
One way to incentivize agents to align their interests with those of shareholders is through equity-
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based compensation (e.g. stock options) (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997b; Fenn & Liang 2001). 
Managers will consequently be able to obtain private benefits from increasing firm value. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the market for corporate control is another important 
corporate governance mechanism. This is because takeovers can reduce the information monopoly 
of the manager (insider) about the firm and also allows for the replacement of inefficient 
management. The threat of a takeover and related removal of the current management can 
discipline otherwise self-interest maximizing managers and serve as an important avenue to align 
agents’ interest with those of principals (Butler, 1988). Consequently, the regulation of anti-
takeover provisions, such as supermajority provisions, poison pills, staggered board, and fair price 
provisions, can have an important effect on corporate governance1.  
Empirically, there has been some support that corporate governance has a moderating effect 
on free cash flow overinvestment: Richardson’s (2006) shows that U.S. companies with more 
activist shareholders display lower levels of overinvestment, while staggered boards and specially 
designed shareholders rights plans (poison pills) suggest higher levels of overinvestment. 
Similarly, Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell (2008) suggest that for U.S. listed, non-financial firms, 
corporate governance seems to have a moderating effect on investment. They find in particular 
that governance metrics based on anti-takeover provisions and capital expenditures are inversely 
related. They further connote that firms with high levels of excess cash and weaker corporate 
governance are more prone to spending cash, particularly on investments and acquisitions.  
Moreover, Billett, Garfinkel, & Jiang’s (2011) analysis of non-financial US firm data between 
                                                 
1 Supermajority provisions increase the shareholder approval requirement for a merger to a higher percentage, poison pills or 
shareholder rights plans gives current shareholders the right to buy new shares at a discount thereby diluting the bidders interest, 
staggered board allow only for a certain number of board members to be replaced at one time, and fair price provisions restrict the 
transfer of control to the buyer if no fair share price is paid.  
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1990 and 2007 shows that poor shareholder governance, as measured by RiskMetrics’ corporate 
governance index, can be associated with overinvestment.  
Similar to the analysis of debt as a moderator, studies on corporate governance and free cash 
flow overinvestment are mainly based on data from developed markets. Research in emerging 
markets has only recently been introduced and is still scarce (Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman, 
2013).  
Theoretically, it can be argued that effective corporate governance mechanisms should equally 
curb the pursuance of self-interests of firm insiders in an emerging market context. It is, however, 
less clear to what degree these mechanisms exist, can be enforced, and are similar to the ones in 
developed market firms (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). This is partly rooted in 
the ownership structure of the firm (see section II.3.3), but also in the institutional environment, 
(see section II.3.4). As expected, the empirical results reported in the literature are less consistent 
compared to the ones from developed markets. Moreover, some of the studies only test certain 
aspects of corporate governance by applying single (or limited) corporate governance measures 
instead of an index. While it has been acknowledged that single variables, such as board 
independence, management duality, and stock ownership of board members are important 
determinants of corporate governance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008), scholars have argued that reliance 
on simple measures eliminates important information about interactions between certain corporate 
governance mechanisms (Schnyder, 2012).  The existing studies are briefly reviewed in the 
following section: 
Cai (2013) finds that Chinese state-owned firms with a large board of directors are prone to 
overinvest and that corporate governance mechanisms - as measured by the independence of the 
board members - have no significant negative relationship to overinvestment of free cash flows. 
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Chen, Sun, & Xu ( 2016) by contrast show that Chinese state-owned firms tend to invest above 
justified levels and that a larger board size seems to curb overinvestment. A higher number of 
tradable shares is also found to be negatively related to overinvestment. Both studies might be 
prone to some bias stemming from the concentration on a select few corporate governance 
measures.  Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman (2013) study a sample of 362 companies in 14 
emerging markets for the year 2000. Using a survey-based corporate governance rating index, they 
find that corporate governance has an effect on the free cash flow overinvestment. The analysis is 
however limited to one year of data. Analyzing 455 major listed firms in 10 Asian markets over 
three years (2001-2004), Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan (2011) suggest that good corporate governance 
leads to more efficient investment decisions and increased firm value. This relationship does 
however not hold for firms with concentrated ownership structures. Taghavi, Khodaei 
Valahzaghard, & Amirjahadi (2014) assert that certain governance factors have a negative impact 
on overinvestment for Iranian firms while others don’t. They identify ownership concentration and 
percentage of non-executive directors as significant, while the existence of controlling 
shareholders (i.e., investors holding more than 50% of the company’s shares) and director – 
executive officer duality shows no significant relationship to overinvestment.  
The above literature review points to empirical evidence suggesting that corporate governance 
may mitigate the free cash flow overinvestment in the context of emerging markets; closer 
analysis, however, reveals that the variables used to measure corporate governance differ across 
analyses and in some instances also produce contradicting results. While some studies use 
corporate governance indices, others use particular variables to operationalize corporate 
governance, subjecting themselves to the aforementioned shortcomings.  The research methods 
applied also vary substantially and do not lend themselves to meaningful comparisons: Cai (2013) 
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and Chen, Sun, & Xu (2016) apply Richardson’s (2006) approach to model the effect of corporate 
governance on the free cash flow overinvestment relationship. Cai (2013) however includes a set 
of only three variables (board size, dual appointment, and board independence, i.e. the proportion 
of non-executive directors on board), while Chen, Sun, & Xu (2016) expand the variables applied 
to account for characteristics of the board and its members. Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan (2011) by 
contrast establish a link between efficient investment and corporate governance through its effects 
on firm value. They operationalize corporate governance with the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
corporate governance score and investment by the change in the firms’ fixed assets. Taghavi, 
Khodaei Valahzaghard, & Amirjahadi (2014) approximate corporate governance by a limited set 
of variables; board independence, dual appointment, controlling investors, and institutional 
investors.  
In summary, it can be stated that, despite the variance in applied methodology, there is 
theoretical and – to a degree – empirical evidence that stronger corporate governance mechanisms 
can curb arbitrary actions of manager or controlling shareholders in emerging market firms as well 
and thus have a moderating effect on the overinvestment of free cash flow.  
 
II.3.3) Ownership and Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow 
As previously mentioned, research in regards to ownership structure and firm performance, 
suggest positive as well as negative effects of ownership concentration (see section II.2.3 and II.3). 
One line of argument is based on the notion that concentrated ownership motivates principals, and 
increases their ability to monitor and direct manager actions (Konecný & Cástek, 2016; 
Baghdasaryan & La Cour, 2013; Short, 1994). Consequently, agency problems between owner 
and agents are reduced, as managers have little ability to act against the interest of the owners. 
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This has previously been found to be particularly true for firms whose environment lacks adequate 
performance monitoring (Becht, Bolton, & Röell, 2001). Accordingly, overinvestment might be 
mitigated by concentrated ownership, as owners are better able to monitor manager actions.  
The other line of argument suggests that majority owners can similarly extract resources at the 
cost of minority shareholders, when they act for their own private benefit (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, & Lang, 2002). Because of the mainly concentrated ownership structure in emerging markets, 
agency conflicts resulting in shareholder expropriation might therefore also be prevalent 
(Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003). With larger equity portions, 
owners can easily gain control of the firm, for instance, through the appointment of family or 
affiliated members, to increase their own utility at the expense of the minority shareholders. 
Decisions of “majority shareholder approved” managers might also be less questioned by directors, 
who themselves are interested in reappointment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny 
1998; Jaggi & Leung, 2007).  As a result, higher ownership concentration can foster free cash flow 
overinvestment. 
Empirical research in this regard is largely focused on government-held assets as a form of 
majority ownership. An analysis of Chinese firms with concentrated ownership, particularly in the 
form of large state holdings, found a negative effect on investment efficiency (He & Kyaw, 2018). 
Evaluating eight East Asian emerging markets before the financial crises Wei & Zhang (2008) 
find that the investment sensitivity to free cash flow increases as the degree of divergence between 
cash flow rights and control rights of large shareholder increases. Empirical research on Jordanian 
emerging market firms, on the other hand suggests that investment efficiency increases with 
increased ownership concentration; regardless of the ownership type (Tayem, 2015).   
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Overall there appears to be some empirical evidence that ownership concentration can affect 
free cash flow overinvestment; particularly in the case of government ownership. The direction of 
the effect, however, remains unclear, with some evidence pointing toward the type of ownership 
(individual, government, corporation) as being the driver of the direction.  
 
II.3.4) Institutional Environment and Free Cash Flow Overinvestment 
The preceding sections show, that while there seems to be a tendency for overinvestment of 
free cash flow in emerging markets, there is no full consent among findings regarding factors that 
can potentially influence that relationship and curtail overinvestment. As previously emphasized, 
this may partly be a result of methodological divergence. However, it can also point toward a 
potential need to expand research to include other variables previously not considered; thereby 
accounting for the special circumstances and characteristics of firms in emerging markets.  
 
II.3.4.1) Institutional Environment in Emerging Markets 
Extant research by Peng & Heath (1996) and Khanna & Palepu (1997) has emphasized weak 
governance and underdeveloped institutional context in emerging markets. Moreover, Claessens 
& Burcin Yurtugolu (2013) show in their encompassing analysis of institutional environment that 
emerging markets do substantially diverge from developed markets (but also from each other) in 
several aspects relevant to corporate governance. Their analysis also demonstrates that emerging 
markets (and transitioning economies) still rank much below developed markets in market and 
economic development. Only some emerging markets (e.g. Korea and Hungary) are close to the 
developed market average in regards to per capita income, while the majority of them are still at a 
far lower level. GDP growth in emerging markets, on the other hand, has surpassed that in 
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developed economies for an extended amount of time. Trade integration overall has now reached 
the level of developed markets. Emerging markets do however display differences amongst each 
other, with East Asian economies showing a larger level of openness. Claessens & Burcin 
Yurtugolu (2013) further illustrate that developed countries’ financial markets and systems are 
much more advanced compared to their emerging counterparts and that there are large differences 
among developing countries.  
Table 1 below shows the financial market development ratings assigned to the analyzed 
countries by the World Bank. The table includes the rating at the beginning and end of the period 
of analysis (2000 and 2015 respectively). Their scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being the highest 
rating. It can be seen that at a regional level the financial market development increased in all three 
regions. All levels are however still well below those of developed markets such as the United 
States (0.87) or U.K. (0.88). Furthermore, the table suggests that there is divergence within the 
respective regions. While the Brazilian level of financial development is 32% above the Americas 
region average, Mexico’s level is 28% below. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Czech 
Republic, are well below the average development level for the Africa, Europe, and Middle East 
region, while South Africa, Russia, and Greece are substantially above. Asia shows the same 
divergence with China and Taiwan well below the regional average and Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Korea well above, with Korea’s level being almost equal to that of developed markets. There are 
also differences over time. Over the three regions, financial market development increased from 
2000 to 2015, with the largest development advance occurring in the Americas (59%). It is, 
however, noteworthy that some countries (Greece, Pakistan, and the Philippines) did experience a 
decline in market development compared to 2000.  
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Table 1: Comparison of Financial Market Development   
 
Source: World Bank’s Financial Development Score (% change based on author’s calculation, categorization based on MSCI emerging market index 
classification) 
 
In addition to market development, Claessens & Burcin Yurtugolu’s (2013) study also displays 
substantial differences in the legal dimension of the institutional environment. This pertains in 
particular to a functioning legal and judicial system. Overall, emerging markets are found to have 
“less strongly defined rights”; especially in several Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American 
countries.  Shareholders rights and rights of creditors are also weak in some Latin American 
countries. Additionally, large differences between emerging markets and developed markets are 
recorded with respect to execution of the law. The ability to enforce rights (including property 
rights) is estimated to be twice as high in developed markets compared to emerging markets. 
Finally, high levels of corruption are also reported in several emerging markets.  
Table 2 provides an overview of the governance effectiveness score published by the World 
Bank for the countries included in this study; at the beginning of the period of analysis (2000) and 
the end (2015). This rating assesses the countries’ quality of public services, civil services, policy 
formulation and implementation as well as its credibility and commitment.  
 
 
Americas  Beginning End Change % Europe, Middle East & Africa Average Beginning End %Change Asia  Beginning End Change %
Brazil 0.46 0.66 43% Czech Rebulic 0.30 0.35 19% China 0.22 0.24 6%
Chile 0.39 0.54 38% Egypt 0.26 0.29 11% India 0.39 0.40 2%
Colombia 0.21 0.46 118% Greece 0.59 0.58 -1% Indonesia 0.32 0.34 4%
Mexico 0.29 0.39 38% Hungary 0.45 0.45 0% Korea 0.69 0.84 22%
Peru 0.21 0.43 104% Poland 0.35 0.48 40% Malaysia 0.56 0.68 22%
Americas Average 0.31 0.50 59% Qatar 0.44 0.45 3% Pakistan 0.30 0.20 -33%
Russia 0.18 0.58 225% Philippines 0.40 0.38 -7%
South Africa 0.49 0.61 24% Taiwan 0.22 0.24 6%
Saudi Arabia 0.12 0.15 24% Thailand 0.47 0.66 38%
Turkey 0.39 0.49 25% Asia Average 0.40 0.44 11%
United Arab Emirates 0.27 0.47 74%
Europe, Middle East & Africa Average 0.35 0.45 28%
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Table 2: Comparison of Government Effectiveness  
 
Source: World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Rating (% change based on author’s calculation, categorization based on MSCI emerging market 
index classification, Percentile Ranking, 100 being highest)  
 
The table shows that there are substantial differences in the development and level of 
government effectiveness among the countries analyzed. Over all three regions only Asia had an 
overall increase in government effectiveness (7% from 59th to 64th) over the observation period. 
The Europe/Middle East/Africa region essentially remained at the 2000 level (65th percentile), 
while the Americas region experienced a decrease (-6% from 62nd to 58th). All of the average 
rankings are lower compared to developed markets, such as the U.S. (89th in 2000 and 90th in 2015) 
and U.K. (93rd in 2000 and 94th in 2015). Looking at the individual countries, it can be observed 
that there are also sizable differences in ratings within the regions. While Brazil’s and Peru’s 
effectiveness ranking dropped by 22% and 12% respectively, Colombia’s increased by 22% over 
the observation period. Furthermore, when comparing country rankings to the average for the 
region, it can be seen that Chile’s ranking (79th) is much higher, while Peru’s (49th) and Brazil’s 
(48th) is substantially below the region average. A similar diversion of rankings can be attested for 
the Europe/Middle East/Africa region. Some of the countries (Egypt, Greece, Hungary, and South 
Africa), experienced a decrease in governance effectiveness, while others (Czech, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) were able to improve their effectiveness over the time 
Americas  Beginning End Change % Europe, Middle East & Africa Beginning End Change % Asia Beginning End Change %
Brazil 61.0 47.6 -22% Czech Republic 74.9 79.8 7% China 53.3 67.8 27%
Chile 84.6 79.3 -6% Egypt 48.2 27.9 -42% India 51.3 57.2 12%
Colombia 44.6 54.3 22% Greece 74.4 62.5 -16% Indonesia 46.2 53.4 16%
Mexico 63.6 59.6 -6% Hungary 82.1 69.2 -16% Korea, Rep. 78.5 80.8 3%
Peru 54.9 48.6 -12% Poland 73.8 73.6 0% Malaysia 83.1 76.0 -9%
Americas Average 61.7 57.9 -6.3% Qatar 70.3 74.5 6% Pakistan 30.3 28.8 -5%
Russian Federation 25.1 44.2 76% Philippines 49.7 51.9 4%
Saudi Arabia 47.7 63.5 33% Taiwan, China 77.4 89.4 15%
South Africa 76.4 64.9 -15% Thailand 63.1 66.3 5%
Turkey 56.9 54.8 -4% Asia Average 59.2 63.5 7.3%
United Arab Emirates 79.5 90.9 14%
Europe, Middle East & Africa Average 64.5 64.2 -0.5%
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period analyzed. Correspondingly, when looking at the individual country’s ranking in comparison 
for the overall region average, dispersion around the average can be observed. Saudi Arabia’s 
ranking (90th) is about 40% higher than the average for the region and comparable to that of 
developed markets. Egypt (29th) and Russia (42nd) on the other hand, rank 57% and 34% 
respectively below the average of the region. A similar diversion is also evident in the Asia region. 
Most countries within the region improved their overall effectiveness ranking, two countries 
(Malaysia and Pakistan) however, dropped in the level of government efficiency. In addition, 
Pakistan’s ranking (29th) is well below that of the region’s average (64th), while Taiwan’s (89th) 
and Korea’s (81st) are significantly above.  
 
II.3.4.2) Institutional Environment and Agency Theory 
The previous section shows that there are substantial differences in the firm environment 
amongst emerging and developed market firms.  Consequently, it can be argued that traditional 
measures to curb agency conflicts - as applied in developed countries - might be less effective or 
even ineffective in an emerging market context. This is because they are originated in developing 
markets and therefore assume a strong regulatory environment and developed financial markets. 
In this regard, scholars have previously argued that the agency theory might have to be extended 
to increase the understanding of firm practices because firm characteristics and behavior, such as   
corporate governance, are embedded in a local context and affected by factors in the institutional 
environment (Zalina & Yusof, 2016; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006). While the interaction 
between institutional environment and firm behavior has been acknowledged in some functional 
international business research (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2007; Peng M. , 2006), (particularly in 
management and strategy) it is lacking in others (Dharwadakar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Bowe, 
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Filatotchev, & Marshall, 2010). This is particularly true for international finance (Bowe, 
Filatotchev, & Marshall, 2010). Prior research has shown an interrelation between institutional 
environment and corporate governance effectiveness from an organizational perspective 
(Aquilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008). It has for instance been argued that because of 
the weak institutional environment, developed market corporate governance measures are often 
replaced by a corporate government construct based on concentrated (family) firm ownership, in 
some instances complemented by firm networks (business groups) or government ownership.  
Similarly, it has been shown that in weak legal environments with elevated levels of corruption, 
family ties and concentrated ownership can be beneficial in achieving firm goals (Steier, 2009).   
Studies have also indicated that there are country-specific differences in the ability to enforce 
financial contracts (for instance in debt enforcement) as well as corporate governance and that both 
are interrelated to the institutional environment (Djankov, Hart, McLeish, & Shleifer, 2008; 
Kaplan, Martel, & Stromberg, 2003).  
Scholars have therefore previously called for the integration of institutional theory and agency 
theory to account for specific circumstances in emerging markets (Bowe, Filatotchev, & Marshall, 
2010).  To the best of the author’s knowledge there is little research in the literature addressing 
this gap.  
Present studies have either focused on country-level corporate governance and sought to assess 
its interaction with, and effect on, firm-level governance or solely estimated the influence of 
institutional environment on free cash flow overinvestment thereby disregarding any firm-specific 
variables. Studies encompassing multiple aspects of institutional environment and their effect on 
free cash flow overinvestment in conjunction with other moderators are still missing. The 
empirical findings of the extant studies are presented below: 
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 Love (2003) and Wurgler (2000) show that legal and contractual environment as (partially) 
mirrored in its financial development (functioning of markets) fosters the efficient allocation of 
investments via reduced financial constraints. Their analyses are based on observations from 
developed as well as emerging markets, with developed country observations representing the 
majority of data points. Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman, (2013) look, particularly at the 
interaction effect of country-level governance and firm level governance. They analyze 362 firms 
from 14 emerging markets for the year 2000. Their research shows that firm level corporate 
governance is more important in determining the firm investment sensitivity to internal cash flow 
in countries with weaker, country-level corporate governance; suggesting firm and country level 
corporate governance are interchangeable. While this analysis provides support for an interaction 
effect between institutional environment and firm behavior, it has to be acknowledged that the 
sample data is from the same year and does not explicitly measure overinvestment (Fazzari, 
Hubbard, & Peterson’s (1988) approach is applied).  Other work from Li (2012) and Goodluck, 
Li, Chen, & Cui’s (2014) is solely focused on the institutional environment, or certain aspects 
thereof, as determining variables for free cash flow overinvestment. No firm-specific variables –
other than free cash flow - are considered in their analyses. Furthermore, they are focused on 
China. 
Despite the described differences in applied methodology, it is important to point out the extant 
research proposes a moderating effect of the firm’s institutional environment on the effectiveness 
of firm investment. Certain variables in the environment the firm is embedded in also appear to 
interact with corporate level factors. This is in line with the previously brought forth arguments 
that an agency theory explanation of free cash flow overinvestment has to be viewed in light of 
the institutional environment the firm is operating in. It is precisely the institutional environment 
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and its interaction with firm level variables that can moderate a firm’s sensitivity to overinvestment 
of free cash flow.  
The aspects of institutional environment previously found to have an interacting with firm 
characteristics and firm behavior are described in the following section along with an evaluation 
of their potential to influence firm (over) investment.  
 
II.3.4.3 Institutional Environment and Firm Investment  
a) Government effectiveness 
An important factor rooted in the institutional environment with the potential to affect free 
cash flow overinvestment is government effectiveness. Government effectiveness can be 
understood as the government’s ability to develop, implement, and enforce sound policies, as well 
as its independence from political pressures2. It is directly related to the level of corruption and 
compliance in a country (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1999b).  
In markets where a sound rule of law exists, property rights and the enforceability of contracts 
are promoted, which in turn improves the laws governing a firm’s (financial) activities. This 
directly affects the ability of (minority) shareholders to monitor and control insider behavior. 
Stronger regulations enable them to challenge management decision when they are not in their 
best interest and ensure corporate boards correctly fulfill their monitoring tasks (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Furthermore, effective policies can also reduce information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, making it easier for the latter to identify behavior that 
isn’t in their best interest. Finally, in particular under the aspect of dominant owners who might be 
able to directly influence management decisions, improved and enforced regulations can minimize 
                                                 
2 This is The World Bank’s definition of Government Effective. Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicator Dataset. 
https://govdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/h1c9d2797?country=BRA&indicator=388&viz=line_chart&years=1996,2017 
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collusion between the two parties (Koh, 2003), (Bao & Lewellyn, 2017). All of the aforementioned 
can, therefore, help to align interests between minority shareholders and managers (or majority 
shareholders), reducing the potential for excess investment for individual benefit.  
When the legal and judicial environment is less efficient and insiders have the ability to extract 
resources from the firm, investors will price this into their required returns. This increases the 
financing cost and can in turn negatively affect the investment efficiency (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny1998): It will not only curb the potential pursuance of positive net 
present value projects when internal funds are lacking but will also lead to excess investment when 
free cash flow exists, because comparatively “cheaper” internal funds serve as an additional 
incentive to invest in projects for personal utility maximization. Furthermore, in instances where 
the government is less effective and property right are less enforced, managers overall might be 
less afraid of being reprimanded compared to environments with better enforced regulations 
(Jensen, 1993). This is because they know that even when any of their actions that do not contribute 
to value creation are exposed, there are little legal consequences. They might, therefore, be - in 
general - more prone to extract resources for personal benefit and thus overinvest.   
Empirical analysis of government effectiveness as a moderator of overinvestment has 
produced somewhat mixed results. Studying Chinese A-listed non-financial firms over the time 
period from 2001 to 2008, Li (2012) cannot attest any significant moderating effect. Goodluck 
Marco, Li, Chen, & Cui (2014), on the other hand find a negative relationship between government 
effectiveness and overinvestment in listed firms. Their analysis is also based on Chinese A-share 
listed companies over a slightly shorter time period from 2003 to 2008. Both studies operationalize 
of the variable government efficiency with the law index from China’s marketization index report, 
which measures legal protection. The different result might, therefore, be based on the sample 
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(size) and transformation of data. An analysis from Du, Li, Lin, & Wang (2018) shows a 
relationship between government integrity and investment efficiency, overall, however no 
significant relationship to overinvestment. They also find that the relationship between 
government integrity and excess investment varies depending on the ownership structure of the 
firm. The sample analyzed covers data from Chinese listed firms between 2011 and 2014. The 
measurement of government integrity is based on a survey rating administered to 2654 companies. 
This is important to note, as the measurement is the perceived government integrity, which 
constitutes only one aspect of government effectiveness, and therefore makes the results not fully 
comparable. Research of Cambini & Rondi (2010) shows that the managers of European energy 
companies, located in areas with weak legal systems, were more likely to invest for personal 
benefit compared to those whose firms were located in areas with effective government.  
Overall there appears to be some empirical support for a relationship between effective legal 
and judicial systems and excess investment of free cash flow in emerging market firms. The results 
are however based on varying methodologies and samples, and produce in part contradictory 
results. Moreover, it should be emphasized that all of the aforementioned empirical analyses 
evaluate a direct relationship between government effectiveness and excess investment. As 
described in the theoretical part of this section as well as in II.3.4.2) there might also be an 
interaction effect between the institutional environment and firm characteristics and 
overinvestment, which could explain the differences or lack of significant relationships.  Maher & 
Andersson (1999) argue that government effectiveness (in the form of an effective legal and 
regulatory environment) interact with firm-level corporate governance, and that policy makers 
should specifically consider the interactions between corporate governance and its institutional 
context, when formulating laws pertaining to firm-level governance. Observing differences in 
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corporate governance mechanisms in countries around the world, Shleifer & Vishny, (1997) argue 
that these differences are a direct result of varying regulatory environments and that the 
institutional enivornment therefore directly determines the quality of corporate governance.   
In summary it can, therefore, be stated that there is theoretical and (some) empirical support 
that government effectiveness can have a moderating effect on the free cash flow – excess 
investment relationship; either directly or indirectly via its interaction with firm characteristics.   
 
b) Government Intervention  
Extant research has further identified government intervention as a factor in the institutional 
environment which might have an effect on the investment decision. In an effective institutional 
environment, firm investment should follow the positive net present value dicta. This maxim 
however no longer holds when governments actively (or passively) intervene, and can thus lead to 
unproductive investment, merely satisfying government goals. In general, two types of 
inefficiencies have been identified (Lin & Wong, 2013):  Ex ante inefficiencies, where profitable 
investments are not pursued due to government intervention and ex-post inefficiencies, where 
projects fail to produce marginal value or prospective investment projects seize to exist.   
Governments often intervene to encourage investment to pursue a certain political agenda 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In emerging markets, governments might, for instance, seek to promote 
certain industries and technologies for political or developmental reasons, and consequently 
encourage firm investment in a particular sector, regardless of the firm’s capability to achieve long 
term competitive advantage. Furthermore, the political interest to attain a positive standing with 
the population in a certain region, e.g. through increased economic activity and corresponding job 
creation, can lead to politically motivated investment incentives for firms. Moreover, emerging 
market firms interested in smooth business operations, might try to create a favorable political 
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environment for themselves. This can, in turn, prompt them to pursue investments without 
marginal value, simply to “please” political influencers (Goodluck Marco, Li, Chen, & Cui, 2014).   
Government intervention can also keep firms from ending inefficient investment projects or 
reduce investment expenditures. Whenever reduction in investment spending collides with 
political agendas or government policies, firms might be prone to disregard the net present value 
maxim to remain in good political standing (Lin & Wong, 2013).  
In general, the paths of government influence on firm investment can be classified into three 
categories; namely policy burden, financial incentive to achieve political goals via investments, 
and industry regulations (Luo & Ye, 2015).  
Empirically, government invention has been linked to investment inefficiencies in several 
studies.  Zhang & Yang (2008) for instance show that the lower the level of Chinese government 
intervention on the local (regional) level, the higher the investment efficiency. Similarly, Yang & 
Hu (2007) find that local government control and intervention promotes overinvestment of free 
cash flow in Chinese firms. Analyzing A listed shares of Chinese companies over a five-year 
period, Goodluck Marco, Li, Chen, & Cui, (2014), as well as Li (2012), confirm the results of the 
earlier studies in regards to the relationship between government intervention and free cash flow 
overinvestment. Deng, Jiang, Li, & Liao (2017) further find that government intervention in the 
form of an economic stimulus packet during the financial crisis of 2008 had a negative effect on 
firm investment efficiency.  
While the aforementioned studies are mainly concentrated on China, their results do suggest 
that government intervention certainly seems to have an effect on investment efficiency. This can 
be further underlined by the fact, that previous research on institutional environment and country 
corporate governance has attested that government intervention is present in several emerging 
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markets (Claessens & Burcin Yurtugolu, 2013). Similar to government effectiveness it has to be 
acknowledged however that the empirical results mainly establish a direct relationship between 
investment efficiency and government intervention.  
As previously argued (see sections II.3.2.4 and II.3.4.3a) there is however good theoretical 
and some empirical reasoning that government involvement might also have an indirect effect via 
its interaction with firm characteristics.  Empirical research has shown that government 
intervention and corporate governance are interrelated. Chang & Wong (2002) for instance show 
that politics can interact with corporate governance of Chinese firms via direct party interference 
as well as via the presence of party representatives and politicians on the board of directors. They 
further show that both forms of government intervention via corporate governance, have negative 
impact on firm performance. Additionally, Zagorchev (2018) shows that for firms in the European 
Union, government intervention is overall positively related to corporate governance quality. 
However, when disaggregating the sample by the type of intervention (as approximated by the 
government ownership type; e.g. pension funds or sovereign wealth funds), he finds that whenever 
federal governments “directly” own a company, corporate governance is negatively affected.  
In summary it can therefore for stated that there is theoretical support as well as emerging 
empirical evidence that government intervention is related to free cash flow overinvestment; either 
directly or indirectly, via its intervention with firm characteristics.  
 
c) Financial Market Development  
Theoretical models suggest that there is a relationship between a firm’s financial health and 
the effectiveness of its investments via financing constraints (Hubbard R. , 1998). Limitations to 
the availability of funds provided by the market (in quantity or price) can lead to relinquishment 
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of investments with a positive net present value, or – as previously argued – can have a catalyst 
effect on investment if firms have excess cash flow. Capital restrictions are frequently a result of 
market imperfections stemming from information asymmetries. Consequently, information 
disclosure by market participants and institutions will lead to increased investment efficiency 
(Boot, Greenbaum, & Thakor, 1993). Information disclosure and availability are directly related 
to the market development level, as better functioning stock markets or a better developed network 
of intermediaries make more (accurate) information available. Furthermore, increased 
transparency (e.g., embedded in a firm’s stock price and assessed via the Tobin’s Q) enables 
participants to more accurately assess the firm’s performance and whether or not its investments 
provide any value (Wurgler, 2000).  
From an agency perspective, it can thus be argued that shareholders have a better ability to 
assess the efficiency of the firm investment and thus can better align their interests with those of 
firm insiders. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998) suggest in that regard that an 
effective legal and judicial system will allow the enforcement of financial contracts and thus 
strengthen the rights of minority shareholders. Their research suggests that this will curb 
overinvestment, particularly in declining industries, rather than providing more capital to growing 
industries. In countries with lower financial market development and thus weaker protection of 
minority shareholder rights, overinvestment is likely more prevalent, because shareholders have 
less opportunity to prevent overinvestment in (declining) industries (Wurgler, 2000).   
Empirically, Love (2003) provides evidence that financial market development reduces 
financial constraints which would otherwise negatively impact effectiveness of firm investment.   
Furthermore, findings from Greenwood & Jovanovic (1990) suggest that the development level of 
the financial markets is related to investment efficiency, with a higher level of market development 
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resulting in more efficient investment. Similarly, Goodluck Marco, Li, Chen, & Cui (2014) and Li 
(2012) find a positive relationship between marketization and investment efficiency.  
The previous section provides theoretical as well as (some) empirical support that financial 
market development can relate to excess investment of free cash. Similar to the other dimensions 
of institutional environment, it can further be argued that there is theoretical support for an indirect 
relationship of market development and overinvestment via interaction with firm characteristics. 
Several scholars (see Drobetz, Schillhofer & Zimmermann, 2004 and Hague, Arun, & Kirkpatrick, 
2008) suggest that financial market development and corporate governance are interrelated and 
that capital markets have the ability to influence the quality of firm level corporate standards. The 
better the quality of legal framework governing the financial markets and its transparency, the 
higher the incentive for the firm to have sound governance mechanisms in place. Furthermore, 
Wurgler (2000) suggests that there is also a relationship between the firm ownership characteristics 
and capital allocation. When state ownership decreases and capital allocation via financial market 
increases, investment is shifted from declining to growing sectors. This is because investment is 
no longer made for a political agenda, but in projects that increase firm value and because 
monitoring increases as well.  
In summary it can, therefore, be stated that there appears to be theoretical and to a degree 
empirical evidence that market development has an effect (either directly or indirectly via its 
interaction with firm characteristics) on free cash flow overinvestment.  
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III) Hypotheses  
III.1) Hypotheses Development  
The analysis of extant theoretical research on the free cash flow hypothesis presented in part 
II.1 and II.2, supports the argument that overinvestment of excess cash may be present in emerging 
market firms. This is because agency conflicts can also be present in emerging market firms and 
have been found to have similar effects on firm investment behavior (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999b). Additionally, while corresponding empirical analyses have been 
carried out within limited geographical regions and with diverging methodologies - thereby 
limiting their explanatory power - extant results overall do support the free cash flow 
overinvestment nexus.   
Hypothesis 1 can, therefore, be stated as: 
H1: Overinvestment of free cash flow is present in emerging market firms 
 
Literature review on determinants affecting the free cash flow overinvestment relationship 
revealed that – despite some inconsistencies in methodology and samples – several moderators on 
the firm level can be theoretically and, to a degree, empirically established. They include debt, 
corporate governance, and ownership structure of the firm.   
As contended in section II.3.1), debt has previously been found to curb overinvestment in the 
presence of principle – agent conflicts, since managers have fewer resources available to fund 
inefficient projects (Jensen M. , 1986). While these types of conflicts might be replaced or 
supplemented by principal – principal conflicts in emerging markets, the introduction of debt could 
similarly curb overinvestment, as comparatively fewer funds are available to insiders (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1999b).  
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Hypothesis 2 can, therefore, be stated as: 
H2: Debt is negatively related to overinvestment in emerging market firms  
 
Section II.3.2. shows that corporate governance as the means to align interests between 
different stakeholders of the firm can help mitigate overinvestment of free cash flow. Although 
this notion is theoretically accepted and holds empirically in extant research for developed markets 
(see Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008 and Richardson, 2006), it is still unclear to what extent 
(traditional) corporate governance mechanisms curb overinvestment in emerging market firms. 
Emerging empirical research, despite methodological divergence, seems to support a moderating 
effect in emerging markets as well.  
Hypothesis 3 can, therefore, be stated as: 
H3: Corporate governance mechanisms negatively moderate the free cash flow overinvestment 
relationship in emerging market firms.  
 
Following the presented arguments in section II.3.3., it can be connoted that concentrated 
ownership can either positively or negatively affect overinvestments. According to the principal – 
principal conflict theory, a positive relationship would be expected (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & 
Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny 1998; Jaggi & Leung, 2007), while 
theories that equate concentrated ownership with increased oversight and control and thus 
alignment of interests suggest a negative relationship to overinvestment.  (Konecný & Cástek, 
2016; Baghdasaryan & La Cour, 2013; Short, 1994).   
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Hypothesis 4 can, therefore, be stated as: 
H4:  Highly concentrated firm ownership moderates (positive or negative) the free cash flow 
overinvestment relationship in emerging market firms. 
 
Finally, despite still being largely disregarded in extant literature, the existence of other factors 
rooted in the institutional environment, specific to emerging market firms, can be theoretically 
supported as important moderators of the free cash flow overinvestment relationship (see section 
III.3.4).  This is because the traditional agency theory implicitly assumes a firm environment 
similar to that of developed markets (the origin of the theory itself). Emerging market firms, 
however, have been found to operate frequently in a very different institutional environment 
(Zalina & Yusof, 2016; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006). While empirical research in this regard 
is still emerging, it can be shown that institutional environment – in the form of government 
effectiveness, intervention, and market development – can have a (direct or indirect) effect on 
overinvestment.  
Hypothesis 5 can, therefore, be stated as: 
H5: Institutional Environment moderates the overinvestment free cash flow relationship in 
the following ways: 
 
5a) A higher level of government effectiveness (directly or indirectly) negatively 
moderates the free cash flow overinvestment relationship 
5b) A higher level of government intervention (directly or indirectly) positively moderates 
the free cash flow overinvestment relationship  
5c) A higher level of financial market development (directly or indirectly) negatively 
moderates the free cash flow overinvestment relationship  
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III.2) Hypothesis Summary 
The following is a summary of the hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical section of this 
research.  
H1: Overinvestment of free cash flow is present in emerging market firms 
H2: Debt is negatively related to overinvestment in emerging market firms  
H3: Corporate governance mechanisms negatively moderate the free cash flow overinvestment 
relationship in emerging market firms.  
H4:  Highly concentrated firm ownership moderates (positively or negatively) the free cash 
flow overinvestment relationship in emerging market firms. 
H5: Institutional environment moderates the overinvestment free cash flow relationship in 
the following ways: 
 
5a) A higher level of government effectiveness (directly or indirectly) negatively 
moderates the free cash flow overinvestment relationship 
5b) A higher level of government intervention (directly or indirectly) positively moderates 
the free cash flow overinvestment relationship  
5c) A higher level of financial market development (directly or indirectly) negatively 
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IV Research Design and Methodology  
 
 
The previous section developed the hypotheses to assess whether overinvestment of free cash 
flow is present in a large sample of emerging market firms and how it can be affected by debt, 
corporate governance, and concentration on the firm level, as well as by government effectiveness, 
intervention and market development on the institutional level. This section will describe the 
overall research design and methodology, will explain why it was selected, and will define the data 
sample. 
 
IV.1) Overall Research Design 
The research design employed for this study is a deductive approach, applying a quantitative 
methodology. This is because the study intends to provide an explanation for the occurrence of a 
particular phenomenon –overinvestment – via assessment of explanatory relationships between 
key variables and does not seek to achieve an exploratory understanding of a problem in order to 
generate new ideas (which would warrant a qualitative approach) (Saunders & Lewis, 2012). The 
goal of this study is to test already established theoretical propositions in an extended framework 
and for a larger population size. This is done to assess whether the relationship between free cash 
flow and overinvestment previously attested holds for a large sample of emerging market firms 
and whether moderators to that relationship are similar to those previously established for 
developed market firms and select emerging markets.   
In general, a quantitative study methodology can be carried out via a descriptive research 
design, where the occurrence of a particular event is to be described; or a causal research design, 
aiming to establish a relationship between variables (Malhotra, Hall, Shaw, & Oppenheim, 2006). 
The latter is precisely what this study is set out to do. Consequently, this research is of quantitative, 
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explanatory nature. Furthermore, the study can be characterized as longitudinal, analyzing 
secondary data over the period from 2000 to 2015. The timeframe is extending the one of existing 
studies. It also analyses a more recent time period; contrary to the majority of extant research.  The 
study universe is all publicly listed companies that are incorporated in emerging markets. The 
classification of a developing economy as an emerging market is aligned with the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International classification of emerging markets (MSCI, 2018). A list of the 253 countries 
included in the study and their respective world region per MSCI classification is referenced in 
appendix A. The unit of analysis is the individual publicly listed firm that operated in an emerging 
market during the time period of the analysis.  The sample includes only those firms that had data 
available for the time period analyzed, and whose primary listing was in the respective emerging 
market exchange. The criterion of primary home country listing is chosen so that the collected 
variables better represent the circumstances in the respective country. This is particularly important 
in regards to corporate governance and institutional environment variables. Previous studies 
suggest that listings in (foreign) developed markets enhance the firm’s corporate governance -or 
certain aspects thereof - as opposed to their domestic counterparts (Fresard & Salva, 2010; Doidge, 
Karolyi, & Stulz, 2009).  
 
IV.2) Description of the Research Methodology 
To answer the research questions, the study follows a three-stage approach proposed by 
Richardson’s (2006) to evaluate the relationship between overinvestment and free cash flow as 
well as its moderators. Richardson’s approach (described below) will be slightly modified in the 
third stage to account for additional variables not included in his model but theoretically 
                                                 
3 Saudi Arabia is currently (2018) still a standalone country, however in June of 2018 it was announced that the country would join the MSCI 
emerging market classification in 2019. It was therefore included in the study. 
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determined (in the previous section) as being a potential moderator of the relationship. 
Richardson’s (2006) process was specifically chosen to address identified shortcomings of 
previously applied methodologies. Different from preceding studies to assess overinvestment and 
its facilitators, Richardson explicitly distinguishes between new investment (i.e. new investment 
projects) and maintenance investment (i.e. investments to maintain existing assets). The new 
investments are then further subdivided into expected investments (i.e. those with marginal value 
for the firms) and unexpected investments (i.e. those that couldn’t be justified by their marginal 
contribution), which constitute overinvestment (see illustration below).  
 
Richardson’s (2006) model is thus constructed to specifically determine overinvestment 
(instead of simply investment) and can, therefore, address shortcomings of previously applied 
approaches (see Arslan & Karan, 2007; Almeida & Campello,2007; Zhao, Chen, & Yao,2009). 
These studies frequently use regression between an investment variable (taken directly from the 
financial reports) and various explanatory variables; to include free cash flow. This type of 
regression, however only provides an indication that free cash flow can serve as a proxy for 
investment (Richardson, 2006) and that firm investment can be related to other factors (e.g. debt 
or corporate governance). If a distinction between investment with and without marginal value is 
missing, the approach is less suitable to address the agency theory explanation of overinvestment, 
which specifically looks at that particular type of firm investment and its relationship to free cash 









Types of firm investment according to Richardson (2006)
Total Investment
New Investment (new investment projects)
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The methodology is based on several regression analyses. In the initial stage, the company’s 
anticipated new investments (i.e. positive net present value projects) are determined by an 
expectation model via linear regression from a pooled sample of firm year observations. 
Anticipated (or expected) investment is thereby regarded as a function of growth opportunities as 
well as additional variables (as listed below), which have previously been established as 
determinants for investment decisions (see Richardson,2006; Bates, 2005; Hubbard, 1998; 
Lamont, 2000). The growth opportunities can be interpreted as the benefit of the firm’s ability to 
make future investments (the estimation method is described below). The fitted value of the first 
regression is the estimate of the expected investment; the unexpected (or excess) investment is the 
residual value (see section IV.4.1 below).  
The second stage of the analysis then determines whether unexpected investment (i.e. the 
residual values) is a function of free cash flow.  For this stage, the residuals from the previous 
stage are regressed on a free cash flow variable (see definition below). This is detailed in section 
IV.4.2.  
Stage one and stage two are used to test the first hypothesis, i.e. determine whether 
overinvestment of free cash flow is present in emerging markets.  
The final stage of the analysis assesses whether certain moderators (debt, corporate 
governance, ownership structure, and institutional environment) have an impact on the relationship 
between overinvestment and free cash flow. To do so, the positive residuals obtained in stage 1 
are regressed on free cash flow (positive) and a set of other moderator variables (as described in 
section IV.4.3). Stage three will be divided into two phases. Phase one will assess the impact of 
firm level variables and phase two will expand the analysis to institutional environment variables. 
For this stage, the approach from Richardson (2006) is modified and extended in the sense that 
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additional variables are added to the regression analysis and that only positive values of 
overinvestment are included (Richardson’s analysis includes only positive free cash flow values). 
This is done to include factors that have been theoretically - and to some extent empirically - shown 
to have an effect on overinvestment of free cash flow and to expand the model to institutional 
environment factors. This is described in section IV.4.3.  
Stage three is applied to test the hypotheses two through five.  
 
IV.3) Justification of the Applied Research Methodology 
Before introducing the regression equations and variable descriptions, it is pertinent to address 
extant criticism in regards to the underlying assumptions of Richardson’s (2006) model. Critics, 
in particular, emphasize the fact that the model, which captures suboptimal investment as the 
residual of the regression of an investment variable on a group of explanatory variables, assumes 
that - on average - this type of investment is zero (because the mean of all residuals is per definition 
0). While this implicit assumption certainly has to be kept in mind when evaluating the results, it 
is important to note that it is inherent to the applied methodology. Linear regression, by design, 
estimates a line that equates the sum of squares of residual values above the lines with those below. 
Whenever it is used to explore the relationship between variables, any variation in a dependent 
variable not explained by the predictor variables is assumed to be 0 on average. The critique is 
thus somewhat extendible to all research methodologies that apply OLS, and consequently also to 
all those assessing a “simple” relationship between free cash flow and investment. The issue thus 
becomes more one of the qualities of the linear expectant model, as its ability to mirror the 
relationship between the dependent variable and its predictors directly influences the residual 
values.  
46 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
Researchers have previously argued that some of the variables used in Richardson’s model to 
estimate the expected investment are questionable. Previous period investment has been 
particularly criticized as a non-suitable predictor for current year investment; especially if the 
investment in the previous period was suboptimal (Bergstresser, 2006). This argument certainly 
does have merit, as the quality of the underlying model in regards to its ability to predict expected 
investment directly affects the measurement of unexpected investment. In that regard, it is 
important to note that the determinants of expected investment applied by Richardson have been 
widely acknowledged in literature (see e.g. Levine & Zervos, 1996; Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1994; 
Meyers, 1977; Lamont, 2000; and Bates, 2005) and that previous investment is specifically added 
to capture any firm characteristic that were not modeled but affect investment (Richardson, 2006).    
It has also been implied that the approach is unable to establish which violation of the 
Modigliani and Millar assumptions (i.e. that of managerial opportunism (agency conflicts) or 
information asymmetries; materialized in capital constraints) is more important in explaining 
excess investment (Bergstresser, 2006).  To this point, it must be emphasized that information 
asymmetries are also underlying agency conflicts and that Richardson’s methodology estimates 
expected investments with a model that captures firm growth opportunities, as well as measures 
of financing constraints, thereby implicitly accounting for the aforementioned capital constraints. 
Thus, allowing for an evaluation of overinvestment from an agency perspective. Furthermore, 
previous research has shown that cash flow sensitivity of investment is present in firms with or 
without capital restraints (Zingales, 2000).  
In summary it can be stated that there certainly are several underlying assumptions that have 
to be considered when interpreting the statistical results of this analysis. Nevertheless, the fact that 
this methodology specifically measures unexpected (over-) investment and its determinants, thus 
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allowing a better test of agency theory, seems to outweigh the aforementioned shortfalls; 
particularly for the research questions this study seeks to address.  
The following section describes the regression equations and variables considered for the 
empirical analysis. A full listing with corresponding sources is included in Appendix B. The 
variable abbreviations as used in the statistical regressions are given in parenthesis.  
 
IV.4) Regression Equations & Variables Considered 
 
IV.4.1) Stage One – Estimation of Expected New Investment 
The determinants of firm investment have been extensively analyzed in the literature (see e.g. 
Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1994; Hubbard, 1998; Xiao, 2009; Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005). These studies 
have identified several variables that should influence the investment decision of companies. They 
include in particular growth opportunities, leverage, and stock market valuation. Richardson’s 
(2006) expectant investment model builds on those. Empirically, growth opportunities and stock 
market valuation have largely been found to be positively related to investment while leverage has 
previously been linked negatively to firm investment. Stock markets can foster investment because 
of reduced transaction costs and capital constraints (Levine & Zervos, 1996). Increasing stock 
market valuation can consequently increase the resources of firms available for investment. 
Similarly, the existence of good investment projects – i.e. those which promise to increase firm 
value – can prompt investment decisions (Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1994). High leverage and 
correspondingly high levels of debt, on the other hand, can curb investment as firms may not be 
able to raise additional funds for investment projects (Meyers, 1977).  The model also has several 
control variables previously determined by literature (e.g.  Hubbard, 1998; Bates, 2005; and 
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Lamont, 2000); to include cash holdings, previous period investment, firm size, and firm age. 
Large amounts of accessible cash enable companies to invest in (in positive net present value) 
projects as they become available without being dependent on the market’s ability (or willingness) 
to provide funding sources. Furthermore, previous period investment can determine future 
investments as projects might require subsequent investments as well as maintenance investments 
to remain viable. Firm size can also be related to investment as larger firms generally have more 
assets available for investment in projects with marginal value. Finally, firm age should be related 
to investment. The business life cycle theory (originated by Chandler,1962) suggests that younger 
firms in their early stages require large investments to move while older firms (or rather firms at a 
larger stage in “life”) would invest less.  
Richardson’s (2006) model to estimate the expected investment is subsequently applied for 
this part of this study; the resulting regression equation is included below. The fitted value from 
this regression is the expected investment, the residual is unexpected investment. This abnormal 
component can be positive (overinvestment) or negative (underinvestment).  
 
Regression Equation 1: 
Investment (New) t = c + α1 Growth Opportunities t-1 + α2 Leverage t-1 + α3 Stock Return t-1 +           
α4 Cash t-1 + α5 Investment (New) t-1 + α6Size t-1 + α7Age t-1 + α8Industry Indicator +                    
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Description of Variables: 
Dependent Variable: 
Investment (New):  The dependent variable of the first regression is new investment (INV NEW). 
As previously described, this variable is intended to capture only the investments in new projects, 
not investment to maintain existing assets. Maintenance investments are therefore subtracted from 
the firm’s total investments (Richardson, 2006):     
 Investments (New) = Total Investments – Maintenance Investments 
Total investments (INV TOTAL) are approximated by capital expenditures (CAPEX), acquisitions 
(ACQ), research and development (RD) and sale of plant, property, and equipment (SALEPPE) 
according to the equation below:  
Total Investmentst = [Capital Expenditures (CAPEX)t + Acquisitionst + Research & 
Developmentt – Sale of Plant, Property, and Equipmentt]  
Research and development expenses are added because they are generally considered 
discretionary investment spending, but are not included in CAPEX. Similarly, money spent on 
acquisitions is also not part of the reported capital expenditures but does constitute firm 
investment. Finally, any assets sold for the period, will reduce investment and are therefore 
subtracted out (Richardson, 2006).  
Maintenance investments are approximated by Depreciation & Amortization (DEP). 
Investments (new) for period t are therefore calculated as: 
Investments (New)t = [Capital Expenditures (CAPEX)t + Acquisitionst + Research & 
Developmentt – Sale of Plant, Property, and Equipmentt]  – Depreciation & Amortizationt  
The resulting value for new investments for period t is scaled by average assets of period t.  
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Independent Variables: 
Growth Opportunities: Literature has previously used several variables to approximate a firm’s 
growth opportunities (GROWTH); typically incorporating a market price in relation to some 
axiom (book) value. One frequently used variable is the price to earnings ratio (P/E ratio), where 
a high ratio represents high growth opportunities (see e.g. Alonso, Iturriaga, & Rodriguez Sanz, 
2005). The ratio captures the market’s assessment of the firm’s ability to generate positive cash 
flows from current investments in the future, and thus its future growth opportunities. Previous 
literature has however cautioned against approximating firm growth via the P/E ratio because the 
ratio can also be driven up by low expected returns (Ang & Zhang, 2011). Several previous studies 
have found that in periods of high P/E ratios, discount rates were low (Claus & Thomas, 2001).    
Another frequently used measure of growth opportunities is Tobin’s Q, which relates the 
market value of the firm to the replacement value of its assets (see e.g. Jose, Nichols, & Stevens, 
1986; Lang & Stulz, 1994, and Berger & Ofek, 1995). The underlying explanation is thereby that 
the quality of investment in regards to the firm’s ability to generate future profits is assessed via 
the firm’s market valuation. This approach, even though frequently used, has not been without 
criticism either. In particular, it has been argued that it is based on the assumptions of perfect 
competitions, constant returns to scale, and the ability to measure a firm’s maximized value by its 
stock market valuation. This means that when those conditions are not satisfied (e.g. with the 
existence of stock market “bubbles” or any other factors driving the market value of the firm from 
that of the present value of future cash flows), Tobin’s Q cannot capture all relevant information 
about the future profitability of firm investment (Bond, Klemm, Newton-Smith, Syed, & Vlieghe, 
2004). Furthermore, Richardson (2006) argues that Tobin’s Q is not fully reflective of the market’s 
expectations of growth opportunities. This is because when applying the residual income valuation 
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models, earnings have to be either completely transitory (book to market valuation) or completely 
permanent (earning to price valuation). Earnings, however, do display a degree of mean reversion 
(i.e. eventually move back to a mean average).  
Consequently, for the purpose of this study, the growth opportunities are captured as the ratio 
of the value of the firm to the market value of the equity (i.e. stock price); following Richardson’s 
(2006) approach.  The firm value is thereby calculated from the book value of common equity, 
earnings, dividends, and a discount rate (cost of capital), via a persistence parameter obtained from 
auto-regressing abnormal returns. Assuming risk neutrality, homogeneous beliefs, and non-
stochastic interest rates, a firm’s market price can be estimated as the present value of the future 
expected dividends. Because the firm’s (current) financial data influences the estimation of any 
anticipated payouts to the shareholders, it can be inferred that firm market price is directly driven 
by the firm’s financial, or rather accounting data. Consequently, firm value can be captured as the 
current (accounting) value of the shareholder’s equity plus the present value of any future residual 
profits, i.e. profits in excess of the cost of capital (or abnormal returns) (Ohlson, 1995). Because 
of the aforementioned dependence of the future expected profit estimation on current accounting 
information, it can be argued that the residual profits follow an autoregressive process where 
abnormal earnings of period t are dependent on those of period t-1 (Ohlson, 1995). 
Applying the aforementioned assessment of firm value (absent any growth opportunities, as 
represented by current financial information), the firm’s growth opportunities can be estimated as 
the ratio of the firm’s value (of assets in place, Vfirm   ) to its market value (Richardson, 2006)4. By 
applying the above described approach, the growth opportunities are captured as the current value 
of the firm’s ability to make future investments and are measured by incorporating the market 
                                                 
4 Following Richardson (2006), the ratio of firm value of assets in place to firm market value was used instead of the difference to allow 
meaningful measurement even in instances where book values are negative.  
52 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
price, the value of assets in place, and current earnings. The calculation of the growth opportunities 
(GROWTH) is described below, with a lower value of GROWTH signifying larger growth 
opportunities. Consequently, the relationship between GROWTH and new investment is expected 
to be negative.  
 
 Growth Opportunities = Vfirm / Stock Price,  
where the value of the firm (Vfirm ) is estimated as follows:  
Vfirm  = (1-α)BV+ α((1+r) X) – αrd, where BV is the book value of common equity, X is the 
earnings (operating income after depreciation), r is the discount rate (or risk free rate), d is 
dividends, and α = (ω/(1+r-ω)) with ω being a fixed persistence parameter restricted to be positive 
and less than one.  
Consistent with Richardson (2006), the auto-regression with a persistence parameter (ω) 
follows Ohlson (1995) and is estimated from the book value of equity, earnings (approximated by 
operating income after depreciation), and annual dividends. Since Richardson’s analysis pertained 
to U.S. firms, his estimates for the persistence parameter (ω) and the risk-free rate r are not applied 
to the firm value calculation in this research. This is because risk-free rates are country specific 
(see Damodaran, 2018) and (to a degree) time period specific. Moreover, Richardson draws on the 
previous work of Ohlson (1995) for the persistence parameter estimate (ω) of abnormal returns. 
They are however also based on U.S. firms.  
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Risk Free Rate Calculation: 
Risk-free rates for developed markets are often assumed to be those of their government bonds 
with a longer term (typically 10 years), such as the U.S. Treasury rates for example. This measure 
is however based on the assumption that governments do not default (because they can “simply” 
print their currency). This supposition is questionable, particularly in an emerging market context, 
because a surge in domestic currency in the market will inevitably lead to its devaluation. Countries 
might, therefore, choose to default instead (Damodaran, 2018). Over the course of seven years 
(between 1996 and 2012) 58 country defaults (31 thereof in local currency) have been recorded.   
 Because of the aforementioned default risk inherent in local government bonds another 
approach often used is to “back out” the default risk of the bond yields. One frequently applied 
way to estimate that risk, is to either observe the Credit Default Swaps of the particular country or 
to use a percentage based on the sovereign credit rating (Damodaran, 2018). In both cases however 
– as Damodaran (2018) points out – the spread calculations are dollar based, which can lead to 
incorrect results when applying them to bonds in the respective domestic currencies.  
 Consequently, for this analysis Damodaran’s build up approach will be used to estimate 
the risk-free rate r. It makes use of the inflation differentials between countries and scales up the 
U.S risk-free rate by the inflation differentials between the U.S. and the respective country 
(Damodaran, 2017b; Damodaran, 2017a) via the following equation: 
Risk Free Rate (country) = (1+Risk Free Rate US) * 
(1+𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)
(1+𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑈𝑆)
 -1,  
where Risk Free Rate (Country) is the risk-free rate of the particular country in local currency (in time 
period t), Expected Inflation country is the inflation measured via the change in consumer price index 
for the respective emerging market (in time period t), and Expected Inflation US, is the inflation 
measured via the change in the consumer price index for the U.S. (in time period t).  
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 Persistence Parameter Estimation: 
 As mentioned in the previous section, Richardson’s (2006) approach applies a persistence 
parameter of abnormal returns previously calculated by Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan (1999), 
appropriate for evaluating a sample of U.S. firms. For the purpose of this study the persistence 
parameter was recalculated to be consistent with the sample of emerging market firms. Following 
Ohlson’s (1995) model – and assuming that other information manifests itself solely in financial 
statement information – the persistence parameter (ω) was estimated via autoregression as follows:  
xat+1 = α + ω xat + ε t+1, where 
xat = xt – r(Yt-1), with xt as the total profits of the firm at time t, r as the risk-free interest 
rate, and Yt-1 as the shareholders equity at the beginning of the period (i.e., time t-1). The parameter 
was estimated at .3056, with a p-value of 0.00 confirming significance at the 1% level. The 
corresponding regression is included in Appendix C.  
 
Leverage: As previously mentioned, debt and investment have been found to be inversely related 
(Meyers, 1977). High debt levels manifest themselves in high leverage. For this study leverage 
(LEV) is included as the book value of short term and long-term debt rescaled by the book value 
of total debt and total equity (Richardson, 2006). The coefficient of the variable is expected to be 
negative.  
 
Stock Returns: Stock returns (STOCK) are included as a proxy for the change in the market 
valuation of the firm. They are calculated as the annual change in value of the firm’s stock for the 
period preceding the period of analysis. As higher market valuation signifies the market’s 
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confidence in the firm to produce future earnings from investment, the relationship to new 
investment is expected to be positive (Richardson, 2006).     
 
Investment (New) of the previous period: This variable is the prior firm level investment for period 
t-1 (INVNEWt-1). It is captured as the Investment (New) variable of the period t-1. This is included 
to account for maintenance investment in Research & Development or investment to maintain 
assets that does not follow the reported depreciation schedule. Assuming that these investments 
are somewhat consistent over time, their effect can be included in the model in this manner 
(Richardson, 2006). The variable is expected to have a positive coefficient, as previous period 
investments should (to a degree) require investment expenditures in the following period.  
 
Other Control Variables: 
Richardson’s (2006) model also includes cash (CASH), firm size (ASSETS), and firm age 
(AGE) as control variables. Cash is measured as the cash balance plus short-term investments 
divided by the total assets (all measured in period t-1). The measurement is similar to other studies 
(Arslan, Florackis, & Ozkan, 2006). The coefficient of the variable is expected to have a positive 
sign, as additional available funds will likely trigger (more) investment. Age is captured as the 
natural log of the number of years since incorporation. The relationship of this variable to 
investment is anticipated to be negative. This is because old companies, at a later stage in their 
lifecycle often have less opportunity for profitable investment projects. Finally, firm size is 
captured as the natural log of the firm’s total assets; measured at the beginning of the period. The 
variable is expected to have a positive coefficient, as companies of larger size with more available 
assets, should be investing more.  
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In addition, both an industry indicator (INDUSTRY) and year indicator (YEAR) are included, 
accounting for any industry-specific or time related occurrences. 
 
IV.4.2) Stage 2 – Assessment of the Free Cash Flow Overinvestment Relationship 
This stage of Richardson’s model is intended to determine whether there is a relationship 
between overinvestment and free cash flow. Overinvestment is captured as the residual from the 
regression in stage one. The model applied allows the relationship between free cash flow and 
overinvestment to be asymmetric (i.e. it allows a change in the fitted value line for free cash flow 
values above and below zero). This type of approach was chosen by Richardson (2006) to identify 
whether overinvestment is more prevalent in firms with (positive) free cash flow. A significant 
difference between the two slope coefficients combined with a larger coefficient of positive free 
cash flow would provide support for the free cash flow hypothesis (Richardson, 2006). The 
corresponding regression equation is included below. Stage 1 and Stage 2 combined will, 
therefore, be used to test hypothesis 1). 
 
Regression Equation 2: 
a) Unexpected investment = α + δ1 FCF < 0 + δ2 FCF > 0 + ε,  
where FCF (free cash flow) > 0 are values of free cash flow greater than zero and FCF <0 are 
values of free cash flow less than 0; or zero otherwise. The variable FCF<0 is expected to have a 
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Dependent Variable: 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV): Unexpected Investment is captured as the residuals of the 
regression ran in stage 1 to estimate the expected investment.  It is the difference between the 
estimated (fitted) value and the observed value for the respective period t. Positive values of the 
unexpected investment are overinvestment, negative values are underinvestment.  
 
Independent Variable:  
Free Cash Flow: For the purpose of this study free cash flow (FCF) is viewed as the cash flow that 
is available after maintaining assets in place, servicing debt, and financing value generating 
investment projects (Richardson, 2006). The free cash flow variable is approximated by adjusting 
the cash flow from assets in place by the expected new investment (i.e. the fitted value from 
regression 1). Cash flow generated from assets in place is calculated by adjusting the operating 
cash flow (taken from the cash flow statement) by any research and development (R&D) 
expenditures (added) and maintenance investments (approximated by depreciation and 
amortization and subtracted). R&D expenses are added because firms have to expense them. They 
are thus deducted out of cash flow from operations. Maintenance investments are subtracted 
because they do not represent voluntary spending (Richardson, 2006). This is expressed in the 
equation below: 
Free Cash Flow = Cash flow from Operations – Maintenance Investments + R&D 
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IV.4.3) Stage 3 – Determinants of Free Cash Flow Overinvestment 
 
The final stage of the model is intended to determine factors that can potentially moderate the 
free cash flow overinvestment relationship; particularly accounting for factors in the institutional 
environment. For this part of the analysis Richardson’s regression model (2006) is modified to the 
degree necessary to account for the additional variables identified in the literature. Stage three of 
the analysis will be divided into two phases in order to initially assess which (if any) of the 
identified firm-level variables can influence the overinvestment – free cash flow relationship (see 
Stage 3a). In a subsequent step (see Stage 3b) (additional) institutional variables will be 
considered. This is done to specifically evaluate whether and how certain factors of the institutional 
environment affect the free cash flow overinvestment relationship (and its moderators).  
 
A) Stage 3a – Firm level determinants of Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow 
For this part of the empirical analysis, the positive values of the unexpected investment variable 
(determined in stage 1) are regressed on the free cash flow variable from the previous section and 
certain moderator variables. These variables are rooted in the theoretical literature analysis (see 
section II.3) and are assumed to have a moderating effect on free cash flow overinvestment. The 
corresponding regression equation and variable description are included in the section below. The 
regression model also includes interaction terms between the free cash flow, corporate governance, 
and the concentration variables to capture any potential interaction effects, thereby allowing an 
assessment on how the free cash flow – overinvestment relationship is influenced by it 
(Richardson, 2006; Balli & Sorensen, 2013). The model thus permits a more specific test of how 
certain factors can potentially curb overinvestment of free cash flow resulting from agency 
conflicts. Consequently, this approach is better able to test the hypotheses compared to models that 
59 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
regress an investment variable on individual regressor variables, as this would only establish a 
relationship between (over)investment and the moderator. 
 
Regression Equation 3a: 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV)t = c + α1 FCFt  + α2 Debt (DEBT)t + α3 Corporate Governance 
(CGSCORE) t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCENT) t + α5 (FCF*CGSCORE) +  α6 
(FCF*CONCEN)t + ε 
According to previous literature, the coefficient of free cash flow is expected to be positive, 
as overinvestment should be dependent on (positive) free cash flow. The interaction term for the 
corporate governance variable with FCF is expected to have negative coefficients. This is because 
superior corporate governance provides less opportunity to squander funds for investment to 
achieve private benefits. As previously described, there are two diverging theories on how 
ownership concentration affects overinvestment, the concentration - free cash flow interaction 
term will, therefore, be determined empirically. This equation will be used to test hypotheses 2) 
through 4). The variables are described below. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Unexpected Investment (Pos)(UEINV): The dependent variable is unexpected investment, it is 
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Independent Variables:  
Free Cash Flow:  This variable is the same as the free cash flow (FCF) variable used for the 
regression in stage two (for calculation see above).  
 
Debt (DEBT): Extant studies have used several variables to assess the influence of debt on free 
cash flow overinvestment. Previous proxies include short-term debt and leverage (Cai, 2013), as 
well as commercial debt and bank loans (Yuan & Dai, 2016) and long term debt (Fernandez, 2011). 
While Jensen’s theoretical argument of debt as a way to curb opportunistic management behavior 
was based on the idea of debt without retention, empirical research has since suggested that other 
forms of debt (e.g. bank loans or long-term debt) can also reduce firm overinvestment (Degryse & 
de Jong, 2006). For the purpose of this study, debt will be approximated by the natural logarithm 
of short and long-term debt, to assess its effect regardless of type and term. Consistent with Jensen 
(1986) the coefficient of debt is expected to be negative.  
 
Ownership concentration (CONCEN): Existing research on ownership concentration in emerging 
market firms has measured concentration as the number of shares held by the largest owners in 
relation to the total numbers of shares outstanding (see Wei & Zhang, 2008; Taghavi, Khodaei 
Valahzaghard, & Amirjahadi, 2014; Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan, 2011). Correspondingly, for this 
study, concentration is measured by the percentage of closely held shares relative to total shares 
outstanding. Closely held shares are thereby classified as shares held by insiders; individuals, 
government, crossholdings or corporations. Consistent with the earlier theoretical explanation, the 
relationship to overinvestment will be empirically determined.  
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Corporate Governance (CGSCORE):  Previous studies have applied a firm level corporate 
governance index derived from the survey by Credit Lyonnaise (Francis, Hasan, Song, & 
Waisman, 2013). Unfortunately, this limits the years for the study as the data is only available for 
certain years (2000, 2003). Other research has used corporate governance index data from 
RiskMetrics (now ISS) (Billett, Garfinkel, & Jiang, 2011); the data is however concentrated on US 
and other developed markets.  As previously argued, corporate governance should be measured on 
several dimensions as opposed to only being approximated by a select few variables. This can 
capture information about interactions between corporate governance mechanisms (Schnyder, 
2012). For this study, the Asset4 environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESC) dataset 
is used. The data is based on 600 datapoints per company and year. They form the basis for 287 
performance indicators, which are categorized into 18 sub-categories. They, in turn, form the basis 
for the overall scores along the four pillars economic, environmental, social, and corporate 
governance performance (see Appendix D). To approximate the quality of corporate governance 
the score on pillar 4 (corporate governance) is used. It is the composite score of the subcategory 
scores for board structure and compensation policy, as well as board functions and shareholders 
rights and therefore able to capture the quality of corporate governance over multiple aspects. The 
score is between 0 and 1 with a higher score indicating a higher level of corporate governance 
quality. It is important to note that the collection of the data started in 2002, with an annually 
increasing number of emerging market firms included in the dataset. Some of the categories were 
however dropped in starting in 2016. While the latter does not have any effect on this research, the 
former does impose a data availability restriction.  
Since good corporate governance is expected to reduce agency conflicts between agents and 
principals the coefficient of the variable is expected to be negative.   
62 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
B) Stage 3b – Institutional Environment determinants of Free Cash Flow Overinvestment 
This stage of the analysis is intended to assess whether and to what extent the institutional 
environment has an effect on free cash flow overinvestment. Institutional environment is thereby 
captured along three dimensions: government effectiveness, government intervention, and market 
development. The effect of each dimension is assessed separately via regression (see below), 
following an approach previously applied by Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman (2013). This is to 
specifically capture its influence on free cash flow overinvestment and its moderators. The 
regression equations and variable descriptions are included in the following section.  
 
Regression Equation 3b.1) – Government Effectiveness 
Overinvestment (UEINV(pos))t = c + α1 Free Cash Flow (FCF)t + α2 Debt (DEBT)t + α3 Corporate 
Governance (CGSCORE)t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCEN)t + α5 Government 
Effectiveness (GOVEFF)t + α6 (FCF * GOVEFF) t + α7  (FCF * GOVEFF * CGSCORE) t + α7  
(FCF * GOVEFF * CONCEN) t + ε 
 
Regression Equation 3b.2) – Government Intervention 
Overinvestment (UEINV(pos))t = c + α1 Free Cash Flow (FCF)t + α2 Debt (DEBT)t + α3 Corporate 
Governance (CGSCORE)t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCEN)t + α5 Government 
Intervention (GOVINT)t + α6 (FCF * GOVINT) t + α7  (FCF * GOVINT * CGSCORE) t + α7  (FCF 
* GOVINT * CONCEN) t + ε 
 
Regression Equation 3b.3) – Market Development 
Overinvestment (UEINV(pos))t = c + α1 Free Cash Flow (FCF) t + α2 Debt (DEBT)t + α3 Corporate 
Governance (CGSCORE)t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCEN)t + α5 Market Development 
(MKTDEV)t + α6 (FCF * MKTDEV) t + α7  (FCF * MKTDEV * CGSCORE) t + α7  (FCF * 
MKTDEV * CONCEN) t + ε 
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The regression equations presented above, expand the firm-level regression analysis to 
account for the institutional environment dimensions. In addition to the firm-level variables an 
institutional environment variable and its interaction with free cash flow are added. This is done 
to specifically capture its effect on the free cash flow overinvestment relationship. Furthermore, 
each equation includes a triple interaction term between free cash flow, corporate governance, and 
the respective institutional environment variable (e.g., government effectiveness).  The intent here 
is to test whether there is an effect of the institutional environment via corporate governance or 
ownership concentration on free cash flow overinvestment (Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman, 
2013). Equations 3b.1) through 3b.3) are used to test hypotheses 5a) through 5c) respectively. For 
each equation the coefficient of FCF is expected to be positive and the one of debt negative.  
The coefficient for government intervention and its interaction term with free cash flow 
term is expected to be negative. This is because less government intervention (as measure by higher 
economic freedom, see below) will provide less opportunity for miss-investment of free cash flow. 
Similarly, the coefficient for government effectiveness and its interaction term with free cash flow 
is expected to be negative, as a more efficient government that establishes property rights and 
controls corruption should leave less opportunity for majority shareholders or managers to 
squander resources. Lastly, the coefficient of market development and its interaction term with 
free cash flow is also expected to be negative as better, more efficient markets leave less room for 
investment miss-management.  
For the triple interaction terms, the direction of the coefficient are not clear and have to be 
empirically determined. This is because the triple interaction allows for offsetting effects. In the 
case of for instance, low government effectiveness in a country and correspondingly expected high 
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free cash flow overinvestment (positive relationship), the interaction with strong firm level 
corporate governance might overall still lower free cash flow overinvestment.   
 
Dependent Variable: 
Positive Unexpected Investment or Overinvestment as described in section 3a) 
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables, FCF, Debt, and Corporate Governance are as described in section 3a.  
 
Institutional Environment Variables:  
Government effectiveness (GOVEFF): Previous research on institutional environment has 
operationalized government effectiveness as a law index assessing the overall development of 
institutions, protection of property rights and trademarks (Li, 2012). The index is part of the NERI 
marketization index for Chinese providences (Fang, annually). Since this study has a research 
population from various geographical regions, this index cannot be utilized. Other analyses have 
approximated the government effectiveness aspect of the institutional environment with data from 
the from World Bank’s Worldwide governance indicator (representing the composite measures of 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) (see e.g. Baik, Cho, Choi, 
& Kang, 2015). This indicator will also be used in this study to approximate government 
effectiveness. The score is representative of the average percentile rank of the respective country 
over all of the dimensions analyzed, thereby assessing the country’s specific ranking in comparison 
to all other emerging markets analyzed. A higher score corresponds to a higher level of government 
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effectiveness. Consequently, the coefficient of the variable is expected to be negative, signifying 
that increased effectiveness leads to less overinvestment.  
Government Intervention (GOVINT): In extant studies this variable has been approximated by an 
index (NERI Index of Marketization of China’s Provinces, published annually by G. Fang), which 
operationalizes marketization along the categories of government control, economic structure, free 
trade, development factor market, legal framework (e.g.  Li, 2012; Goodluck Marco, Li, Chen, & 
Cui, 2014). Another common approximation of government involvement is that of state ownership 
or previous connection of the manager to the government (e.g. former government employee or 
political party member) (Chen, Sun & Tang, 2011; Hao & Lu, 2018). These measures, however, 
are either specific to China and not available for other emerging markets or not the most suitable 
measure for a larger sample of emerging market, whose transition from state ownership and state 
involvement are different from China. For this study, the Economic Freedom Index, published by 
the Economic Heritage Foundation, will be used. Previous literature has also identified this index 
as a suitable measure for formal institutional environment (Garrido, Gomez, Maicas, & Orcos, 
2013). The index scores a country’s government intervention (or lack thereof) on a scale from 0 to 
100 (higher mark means less intervention). The index is based on 12 quantitative and qualitative 
factors, to include business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom, government integrity, judicial effectiveness, government spending, 
tax burden, fiscal health, property rights. The final score is the arithmetic average of the individual 
scores on the twelve factors (The Heritage Foundation, 2018).  The index was chosen because it 
includes similar categories as those used in previous research (see above), but covers all emerging 
markets over the time frame of the analysis. Since a higher score indicates less intervention, the 
relationship between the variable and overinvestment is expected to be negative.  
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Market Development (MKTDEV): Previous research has approximated financial market 
development via a stock market and financial intermediary development market index constructed 
according to Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1996). It is based on market capitalization, value traded, 
turnover, as well as liquid liabilities and domestic credit to private sector (Love, 2003). For Chinese 
markets, a financial market index derived from the NERI marketization index for Chinese 
providences was applied. For the purpose of this study, the financial market development index 
published by the World Bank will be used, because it encompasses the variables of Demirguc-
Kunt & Levine (1996) and is broadly available for emerging markets over the time period of this 
study. Similar to the previous two institutional environment variables, the relationship to 
overinvestment is expected to be negative, signifying that a higher level of market development 
decreases overinvestment.  
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V Empirical Results  
 
V.1) Data and Sample Description  
Data for the individual firm’s financials was obtained from the Compustat and Capital IQ 
database via the Wharton Universities Research Data Services (WRDS). Data on the firm’s stock 
price, market capitalization, and corporate governance was collected from the Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope database.  Data on firm age was gathered from the Bureau van Dijk OSIRIS database; 
missing values were manually calculated for the respective firm years.  Consistent with previous 
research on the topic of firm investment, data from the financial services industries (SIC codes 
6000 to 6999) - where cash flow is hard to measure - were excluded and only firms whose primary 
listing is in the respective foreign country were included. The data for the institutional environment 
was obtained from the Economic Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index and the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator, as well as the World Bank’s Global Financial 
Development dataset.  Data on the risk-free rates (for the growth estimation) was obtained from 
the CIA world factbook. The timeframe of the analysis is 2000 to 2015, to expand the scope 
compared to existing research. A summary of the variables and respective sources is provided in 
Appendix B).  
 
V.2) Determinants of Firm Investment – Regression 1 
The preliminary frequency analysis of the data for stage one showed that variables GROWTH t-1 
(growth opportunities), STOCK t-1 (stock returns), INV NEW t (Investment New), LEV t-1, 
(Leverage t-1) and INV NEWt-1 (Investment New in period t-1), were significantly positively 
skewed and displayed kurtosis. The analysis of outliers, showed significant extreme values in the 
aforementioned variables as well. The variables STOCK t-1, INV NEW t, LEV t-1, and                     
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INV NEW t-1 were therefore trimmed at 0.1%, eliminating values above the .001st and .999th 
percentile. Furthermore, the variable GROWTH was winsorized at 1%, recording the values 
beyond the 1st and 99th percentile to the respective percentile (similar to Richardson, 2006). After 
the transformation the variables showed no strong correlation (above .5) and no multicollinearity, 
but heteroskedasticity was detected. This was confirmed by a p-value of 0.000 of the Breusch & 
Pagan (1979) test statistic B (~ χ2(1)) of the final model; rejecting the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity. The regression estimation for stage one was subsequently based on Huber-White 
robust standard errors. After the transformation 87,935 firm year observations (from 11,748 firms) 
remained in the common sample underlying the final model of Regression 1 (see Appendix E for 
details). 
 
V.2.1) Descriptive Statistics 
The following table displays the descriptive statistics for the investment expenditures of 
emerging market firms.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Investment Expenditures 
 
  
INV TOTAL CAPEX DEP INV NEW 
N Valid 159056 159056 159056 159056 
Mean 0.0822 0.0661 0.0353 0.0432 
Std. Deviation 0.7992 0.7569 0.0697 0.7933 
Percentiles 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
25 0.0142 0.0093 0.0146 -0.0142 
75 0.0898 0.0798 0.0441 0.0446 
99 0.4772 0.3960 0.1432 0.4470 
 
INV TOTAL is the total investment in period t calculated as the sum of Capital Expenditures (CAPEX), 
Acquisition (ACQ), and research &development (R&D) minus any losses from sale of PPE (SALEPPE), 
rescaled by average assets. 
INV NEW is the (total) new investment of period t, calculated as INV TOTAL minus depreciation (DEP) 
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Table 3 shows that emerging market firms spend, on average, 8.22% of their assets on new 
investments (total). This percentage is smaller than the comparable numbers from previous studies 
for the United States (13.1%, reported by Richardson, 2006) and for China (10%, reported by 
Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016). Capital expenditures make up the largest part of the total investment 
(6.6% of the asset base). Research & development and acquisitions are comparatively small. 
Together these investments only amount to 1.6% of the firm’s assets5. In comparison, these 
components of firm investment make up about 7.3% of the firms’ asset base in developed market 
firms.  In regards to the overall composition of total investment, it can be seen that maintenance 
investment constitutes about 42.9% (DEP/TOTAL INV = 0.0353/0.0822) and new investment 
about 57% (INV NEW/ TOTAL INV) of the total expenditures. This breakdown is similar to the 
United States, where maintenance makes up about 44% and new investment about 56% of the total 
investment expenditures (Richardson, 2006).   
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - Investment Expenditures by Industry  
 
INV TOTAL CAPEX DEP INV NEW 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Admin 0.0753 0.0381 0.0233 0.0520 
Agriculture 0.0819 0.0597 0.0250 0.0569 
Construction 0.0586 0.0437 0.0189 0.0396 
Manufacturing 0.1187 0.0636 0.0308 0.0879 
Mining 0.1476 0.0863 0.0387 0.1090 
Retail  0.0957 0.0714 0.0359 0.0598 
Service 0.1652 0.0544 0.0361 0.1291 
Transportation 0.1127 0.0737 0.0462 0.0665 
Wholesale 0.0973 0.0406 0.0259 0.0714 
Variables are defined as in table 3. The table shows the mean of each variable by industry  
                                                 
5 The values sale of PPE (SALE PPE) are sporadic and significantly reduce the common sample size; they were therefore excluded.  
70 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
Table 4 shows that the mean investment undertaken varies among the firms analyzed based 
on their industry categorization. Over all industries the investment expenditures range is from 5.9% 
of the firm’s asset on the lower end to 14.8% on the upper end. The inter-industry differences 
observed appear to be consistent with the type of industry the firm operates in. Industries that 
typically require comparatively larger investments in assets – such as manufacturing, mining, 
service, and transportation – display larger investments in relation to their asset base, while 
industries that require comparatively less investment – such as wholesale, administration, and 
agriculture – show a lower ratio. Except for the service industry, capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
accounts for the largest part of the firm’s total investment, ranging from 3.8% of the firm’ assets 
to 8.6%. Expenditures for acquisitions (ACQ) and research & development (R&D) are 
comparatively less, ranging from 1.5% to 6.1%6. For service industry firms, ACQ and R&D 
expenditures combined make up about 11.1% of the firms’ assets, while CAPEX is comparatively 
smaller, with expenditures (only) about 6.0% of the asset base. Furthermore, it can be seen that the 
ratio of maintenance investment to new investment varies among industries. Service industry firms 
spend about 3.57 times as much on new investment compared to maintenance investments, while 
retail and transportation firms spend only 1.66 and 1.46 times as much respectively. 
Administration, agriculture, and construction firms’ expenditures on new investment are about 
twice as much as expenditures to maintain assets in place.  
In additional analyses (see Appendix F) the composition of the firm’s total investment was 
also analyzed on a country basis. The means of total firm investment over all firms analyzed range 
from 4.6% (Egypt) to 9.4% (Hungary) in relation to the firms’ asset base. In regards to the 
composition of the investment it can be reported that about half of the countries spend, on average, 
                                                 
6 The values for sale of PPE (SALE PPE) are sporadic and significantly reduce the common sample size; they were therefore excluded.  
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more on maintenance as opposed to new investment. Countries with comparatively larger new 
investments are the United Arab Emirates, China, Egypt, India, Poland, Russia, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Taiwan, and South Africa. Particularly noteworthy are Qatar and China, whose 
expenditures on new investment in relation to their asset base are more than double of those on 
maintenance investment.  
 
V.2.2) Estimation Results  
The following section will display and interpret the results from the different estimation models. 
The final regression equation is included in the table before the summary of the results. Detailed 
regression outputs are included in Appendix G.  
 
V.2.2.1) Estimation of Investment New  
Table 6: Investment New Estimation Models 
Regression Equation: 
Investment New (INV NEW) t =  
= c + α1 Growth Opportunities (GROWTH) t-1 + α2 Leverage (LEV)  t-1 + 
 α3 Stock Return (STOCK) t-1  + α4 Cash (CASH)  t-1 + α5 Investment New (INVNEW)  t-1 +  
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Table 5: Regression Results – Models Expected Investment  
 
 
The above table shows the different models analyzed to estimate firm investment. The 
models reported are similar to those previously run by Richardson (2006). They were run for a 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GROWTH  - -1.559 -0.690
(-8.357)*** (-4.436)***
INV NEW(t-1)  +  0.427 0.427
(66.289)*** (62.805)***
STOCK  + 0.008 0.007
(22.92814)*** (19.081)***
LEV  - -0.002 -0.001
(-9.150209)*** (-8.513)***
CASH  + 0.059 0.064
(27.55061)*** (29.426)***
AGE  - -0.005 -0.003
(-6.952792)*** (-4.383)***
SIZE  + 0.001 0.001
(2.453587)** (6.530)***
CONSTANT 0.035 0.011 0.015 -0.003
(83.765)*** (6.927)*** (12.248)*** (-1.145)
INDUSTRY/YEAR 
INDICATOR NO/NO YES/YES NO/NO YES/YES
R-squared 0.01 0.012 0.234 0.2467
t-stats are reported in parenthesis
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level
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pooled data sample with robust (Huber-White) standard errors, correcting for heteroskedasticity 
and any serial correlation (Hayes, 2007). In unreported tests the models were also run with Tobin’s 
Q (calculated as the ratio of market value of the firm to the book value of total assets) and sales 
(approximated by the log of sales revenue) as an estimate for the firm’s growth opportunities, 
however no significant relationship and / or higher R-squared could be detected.  
Model 1 assess the relationship between firm investment (INV NEW) and its growth opportunities 
(GROWTH). The variable displays the expected coefficient, confirming a positive relationship 
between growth opportunities and new investment7. The coefficient can be interpreted as follows: 
a one standard deviation change in growth opportunities (0.0016) leads to additional investment 
in the amount of 1.56*0.0016 = 0.0026 or 0.26% of the firm’s asset base. Alternatively, following 
Richardson’s (2006) interpretation: a change from the first to the third quartile in growth 
opportunities of 0.044545 (first quartile 0.000055 - third quartile 0.0446) leads to additional 
investment in the amount of 1.56*0.044545 = 0.069 or 6.9% of the firm’s asset base. This is about 
double of what was reported by Richardson (2006) for developed market firms. It has to be 
acknowledged that the R-squared of the model is 0.01; allowing for growth opportunities to explain 
about 1% of the variation in new investment. This percentage is smaller compared to what has 
previously been found for US (developed) market firms (5%) and similar to Chinese firms (1%) 
(Richardson, 2006), (Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016).  
Model 2 includes only industry and annual fixed effects. It can be seen that the explanatory 
power of the model only slightly increases; explaining about 1.2% of the variation of new 
investment of the firms. Similar to the previous model, this percentage is comparatively smaller 
for the values found in previous studies, which report an R-squared of about 11% for this model. 
                                                 
7 This is because GROWTH is the ratio of firm value to the market value of the firm, an increase in market value compared to firm 
value signifies additional growth opportunities. For the ratio this means it becomes smaller.  
74 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
It is also important to note that not all of the industry dummies were significant, suggesting that 
the average new investment is not necessarily significantly different over all industry groups for 
the entire time period analyzed.  
Model 3 includes all control variables of new firm investment previously established in 
literature; it does not control for annual and year fixed effects. The R-squared of the model – and 
thus explanatory power – increases to 24.4%. This is about 6% below the results previously found 
for US firms (30%) and similar to the level of Chinese firms (24%). 
The final model, Model 4, includes all variables from Model 3 plus growth opportunities 
as well as industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Similar to previous work, the R-squared of 
the final model increased compared to Model 3. In total, the investment model is able to explain 
24.7% of the overall variation in new investment of emerging market firms.  
Model 4 was subsequently used to generate the fitted values and the residuals for the second 
regression. The fitted values from this regression are the expected investment, the residual is the 
unexpected investment; positive residuals thereby indicate overinvestment, negative residuals 
underinvestment.  
 
V.3) Free Cash Flow Overinvestment (Regression 2) 
V.3.1) The free cash flow overinvestment relationship. 
The following sections include a breakdown of the uses of the analyzed firms’ free cash flow as 
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V.3.1.1) Free Cash Flow uses  
Since a company cannot spend more cash than it generates, its free cash flow (source) has to 
equal its uses of cash. Similarly, any cash shortfalls experienced have to be financed. Following 
Richardson (2006), the uses of cash flow – or how cash shortfalls can be financed - can thus be 
broken down in different categories. They are: 
• Payments to / Receipts from shareholders  
• Payments to / Receipts from debt holders (principal) 
• Increase / Decrease in cash and short-term investments  
• Cash inflow / outflow from a decrease / increase in investments  
• Other changes (exchange rate effects and other investments) 
The following table shows the mean of the free cash flow variable for the total sample analyzed 
Subsequently, the uses of the cash generated and sources used to finance the cash shortfall are 
analyzed; broken down by positive free cash flow and negative free cash flow firm year 
observations.  
Table 6: Free Cash Flow uses (the breakdown and definitions follow Richardson, 2006) 
  FCF total  
  N 87912 
Mean -0.0024 
  Std. Deviation 0.1016 





  FCF >0  FCF < 0  
N 43313 44599 
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  Average Average8 
FCF 0.070 -0.073 
UEINV 0.012 -0.007 
Δ Debt 0.015 -0.021 
Δ Equity 0.009 -0.028 
Δ Financial Assets 0.024 -0.006 
Δ Investments 0.010 0.002 
Δ Other  -0.001 -0.013 
 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) is the difference between the (positive or negative) firm’s cash flow from assets is place 
(CFAIP) and Depreciation & Amortization (DEP) – the variable is scaled by average assets 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV) is the residual from regression 1 
Δ Debt is the net cash returned to/ received from debtholders (calculation: long term debt reduction minus long 
term debt issuance minus changes in current debt, all as reported on the cash flow statement) 
Δ Equity is the net cash returned to /received from the equity holders (calculation: purchase of common and 
preferred stock plus cash dividends minus sale of common and preferred stock, all as reported on the cash flow 
statement) 
 Δ Financial Assets is the increase / decrease in cash (calculation: change in cash & cash equivalents minus Short 
term investments changes, all as reported on the cash flow statement) 
Δ Investments is the increase / decrease in (other) investments (calculation: increase in investments minus sale of 
investments, all as reported on the cash flow statement) 
Other are all remaining items on the cash flow statements, they are captured as the (negative of) exchange rate 
effect, and other investing and financing activities.  
Table 6 shows that the mean value of the free cash flow variable is negative over the entire 
sample. This suggests that the firms analyzed – on average – experience a cash shortfall of about 
.24% of their asset base. A breakdown of the sample into firms with positive vs. negative free cash 
flow illustrates that about 49.3% (43,313/87,912) of the firms have positive free cash flow. Firms 
with available cash roughly return 21% and 13% (0.015/0.070 and 0.009/0.070) thereof to 
debtholders and equity holders respectively. About 34% (0.024/0.070) of it is retained as financial 
assets (cash holdings). This finding appears to be consistent with prior research signifying (free) 
                                                 
8 Average Numbers are for the common sample, i.e. only for the firm year observations that had data available in all of the listed 
categories 
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cash flow retention in emerging market firms (Ramirez & Tadesse, 2009), where available cash is 
kept within the firm not returned to equity holders.  The amount is less compared with the financial 
assets retained by developed market firms (44% of their assets, Richardson, 2006)  
The table further shows that 17% (0.012/0.07) of the free cash flow is used for investments 
that do not produce any marginal value to the firm (overinvestment). This percentage is about 3% 
less compared to what has previously been observed in developed market firms (20%, Richardson, 
2006) and about two thirds (29%, Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016) of what has been reported for Chinese 
firms. Overall, firms, on average, invest about 1.2% of their asset base in projects with no marginal 
value.  
When analyzing the subsample of firms with negative free cash flow, it can be seen that 
about 30% and 38% percent of the cash shortfall is financed by debt and equity holder respectively. 
Furthermore, firms with negative free cash flow experience underinvestment (i.e. forgone projects 
with positive net present value because of lacking funds) of about 0.7% of their asset base.  
 
V.3.2) Regression Results: Free Cash Flow Overinvestment Relationship  
The following table includes the results of regression equation two. For the regression the 
variable free cash flow (FCF) was trimmed at the 0.001st and .999th percentile to minimize the 
effect of outliers. 
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Table 7) Results – Regression Free Cash Flow Overinvestment 
Regression Equation:  
Unexpected investment (UEINV) = α + δ1 FCF < 0 + δ2 FCF > 0 + ε,  
 
Dependent Variable: UEINV  
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 87732 after adjustments 
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
        errors and covariance  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.06E-05 0.000336 0.031536 0.9748 
FCF>0 0.092787 0.005458 17.00018 0.0000 
FCF<0 0.088299 0.005763 15.32288 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.019898   
Adjusted R-squared 0.019876   
F-statistic 890.5484   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000   
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
UEINV is the unexpected investment (Overinvestment). It is the residual from the expected investment 
estimation (Regression 1)  
Free Cash flow (FCF) is the difference between cash flow from Assets in place (CFAIP) and the expected 
investment (i.e. the fitted value from the expected investment estimation, Regression 1)  
CFAIP is the Cash flow from operating activities + Research & development expenses – Depreciation & 
amortization (as the proxy for maintenance investment) (the variable scaled by average assets) 
FCF > 0 is the FCF value for values > 0, and 0 otherwise 
FCF < 0 is the FCF value for values <0, and 0 otherwise 
 
The regression output in table 7 above attests a significant, positive relationship between       
FCF > 0 and unexpected investment (coefficient 0.0928). This relationship is also different (larger) 
than the relationship between FCF < 0 and unexpected investment (coefficient 0.088). This 
proposes that as the free cash flow of the firm increases in relation to its asset base; firms tend to 
overinvest more (similarly it also means that for increasingly negative free cash flow – in 
comparison to the firm’s asset base – firms tend to overinvest less, or expressed differently, 
underinvest more). The R-squared of the regressions is .019, which means that the FCF variable 
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explains about 1.9% of the variation in the investment variable. While this percentage is low, it 
can be viewed in combination with the results from regression 1. The two phases of the analysis 
jointly provide support for the hypothesis that (positive) free cash flow and excess investment are 
related and explain about 25% of the variance in new firm investment  (Richardson, 2006).  
Consequently, the statistical results provide support for Hypothesis 1), suggesting that firms 
with free cash flow (in the sample of emerging market firms analyzed) tend to overinvest.  
 
III.3.3) Robustness Tests 
To test the robustness of the above estimate, two more tests of the relationship between 
overinvestment and free cash flow were performed. For the first test, quintile regression for the 
excess investment variable was run. For the second test rank dummy regression was carried out. 
The techniques and corresponding results are summarized below.  
 
a) Quintile Regression 
Based on Koenker and Basset (1978) the linear relationship between the free cash flow variable 
and 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentile of the excess investment variable (UEINV) was assessed. 
This allows to predict how the respective percentiles are affected by the regression variable, and 
thus can contrast the relationship between large negative values of excess investment (20th 
percentile) and large positive values of excess investment (80th percentile). Slope equality tests 
were performed between the different slope coefficients. All tests showed significant differences 
of slopes. The coefficients for each quintile are summarized below; the detailed outputs are 
included in appendix H).  
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Table 8) Regression Results - Quintile Regression 
 
   The results above exhibit that the relationship between free cash flow and excess 
investment is different for different percentiles of excess investment. For larger negative values of 
excess investment (underinvestment, 20th percentile, coefficient of 0.033) the relationship is 
stronger compared to less negative value of excess investment (underinvestment, 40th percentile, 
coefficient of 0.032). More importantly for larger, positive values of excess investment 
(overinvestment, 80th percentile) the relationship observed is stronger (coefficient of 0.0434) 
compared to smaller positive (coefficient of 0.034) and negative values of excess investment 
(coefficients of 0.032 and 0.033). The results therefore provide further support for the free cash 
flow hypothesis, as they show that larger values of positive (negative) free cash flow relate to more 
positive (more negative) excess investment. 
 
Dependent Variable: UEINV
Percentile Relationship Cofficient 
FCF
20th  + 0.033
(24.413)***
40th  +  0.032
(26.595)***




t -stats are reported in parenthesis 
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level
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b) Rank Dummy Regression 
The effect of free cash flow on overinvestment was also assessed via regression with dummy 
variables. For this test, the free cash flow variable was ranked from largest to smallest and divided 
into five sections (largest, second to largest, etc.). For each section a dummy variable was created 
that was assigned the value of 1 for each value in that particular section and 0 otherwise. The 
regression was then run with the free cash flow variable (calculated as before, but now not 
separated in values above and below zero) and the dummy variables. The results are included 
below.  
Table 9) Regression Results – Rank Dummy Regression  
 
Dependent Variable: UEINV   
Method: Least Squares    
Included observations: 87890 after adjustments  
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
        errors and covariance   
      
      Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
      
      C -9.81E-05 0.000412 -0.238339 0.8116  
FCF  0.038384 0.011326 3.389013 0.0007  
FCF_D1 0.007619 0.001636 4.656288 0.0000  
FCF_D2 0.002250 0.000740 3.038441 0.0024  
FCF_D3 -0.002323 0.000744 -3.124076 0.0018  
FCF_D4 -0.006599 0.001734 -3.806414 0.0001  
      
      R-squared 0.018969    
Adjusted R-squared 0.018913    
F-statistic 339.8568    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000     
      
      UEINV is the unexpected investment (Overinvestment). It is the residual from the expected investment estimation 
(Regression 1)   
Free Cash flow (FCF) is the difference between cash flow from Assets in place (CFAIP) – the expected investment 
(i.e. the fitted value from the expected investment estimation, Regression 1)  
CFAIP is the Cash flow from operating activities + Research & development expenses – Depreciation & 
amortization (as the proxy for maintenance investment) (the variable scaled by average assets) 
FCF_D1 is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for largest 20% of FCF values and 0 otherwise 
FCF_D2 is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for the second largest 20% of FCF values and 0 otherwise 
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FCF_D3 is a dummy variables that assumes the value of 1 for the second smallest 20% of FCF values and 0 
otherwise 
FCF_D4 is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for the smallest 20% of FCF values and 0 otherwise.  
 
The regression results above show that there is a significant positive relationship between 
free cash flow and unexpected investment. The positive coefficient means that free cash flow 
values above 0 correspond with unexpected investment above 0 (overinvestment) and vice versa. 
The significant coefficients for the FCF_D1 and FCF_D2 dummies show that for large, positive 
free cash flow values positive unexpected investment is larger compared to FCF values near zero 
(base group). Correspondingly, the significant coefficients for the FCF_D3 and FCF_D4 dummies 
suggest, that for large, negative free cash flow values negative unexpected investment is 
comparatively smaller (all else equal). Similar to the previous analyses, the regression results 
support the free cash flow hypothesis.  
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V.4) Determinants of Overinvestment (Regression 3) 
Before running the models to assess potential determinants of free cash flow 
overinvestment, the data was analyzed and transformed where necessary.  All variables included 
in the determinant model of unexpected investment (overinvestment) were examined for skewness 
and kurtosis. Except for debt, none of them were significantly skewed. Debt was transformed via 
natural logarithm to reduce skewness to an acceptable level. The covariance matrix displayed only 
low covariance values between the variables included in the model, suggesting that it is not present. 
The Preusch-Pagan test for the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, however, had to be rejected. 
As previously, the models were therefore run with Huber-White resistant standard errors. The final 
sample analyzed included 1455 firm-year observations (1285 and 1063 respectively for the 
government intervention and market development model) over a total of 649 firms. A breakdown 
of the firms by country as well as the outputs of the analyses are included Appendix I). 
 
V.4.1) Descriptive Statistics  
The following table shows the descriptive statics for the variables included in the firm 
level model and the firm and institutional environment level model.  
Table 10) Descriptive Statistics – Determinants of Overinvestment9 
 
  UEINV (pos) FCF CGSCORE CONCEN DEBT GOVEFF GOVINT MKTDEV 
Mean 0.0457 0.0424 0.2402 0.5425 3.8883 0.6350 0.6095 0.4211 
Std. Deviation 0.0501 0.0830 0.2080 0.2281 1.2530 0.1524 0.0823 0.1551 
Maximum   0.3205 0.5288 0.9199 1.0000 7.5297 0.8942 0.7900 0.6884 
Minimum   0.0004 -0.2751 0.0118 0.0000 -1.5850 0.2085 0.4980 0.1166 
                                                 
9 The values displayed are for the common sample, the full descriptive statistics as well as the values for the individual samples are 
included in Appendix I.  
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The table above shows that the mean overinvestment (UEINV) for the subsample of firms 
with positive excess investment is 5%. This suggests that those firms – on average – spend about 
5% of the asset base on investments with no marginal value.  
The corporate governance scores suggest that the emerging market firms analyzed have a 
comparatively low(er) level of corporate governance. The mean corporate governance 
(CGSCORE) score reported is 24.00% (of 100%). Unfortunately, no other studies are identifiable 
which use the same variable (ASSET4 ESG data based scores) over a similar sample, to directly 
compare corporate governance levels. Nevertheless, extant research on corporate governance 
quality in emerging market firms in general shows higher corporate governance ratings. Klapper 
& Love (2004) for instance apply the Credit Lyonnais governance score (measuring over the 
categories transparency, accountability, independence, social awareness) and find a mean score of 
54% (of 100%) for the firms analyzed. Brown and Caylor (2006) present an average corporate 
governance rating for their emerging market firm sample of 22.5 with a range of 13 to 38, 
suggesting a score of about 60%. They use the Institutional Shareholder Service’s (ISS) corporate 
governance data which covers audit bylaws, executive compensation, and ownership.  
The mean value for the ownership concentration variable (CONCEN) of 0.5425 proposes 
that the largest shareholders – on average - hold about 54% of all outstanding shares, and thus the 
controlling majority. This level of ownership concentration is higher than the one previously 
reported for developed market firms (U.S.), where block holders own about 39% of all shares 
(Holderness, 2006a). The value is also consistent with extant research which estimates ownership 
concentration in emerging market firms at about 50% of all outstanding shares (Claessens & 
Burcin Yurtugolu (2013).  
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In regards to institutional environment, it can be inferred that the average level of financial 
development of emerging market firms is well below that of developed markets (U.S. and U.K.) 
The mean market development score for the sample analyzed is 42%, while that for the U.S. and 
U.K. is at 89%10. Similarly, the average scores for government effectiveness are below those of 
developed markets. While the U.S. and U.K. rank in the 94th and 93rd percentile respectively, 
emerging market firms are at the 64th percentile. Average government intervention (as 
approximated by the Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index) ranks at 61% for emerging 
market firms, well below the ratings for the U.S. and U.K., which both are above at 75%. This 
means that government intervention is still comparatively higher in emerging market firms.  
Combined the institutional environment measurements suggest that the emerging market firm 
environment differs substantially from that of the developed market firms.   
 
 V.4.2) Regression results – Determinants of Overinvestment  
The following section will summarize the results of the different estimation models to 
assess the potential determinants of overinvestment. All regressions were run with only main 
effects as well as with main and interaction effects. Models with interaction terms were run 
regularly as well as with centered variables where the mean of the variable is subtracted from each 
observation. This was done to ensure that collinearity does not affect the results of the model. In 
the initial phase, only firm level variables were included. In the subsequent phase, firm level 
variables as well as the respective institutional environment variable were included. The regression 
models are summarized below. For detailed outputs see Appendix J.  
  
                                                 
10 Measured by the World Bank’s Financial Market Development Index 
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Unexpected Investment (Overinvestment) Estimation Models  
Regression Equations Summary: 
Firm Level (Model 3a) 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV)t = c + α1 FCFt  + α2 Debt (DEBT)t + 
α3 Corporate Governance (CGSCORE) t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCEN) t +  
α5 (FCF*CGSCORE)  + α6 (FCF*CONCEN)t + ε 
Only positive values of UEUNVt are included in the analysis 
The regressions are first run without interaction effects 
 
Firm Level and Institutional Environment (Models 3b) 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV)t = c + α1 FCFt + α2 Debt (DEBT)t +  
α3 Corporate Governance (CGSCORE)t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCEN) t +  
α5 Government Effectiveness (GOVEFF)t + α6 (FCF*GOVEFF)t +  
α7 (FCF*GOVEFF*CCGSCORE)t + α8 (FCF*GOVEFF*CONCEN)t + ε 
 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV)t = c + α1 FCFt + α2 Debt (DEBT)t +  
α3 Corporate Governance (CGSCORE)t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCEN) t +  
α5 Government Intervention (GOVINT)t + α6 (FCF*GOVINT)t +  
α7 (FCF*GOVINT*CCGSCORE)t + α8 (FCF*GOVINT*CONCEN)t + ε 
 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV)t = c + α1 FCFt + α2 Debt (DEBT)t +  
α3 Corporate Governance (CGSCORE)t + α4 Ownership Concentration (CONCEN) t +  
α5 Market Development (MKTDEV)t + α6 (FCF*MKTDEV)t + α7 (FCF*MKTDEV*CCGSCORE)t 
+ α8 (FCF*MKTDEV*CONCEN)t + ε 
Only positive values of UEUNVt are included in the analysis 
The regressions are first run without interaction effects 
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Table 11: Firm Level Models (3a) 
Dependent Variable: UEINV(pos)    
     





Model 3a.2   Firm 
Variables with 
Interactions centered 
Model 3a.3  Firm 
Variables with 
Interactions centered 
         
FCF + 0.0843 0.0802 0.0804 
  (3.000)*** (3.227)*** (3.242)*** 
        
CGSCORE - -0.0099 -0.0017 -0.0028 
   (-1.779)** (-0.285) (-0.394) 
         
CONCENTRATION  -/+ 0.0041 0.0163 0.0166 
  (0.642) (2.333)** (2.40)** 
        
DEBT/SIZE  - 0.03487 0.03735 0.03728 
  (3.438)*** (3.644)*** (3.631)*** 
        
AGE  -  -0.0144 -0.0147 -0.0149 
  (-3.253)*** (-3.359)*** (-3.383)*** 
INTERACTION TERMS  
included / 
significant included / significant included / significant 
        
FCF*CGSCORE - NO -0.1483 -0.1471 
    (-2.324)** (-2.303)** 
        
FCF*CONCEN -/+ NO -0.2345 -0.2341 
    (-2.136)** (-2.127)** 
         
CGSCORE*CONCEN -/+ NO NO -0.0087 
       (-0.424) 
     
INTERCEPT  0.0356 0.0344 0.0341 
   (3.308)***  (3.203)***  (3.187)*** 
     
R-squared   0.0238 0.033 0.032 
     
t-scores are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients 
* significant at 10% level     
** significant at 5% level      
*** significant at 1% level     
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The above table shows a summary of the results of each of the firm level estimation models. 
The R-squared for the interaction model is higher (0.033) than the one for the model without the 
interaction terms (0.0238).  
Because of detected multicollinearity between debt (DEBT) and size (SIZE), they were 
transformed into one variable by creating the ratio (Debt/Size) between the two. Furthermore, the 
interaction terms and the free cash flow variable (FCF) showed high levels of multicollinearity, 
they were therefore centered. The VIF factors subsequently reduced to below 2.5.  
In all of the simple firm level models (models 3a) FCF is significantly (1% level) and 
positively related to overinvestment (UEINV(pos)), supporting the agency explanation of free cash 
flow overinvestment11.  
 Additionally, the results propose that corporate governance as a combination of multiple 
measures can negatively affect overinvestment (Model 3a.1). The corporate governance score 
coefficient in model 3a.1 is significant and negative. This suggests that -all else equal - effective 
monitoring mechanisms can restrict overinvestment in emerging market firms.  
Furthermore, when the corporate governance variable is interacted with the free cash flow 
(Model 3a.2), the interaction term is negative and significant. The significance remains when 
controlling for interaction between corporate governance and concentration (Model 3a.3). This 
proposes that the effect12 of free cash flow on excess investment varies for different levels of 
corporate governance. The negative sign thereby signifies that corporate governance negatively 
affects the free cash flow relationship or, put differently, with increasing levels of corporate 
governance firms tend to overinvestment less of their free cash flow. This finding therefore 
                                                 
11 In the second model the coefficient of free cash flow signifies a positive effect when corporate governance and concentration are 0.  
12 Effect in the empirical section of this dissertation is regarded as a statistical effect, not in the sense of a “cause and effect”.  
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supports hypothesis 3) and is consistent with previous findings from Chen, Sun, & Xu ( 2016) and 
Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman (2013).  
The coefficient for the ownership variable in the simple model is positive, however it is 
not significant. All else equal, ownership concentration therefore does not appear to have an effect 
on overinvestment (Model 3.a.1). However, the coefficient for the interaction term of 
concentration and free cash flow is negative and significant in the interaction model. This suggests 
that ownership concentration as a firm characteristic moderates the free cash flow overinvestment 
relationship.  Similar to corporate governance, the negative sign suggests there is a limiting effect: 
With increasing levels of ownership concentration firms tend to overinvestment less of their free 
cash flow. This finding therefore supports hypothesis 4) as it proposes that concentration does 
(negatively) affect the free cash flow overinvestment relationship. This is consistent with the 
explanation that higher ownership concentration increases the ability of the owners to monitor and 
control the managers, thus reducing principle – agent conflicts  (Konecný & Cástek, 2016), 
(Baghdasaryan & La Cour, 2013) (Short, 1994)). 
Finally, contrary to prior research, debt (as the log of long term and short-term debt)13 
appears be positively related to overinvestment14. The coefficient of the variable is positive and 
significant. Consequently hypothesis 2) has to be rejected. The result therefore proposes that 
increasing levels of debt increase overinvestment. This finding is unexpected, it however provides 
some empirical support that developed market mechanisms to mend overinvestment might not 
have the same effect on emerging market firms. Possible explanations might be a lower 
development level of financial markets, a high overall growth (potential) for the firm (Lang, Ofek, 
                                                 
13 In unreported test, the variable was calculated in several ways previously identified is literature (ratio of assets to equity, the ratio 
of short and long term debt to short and long term debt plus equity, ratio of debt to assets, long term debt only), the relationship did 
not change 
14 As debt increases the ratio of debt / size increases. 
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& Stulz, 1996), or higher levels of diversification of the firms (Aivazian, Ge. Qiu, 2005). The 
aforementioned circumstances have previously all been found to foster a positive relationship 
between debt and overinvestment, contrary to the monitoring effect that debt otherwise exerts on 
management (Jensen, 1986). This will further be discussed in the conclusion section (Section VI). 
 
In the second phase of the analysis of the determinants of overinvestment, the model is 
expanded to institutional environment variables (models 3b). Summaries of all models run and 
their interpretation are provided below, the full analysis and outputs are included in Appendix J.  
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Table 12 Regression Results - Firm Level Variables & Government Effectiveness (Models 3b.1) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: UEINV(pos)15      
      
































           
FCF  + 0.0839 0.0783 0.0527 0.0451 
  (2.975)*** (3.6145)*** (2.279)** (2.010)** 
          
CGSCORE - -0.0190 -0.0114 -0.0132 -0.0160 
   (-3.068)*** (-1.700)* (-2.007)** (-1.908)* 
           
CONCENTRATION  -/+ -0.0079 0.000 0.0000 0.0001 
  (-1.117) (0.472) (0.424) (0.017) 
          
DEBT/SIZE  - 0.0344 0.0367 0.0356 0.0368 
  (3.409)*** (3.605)*** (3.588)*** (3.502)*** 
          
AGE  -  -0.0114 -0.0116 -0.0110 -0.0116 
  (-2.510)** (-2.527)* (-2.386)** (-2.364)** 
          
GOVEFF   -  -0.0502 -0.0511 -0.0537 -0.0494 
  (-4.036)*** (-3.628)*** (-3.883)*** (-3.502)*** 
          
                                                 
15 Intercepts are included but not reported 
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Table 12 continued      









           
FCF*CGSCORE - NO -0.1298 -0.0015 -0.1388 
     (-2.045)** (-1.741)* (-1.667)* 
           
FCF*CONCEN - NO -0.0021 -0.0597 -0.0386 
     (-2.049)* (-0.941) (-0.471) 
           
FCF*GOVEFF - NO 0.0615 0.0533 0.0472 
    (0.429) (0.386) (0.329) 
          
FCF*GOVEFF*CGSCORE  NO NO -0.011 -1.481 
      (-1.865)* (-3.009)*** 
          
FCF*GOVEFF*CONCEN   NO NO -0.004 -0.649 
       (-0.957) (-0.964) 
           
GOVEFF*CGSCORE   NO NO NO 0.0965 
         (1.352) 
           
GOVEFF*CONCEN   NO NO NO 0.0397 
         (0.610) 
           
R-squared   0.0347 0.0424 0.0455 0.046 
      
t-scores are reported in parenthesis below 
coefficients      
* significant at 10% level      
** significant at 5% level       
*** significant at 1% level      
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When government effectiveness (GOVEFF) is added to the model, the basic relationships 
and overall significances of the variables included do not change in comparison to the pure firm 
level estimation (see column Model 3b.1.1). As before, FCF and debt (divided by size) are 
significant and positively associated with overinvestment, while corporate governance, size, and 
age are negatively related. Governance effectiveness has a significant negative coefficient 
suggesting that (all else equal) a higher level (quality) of the combined effects of rule of law, 
political stability, regulatory quality, accountability and control of corruption, can negatively 
moderate firm overinvestment. The R-squared (0.035) increases compared to the firm variable 
only model (0.024).  
Interaction effects are subsequently added to the model; initially simple interaction terms 
and then triple interaction terms (models 3.b.1.2 through 3.b.1.4).  
While the simple interaction effect between free cash flow and government effectiveness 
is not significant, the triple interaction effect is significant and negative. The R-squared for the 
models are 0.0424 and 0.0455 respectively (both values are above the model without interaction 
effects 0.0347). The higher R-squared suggests a better fit of the model with interaction terms. 
This can be interpreted as follows: The relationship between overinvestment and free cash flow 
appears to not be different for different levels of government effectiveness (simple interaction). 
However, the interaction of corporate governance with the institutional environment (here 
government effectiveness), negatively moderates the free cash flow – overinvestment relationship. 
This suggests that while an overall better quality of regulatory and legislative environment does 
not directly moderate the free cash flow overinvestment relationship, there appears to be an indirect 
effect via its interaction with corporate governance. The interaction term thereby suggests that they 
are complements, i.e. the effect of corporate governance in moderating the free cash flow 
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overinvestment relationship is larger in countries with stronger legal and regulatory institutional 
environment (and vice versa). Following Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman (2013) the sensitivity 
of the free cash flow overinvestment relationship can be roughly approximated as follows:  
 [+0.0527-0.0015*CGSCORE-0.011*CGSCORE*GOVEFF]  
For the mean value of CGSCORE (0.2668) and GOVEFF (0.6368), this represents an 
average sensitivity of [0.0527 – 0.0015 *0.2668 – 0.011*0.2668*0.6368] = 0.05. This means that 
for firms in an environment with low levels of government effectiveness (0.2019), a one standard 
deviation increase in the corporate governance score (0.235) results in a decrease in the free cash 
flow overinvestment sensitivity of (-0.0015*0.235-0.011*0.235*0.2019) = |-0.00087| or 1.7% (|-
0.00087|/0.05) relative to the aforementioned average sensitivity, all else equal.  For firms acting 
in high level government effectiveness environments, that change is (-0.0015*0.235-
0.011*0.235*0.971) = |-0.0029| or 5.4% (|-0.0029|/0.05), relative to the average sensitivity. 
Corporate governance thus has a higher moderating effect (relative to the average) in environment 
with higher government effectiveness.  
The findings therefore provide support for hypothesis 5a): There is in an indirect effect (via 
interaction with corporate governance) of the institutional environment on the free cash flow 
overinvestment relationship.  
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Table 13) Regression Results - Firm Level Variables & Government Intervention (Models 3b.2) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
UEINV(pos)      
      

















simple & triple 
Interactions 
Centered 




simple & triple 
Interactions 
Centered 
          
FCF  + 0.0550 0.0580 0.0483 0.0451 
  (2.422)** (2.331)** (1.819)* (1.696)* 
         
CGSCORE - -0.0164 -0.0133 -0.0147 -0.0164 
   (-1.887)* (-1.442) (-1.610) (-1.655)* 
          
CONCENTRATION  -/+ 0.0021 0.0001 0.0001 0.0032 
  (0.249) (0.798) (0.805) (0.325) 
         
DEBT/SIZE  - 0.0474 0.0484 0.0486 0.0489 
  (3.798)*** (-3.848)*** (3.848)*** (3.864)*** 
         
AGE  -  -0.0136 -0.0135 -0.0135 -0.0140 
  (-2.181)** (-2.412)** (-2.075)** (-2.180)** 
         
GOVINT  -  -0.0653 -0.0589 -0.060 -0.0514 
  (-2.619)*** (-2.072)** (-2.115)** (-1.834)* 
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Table 13 continued       









          
FCF*CGSCORE - NO -0.0573 0.0092 0.0271 
    (-0.647) (0.087) (0.257) 
         
FCF*CONCEN - NO -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0407 
    (-1.183) (-0.525) (-0.395) 
          
FCF*GOVINT - NO -0.1579 -0.1915 -0.2398 
    (-0.654) (-0.755) (-0.919) 
         
FCF*GOVINT*CGSCORE  NO NO -1.0901 -1.334 
     (-1.049) (-1.164) 
          
FCF*GOVINT*CONCEN   NO NO -0.0120 -1.908 
       (-1.256) (-1.180) 
           
GOVEFF*CGSCORE   NO NO NO 0.0539 
         (0.530) 
           
GOVEFF*CONCEN   NO NO NO 0.1418 
         (1.482) 
         
R-squared   0.0245 0.0229 0.0227 0.022 
      
t-scores are reported in parenthesis      
* significant at 10% level      
** significant at 5% level       
*** significant at 1% level      
97 | P a g e                                                          N . H r u b a n  
 
Similar to government effectiveness, the inclusion of government interaction does not 
change the basic relationships and significances of the variables included in the firm level model. 
FCF and debt (divided by size) are significantly positive related to overinvestment, while corporate 
governance, size, and age are negatively related. Government intervention has a significant 
negative coefficient, suggesting that the combined effects of higher level (quality) of property 
rights, government integrity, judicial effectiveness, fiscal health, business freedom, labor freedom, 
monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom (i.e. less 
intervention), can negatively moderate firm overinvestment (all else equal). Similarly, a lower 
level thereof is positively related to overinvestment. The R-squared of the model (0.025) only 
slightly increases compared to the firm level model (0.024). As before, two different sets of 
interaction effects are added to the model subsequently: a simple interaction term between the free 
cash flow variable and government effectiveness (3.b.2.2) and a triple interaction effect between 
free cash flow, government intervention, and corporate governance and concentration (3.b.2.3 and 
3.b.2.4). Neither the simple nor the triple interaction effects are significant however. This suggests 
that while government intervention is a fundamental factor related to overinvestment, there is no 
effect via free cash flow. Hypothesis 5b) suggesting there is a moderating effect of government 
intervention on the free cash flow overinvestment relationship can therefore not be confirmed.  
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Table 14) Regression Results - Firm Level Variables & Market Development (Models 3b.3) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: UEINV(pos)     
      

















simple & triple 
Interactions 
Centered 




simple & triple 
Interactions 
Centered 
          
FCF  + 0.1001 0.0690 0.0779 0.0782 
  (3.049)*** (3.088)*** (3.137)*** (3.132)*** 
         
CGSCORE - -0.0081 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0016 
   (-1.093) (-0.218) (-0.195) (-0.146) 
          
CONCENTRATION  -/+ 0.0085 0.0002 0.0208 0.0196 
  (1.194) (2.833)** (2.443) (2.182)** 
         
DEBT/SIZE  - 0.0433 0.0441 0.0423 0.0425 
  (3.605)*** (3.763)*** (3.527)*** (3.357)*** 
         
AGE  -  -0.0184 -0.0170 -0.0170 -0.0170 
  (-3.640)** (-3.464)*** (-3.206)*** (-3.199)*** 
         
MKTDEV  -  -0.0062 -0.0119 -0.0118 -0.0103 
  (-0.917) (-1.681)* (-1.310) (-0.920) 
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Table 14 continued      









         
FCF*CGSCORE - NO -0.1416 -0.0970 -0.0992 
    (-1.485) (-0.805) (0.809) 
          
FCF*CONCEN - NO -0.0026 -0.0198 -0.0192 
    (-2.282)** (-2.254)** (-2.146)** 
         
FCF*MKTDEV - NO 0.1532 0.0236 0.0187 
    (1.0730) (0.201) (0.155) 
         
FCF*MKTDEV*CGSCORE  NO NO -0.4139 -0.3832 
     (-0.809) (-0.681) 
         
FCF*MKTDEV*CONCEN  NO NO -0.0061 -0.0067 
     (-1.733)* (-1.746)* 
         
GOVEFF*CGSCORE   NO NO NO -0.0053 
         (-0.108) 
           
GOVEFF*CONCEN   NO NO NO 0.0171 
         (0.409) 
         
R-squared   0.029 0.039 0.041 0.039 
t-scores are reported in parenthesis      
* significant at 10% level      
** significant at 5% level       
*** significant at 1% level      
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When the market development variable is added to the model, the direction and overall 
significances for free cash flow, debt (ratio of debt / size) and age do not change. Concentration 
remains with a positive but not significant coefficient. Corporate governance is no longer 
significant in the model (compared to the firm level only model). Market development itself is also 
not significant. This suggests that for the sample analyzed there is no attestable relationship 
between the market development level and overinvestment (all else equal). The R-squared of the 
model (0.029) increases compared to the firm level model (0.024). Similarly, the interaction term 
between free cash flow and market development is insignificant. This proposes that the free cash 
flow overinvestment relationship is not different for different levels of market development 
overall. However, the interaction of ownership concentration with the institutional environment 
(here market development), negatively moderates the free cash flow – overinvestment relationship. 
This suggests that while overall better developed financial markets do not directly moderate the 
free cash flow overinvestment, there appears to be an indirect effect via their interaction with 
ownership concentration.  
The sensitivity of the free cash flow overinvestment relationship can be roughly estimated 
as follows (Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman, 2013):  
[+0.0779-0.01983*CONCEN+0.0061*CONCEN*MKTDEV].  
For the mean value of CONCEN (0.5662) and MKTDEV (0.4041), this represents an 
average sensitivity of [0.0779 – 0.01983 *0.5662 + 0.0061*0.5362*0.4040] = 0.068 (all else 
equal). This also means that for firms in an environment with low levels of market development 
(0.1166), a one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration (0.229) results in a change 
in the free cash flow overinvestment sensitivity of (-0.01983*0.229+0.00606*0.229*0.1166) = |-
0.0044| or 6.4% (|-0.0044|/0.068) relative to the aforementioned average sensitivity.  For firms 
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acting in highly developed financial markets (0.854), that change is (-
0.01983*0.229+0.00606*0.229*0.854) = -0.0034 or 4.9% (-0.0034/-0.068). This suggests that the 
effect is higher in low level market development environments and lower in high level market 
development environment. Ownership concentration thus seems to be more effective in lower 
developed markets, and can therefore act as a substitute for institutional weaknesses.  
Hence, the findings provide support for hypothesis 5c): There appears to be an indirect 
moderating effect of market development (via ownership concentration) on free cash flow 
overinvestment.   
 
VI Discussion   
Section V) presented the empirical results of the study. The following part will evaluate and discuss 
the findings in light of the previously provided theoretical background.  
 
VI.1) Overinvestment of Free Cash Flow 
The combined results from regression 1 and regression 2 suggest that overinvestment of free 
cash flow is present in emerging market firms and that overinvestment is most prevalent when free 
cash flow is available. The findings also support the notion that firms tend to overinvestment more 
with increasing levels of free cash flow. Combined, these results appear to be consistent with 
Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis, suggesting that agency conflicts between stakeholders 
of the firm can lead to investment without any marginal value.  
Furthermore, the results confirm previous empirical findings on this topic by Richardon 
(2006) for the U.S. and Chen, Sun & Xu (2016), Cai (2013) and Chunyan & Yuehu (2010) for 
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China. The sample for this study is comprised of firms of all 2516 countries currently included in 
the MSCI emerging market index over a 15-year time frame. Consequently, this analysis extends 
previous research on emerging market firms, and relieves some regional, time, or methodological 
restrictions. It further signifies that agency conflict driven overinvestment is a phenomenon that 
persists over time and regardless of whether the firm is located in an emerging market or developed 
market. As such it has the potential to negatively affect firm performance and value in emerging 
market firms (Jensen, 1986;   Jensen  &  Meckling,  1976;  Titman,  Wei,  &  Xie,  2004;  Fairfield,  
Whisenant,  &  Yohn,  2004;  Richardson,  &  Sloan,  2008).    
The findings are also interesting to consider in light of the magnitude of overinvestment. 
The results of this study suggest that the degree to which firms overinvest appears to be lower in 
the emerging market firms analyzed, compared to their developed market counterparts. This is 
consistent with the results from Chen, Sun & Xu (2016) and suggests that emerging market firms 
– on average - invest about 1.2% of their asset base in excess investments. Their developed market 
counterparts overinvest – on average - about 1.5% of their assets (Richardson, 2006). While the 
comparison certainly has to be considered in light of the period of analysis, it still can be noted 
that overall the magnitude of excess investment appears to be less in developing market firms.  
The results further show that firms with free cash flow – on average – retain 34% thereof 
in the form of cash and short- term investments. While a detailed theoretical debate over the 
reasons for cash holdings is not part of this study, it is important to note that there are two diverging 
explanations provided in literature as to why firms retain cash. One argument is that firms hold 
short term financial assets as a method of reduction of uncertainty stemming from the volatility of 
(future) availability of cash flow (Morris, 1982; Opler, Pinkowitz, & Willamson, 1999; Campello, 
                                                 
16 Saudi Arabia is currently (2018) still a standalone country, however in June of 2018 it was announced that the country would join the MSCI 
emerging market classification in 2019. It was therefore included in the study.  
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2003). Cash is therefore regarded as the means to protect against (future) shocks. On the contrary, 
agency conflict rooted research suggests that cash is held for status and interest protection. 
Retained, available cash is thereby viewed as a particularly suitable vehicle because it is not subject 
to any restrictions or supervisory activity otherwise placed on the funds obtained through the 
capital markets (Jensen, 1986). Empirical research in this regard suggests that corporate cash 
holdings in (Chinese) emerging market firms are more driven by agency conflicts than by 
protection against future uncertainties (Liu, 2008; Wu, Zhan, & Zhang, 2007).  
Regardless of the theoretical explanation, it is important to note that in both cases cash is 
not returned to equity holders but kept within the company. This study suggests that the extent of 
cash stockpiling appears to be comparatively less for emerging market firms. The firms analyzed 
retain less (not more) of the available cash in relation to their assets compared to developed market 
firms (34% vs. 44% observed by Richardson, 2006). This is in line with findings from previous 
studies by e.g. Ramirez & Tadesse (2009), who show that all emerging market firms analyzed – 
except China - have lower mean cash holdings in relation to their firm assets than developed market 
firms in the sample.  
 
VI.2) Determinants of Overinvestment 
The results of the regressions in phase three suggest that there are several variables that can 
affect overinvestment. They will be discussed below. 
 
VI.2.1) Corporate Governance 
The analysis on the firm level showed that corporate governance has a negative effect on 
overinvestment. Furthermore, it also negatively moderates the free cash flow overinvestment 
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relationship. Collectively, the results from the firm level model propose that corporate governance 
can in fact increase investment efficiency in emerging market firms. This finding is interesting for 
several reasons: 
First, it shows that effective corporate governance can moderate free cash flow 
overinvestment, even in firms whose institutional environments are less developed.  
Additionally, it proposes that the combined effects of “traditional” corporate governance 
mechanisms (board function and structure, executive compensation, and shareholder protection), 
known to be effective monitoring and control tools for developed market firms, similarly seem to 
curb overinvestment in emerging market firms. This is an important outcome and confirms 
previous results from Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman, (2013) and Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan, 
(2011). Taken together, the findings provide strong evidence that firms in developing markets can 
improve their investment efficiency and ultimately value when effective systems for aligning 
interests among stakeholders of the firm are in place.  
Furthermore, the results also give empirical support for the moderating effect of corporate 
governance from an agency theory perspective. Since the cross term between corporate governance 
and free cash flow has a negative (significant) coefficient, it can be inferred that free cash flow 
overinvestment is lower for higher levels of corporate governance. This suggests that corporate 
governance is in fact able to moderate the agency conflict driven free cash flow overinvestment. 
Higher levels of corporate governance reduce the ability of managers to use available cash (free 
cash flow) for investment without marginal value, thereby providing support for previous findings 
on moderators of the agency conflict motivated free cash flow overinvestment (Richardson, 2006, 
Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016; Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman, 2013; Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan, 
2011).   
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Finally, the results establish the effectiveness of corporate governance as a construct of 
multiple, interacting mechanisms. Researchers have previously argued that capturing the 
interrelations between the individual mechanisms is important to fully understand the effects of 
corporate governance on firm behavior (Schnyder, 2012). The outcomes of this study provide some 
empirical support in this regard. They show that the combined workings of multiple corporate 
governance measures (board structure and compensation policy, as well as board functions and 
shareholders rights) can moderate the free cash flow overinvestment relationship. The findings 
might therefore also help to explain previously diverging results for the effect of corporate 
governance, particularly for studies that approximated corporate governance via a select few 
numbers of variables (Cai, 2013; Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016).   
 
VI.2.2) Ownership Concentration  
As previously described, literature has provided theoretical and empirical support for a 
positive as well as a negative effect of ownership concentration on free cash flow overinvestment. 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Konecný & Cástek, 2016; Short, 1994).  
The empirical results from this study appear to support the latter. While ownership 
concentration has no effect in the main effects model, the interaction term between concentration 
and free cash flow is significant and negative. This proposes that for higher levels of ownership 
concentration, the free cash flow-overinvestment relationship is negatively moderated, i.e. excess 
investment is less strongly related to free cash flow. The negative moderating effect of ownership 
concentration further suggests that free cash flow overinvestment in emerging market firms might 
primarily be driven by principal – agent conflicts and not principal – principal conflict, as the 
relationship would have to be positive to support the latter.  
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This finding is contrary to results reported by several emerging market researchers, who 
previously attested a positive relationship between ownership and excess investment (see 
Filatotchev, Kapelyushnikov, Dyomina, & Aukutsionek, 2001a). It is however in line with 
research presented by Tayem (2015) who attests a positive relationship between investment 
efficiency and ownership concentration.  
A possible explanation for the divergence of the results might be rooted in the measurement 
of ownership concentration. Previous studies frequently associate ownership concentration with 
large government holdings (He & Kyaw, 2018). Concentration for this study is measured as the 
ratio of closely held shares to total shares outstanding, regardless of the ownership type. 
The outcomes from this study also propose that ownership concentration can have different 
effects on free cash flow-overinvestment in developed versus emerging market firms. In an 
encompassing study over multiple countries (U.S., Canada, Australia, and the majority of 
continental Europe) Gugler, Mueller, & Yurtoglu (2008) show that with higher (insider) ownership 
concentration in firms, the investment performance becomes negative. They separately measure 
entrenchment effect (of owner-managers) and wealth effect17 and find that with rising insider 
ownership the entrenchment effect supersedes the wealth effect in the U.S. and other English 
speaking countries (U.K., Australia).   
 
VI.2.3) Debt  
In the statistical regression models for the firm level only as well as for the combined firm 
and institutional level, debt is always observed to have a significant positive effect on 
overinvestment. This finding is not expected, as debt has previously been theorized and empirically 
                                                 
17 This effect is based on the notion, that managers who hold shares of their company are more prone to act in the “best interest” of the 
company as they identify as shareholders when they strive for wealth maximization. This will align the interests between insiders and outsiders.  
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supported to curb overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; D'Mello & Miranda, 2010; Fernandez, 2011; 
Chen, Sun, & Xu, 2016). From an agency perspective debt – without retention – reduces the free 
cash available to managers (and controlling shareholders) and should thus reduce excess 
investment spending.  
The observed inconsistency with extant research can have several reasons: While previous 
literature has approximated debt via several variables, it is important to note that Jensen (1986) 
specifically theorizes debt without retention – i.e. the introduction of debt into the capital structure 
– as a moderator of free cash flow overinvestment. This implicitly assumes that the firm does not 
retain the funds raised by the debt issuance but instead returns them to shareholders. From this 
perspective it can be argued that the observed effect could be a result of the approximation of the 
variable via the short term and long-term debt in the capital structure. This measure is unable to a) 
distinguish between bonds and other forms of debt and b) does not capture the use of funds 
obtained (i.e. whether they were returned to shareholders).  
Nevertheless, the agency-based argument of debt as a moderator has previously been 
extended to other forms of debt. This is because creditors (or any type of debt capital provider) 
can be assumed to exert some monitoring mechanisms, because of increasing bankruptcy costs 
with rising levels of debt (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, extant studies which approximated debt in a 
similar way have found a negative relationship. The following section will therefore discuss factors 
which can potentially influence the effect of debt on overinvestment.  
Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, Leverage (1996) find that the negative debt – investment relationship 
only exists for low growth firms, i.e. for firms where the market either does not recognize the (true) 
growth potential or where there is none, but not for high growth firms or firms in high growth 
industries. Consequently, for this study, the observed positive relationship between debt and 
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overinvestment could be a result of the (assumed) growth performance of the firms. As previously 
noted, companies headquartered in emerging markets grow about twice as much as their developed 
market counterparts (Atsmon, Kloss, & Smit, 2011). If firms have (or are assumed to have) growth 
potential, or operate in high growth areas, creditors might be prone to provide funds, without 
undertaking an in depth due diligence on whether or not the capital is extended for projects with 
marginal value. This phenomenon might be aggravated by less functioning capital markets and 
inherent information asymmetries that provide weaker opportunities for creditors to carry out a 
full analysis (see section II.3.4.c).      
Another explanation for the positive relationship might be the level of debt. Previous 
research on peripheral European countries (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Slovenia) has found 
that debt reduces investment only above a certain level of leverage. The firms analyzed only 
experienced negative effects on investment when the debt to asset level increased above 80%. 
Below that threshold, the effect of debt on investment was dependent on firm characteristic as well 
as the macroeconomic environment (Gebauer, Setzer, & Westphal, 2017). Consequently, it can be 
theorized that firms with a debt to asset ratio below a certain threshold do not experience a 
dampening effect of debt on (over)investment. The mean of debt to assets in the firm sample 
analyzed is 0.51 or 51%, which is below the threshold identified by Gebauer, Setzer, & Westphal, 
(2017). 
In summary, the findings and explanations suggest that the agency-based explanations of 
the negative effect of debt on overinvestment of free cash flow might not be invariant to the 
specific firm characteristics and the environment it operates in.  
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VI.2.4) Institutional Environment  
A) Government effectiveness 
 The significance of government effectiveness in the simple (main effects) model suggests 
an inverse relationship between the quality of the legal and judicial system and excess investment. 
This indicates that firms operating in an environment which promotes a sound rule of law tend to 
overinvest less. As previously discussed, this could be a result of the increased monitoring and 
controlling abilities of (minority) shareholders via the promotion of property rights and contract 
enforcement. In such an environment stakeholders’ interests are aligned better (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Koh, 2003). The findings are therefore consistent with 
previous findings from Goodluck Marco, Li, Chen, & Cui (2014) which attest a negative 
relationship between overinvestment and regulatory environment for Chinese firms.  
Furthermore, the significant negative interaction of government effectiveness with 
corporate governance in moderating the free cash flow-overinvestment relationship proposes that 
firm characteristics (or behavior) and institutional environment are not independent from one 
another. Firms that operate in a weak institutional environment (here measured as government 
effectiveness) experience a weaker moderating effect of corporate governance on free cash flow-
overinvestment compared to firms operating in a stronger institutional environment. This means 
that the institutional environment complements the firm level corporate governance in its effect on 
free cash flow-overinvestment. When firms operate in an environment that has effective policy 
making and enforcement systems in place, the effect of corporate governance on agency conflict 
based free cash flow-overinvestment is stronger as compared to a weaker policy environment. As 
previously argued, this could be because the better regulations make it easier for (minority) 
shareholders to challenge management decisions and to ensure that boards carry out their functions 
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correctly, but also because managers (majority shareholders) are more likely to face consequences 
if their behavior does not align with value creation (Jensen M., 1993;  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).  
It is important to note that the findings are different compared to those of Francis, Hasan, 
Song, & Waisman  (2013) who attest a substituting effect for internal and external governance 
mechanisms, suggesting firms can benefit from strong corporate governance in weak institutional 
environments.  
 
B) Government Intervention 
The outcomes of the analyses suggest that (all else equal) there appears to be a positive relationship 
between government intervention and excess investment. This indicates that government activities 
to promote certain industries or technologies can lead to excess investment. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies carried out on Chinese firms (Zhang & Yang, 2008; Goodluck 
Marco, Li, Chen, & Cui, 2014). It also shows that a general relationship between excess investment 
and government intervention exists in other emerging markets. For the firm sample analyzed there 
is, however, no evidence of a specific moderating role from an agency perspective (i.e. via the 
interaction with free cash flow and firm characteristics). This could be a result of the sample of the 
firms analyzed and / or measurement of government intervention, but it might also stem from the 
“means” of how government involvement can lead to overinvestment.  
Many of the previous studies look at government intervention in China, which has a planned 
economy with market elements, often referred to as a mixed economy (Chow, 2011). This sample 
is different, as China is only one of 25 countries analyzed. Although it has to be acknowledged 
that government intervention exists in all emerging market firms, the level of intervention might 
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be different. Many of the countries included in this study are qualified as a market or capitalistic 
economy, rather than centralized planning economy18. Additionally, it has previously been found 
that while overall state ownership (as a form of government intervention) has been reduced over 
the last two decades, it remains strong – particularly in utility, transportation, and infrastructure. 
Furthermore, even non-state-owned Chinese firms are still heavily influenced by the government 
(Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005). Moreover, when looking at the economic freedom index (the 
measurement of government involvement for this study), China has an average rating of 52% 
which is below the average reported for the entire sample (57%). The comparatively higher score 
could signal less involvement and therefore no significant effect via interaction with free cash flow 
or other firm characteristics.  
In addition, the measurement itself could have an influence on the result. Extant studies 
frequently measure government ownership via firm state -ownership or connectedness of the 
manager to the government (see e.g. Chen, Sun, & Tang, 2011; Hao, Lu, 2018), while this study 
uses the economic freedom index.  
Finally, the observed result could be due the way government intervention is related to excess 
investment. The results of this study are consistent with Chen, Sun & Tang (2011), Hao & Lu 
(2018), in the sense that there is a main effects relationship between government intervention and 
investment efficiency while similarly attesting a main effect relationship with available cash flow. 
This study has similar findings. It does, however, not show any significant interaction effect with 
cash flow or other firm characteristics. This could be an indication that government interaction 
does not necessarily lead to overinvestment via the use of free cash flow, but rather to 
overinvestment stemming from e.g. government loans or otherwise extended credit. This is be 
                                                 
18 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2116.html 
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consistent with the results from Deng, l., Jiang, P., Li, S., & Liao, M. (2017), who find a strong 
relationship between excess investment and government intervention in Chinese firms via an 
economic stimulus packet during and after the financial crises. Their research also shows that once 
the economic stimulus package (in the form of tax incentives and low interest rate loans) was 
introduced, firms relied less on internal cash flow to finance (excess) investment but rather on bank 
loans. Consequently, it can be argued that the overall availability of external funds to finance 
investment could be a reason as to why there is a main -effects relationship between investment 
and government intervention but not via interaction of determinant variables.  
 
C) Market Development 
 The empirical findings propose that although no direct relationship between market 
development and excess investment can be observed, there appears to be an effect via its 
interaction with ownership concentration. The results suggest that for lower levels of market 
development, the effects of ownership concentration on free cash flow-overinvestment are stronger 
compared to higher development levels. In other words, the ability of concentrated owners to 
monitor manager behavior, has a larger inhibiting effect in less developed market environments. 
These findings are consistent with a substitution effect of ownership concentration. The outcomes 
therefore provide empirical support for the argument made by from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schleifer, & Vishny (1999b) and Steier (2009) that ownership concentration can - to a certain 
extend - replace shortfalls in a firm’s institutional environment. Concentrated owners are better 
able to monitor and control management behavior. This is particular true when the firms are family 
owned or have only one or two large owners who are also involved in management.  In this 
scenario managers are under close supervision and have consequently less opportunities to extract 
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resources for personal benefit. As described in section II.2) Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000 find 
that the aforementioned type of ownership structure is very prevalent in East Asian as well as Latin 
American countries, which could explain the empirical findings. The results further support 
previous findings from Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman (2013) which suggest a substitution 
effect between firm level corporate governance and country level governance (as approximated 
via legal environment and effective implementation of law).      
  
In summary, the results of the combined analysis of the firm and institutional variables as 
well as their interactions suggest that there is in fact a moderating effect of some institutional 
variables on firm behavior. Combined, the findings therefore provide some empirical support that 
agency theory is not invariant to the institutional environment the firm operates in. As such the 
findings provide an empirical basis for the theoretical arguments previously brought forth by 
Zalina & Yusof (2016) and Douma, George, & Kabir (2006), suggesting that agency theory should 
be viewed in light of the institutional context the firms are embedded in to better understand firm 
behavior. This further supports the notion from Bowe, Filatotchev, & Marshall (2010) that the 
integration of institutional theory and agency theory could result in a better understanding of firm 
behavior. The interaction between the specific environment emerging market firms operate and its 
behavior could thus be better captured. Finally, there appears some empirical justification that the 
acknowledged interaction between institutional environment and firm behavior in management 
and strategy (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2007; Peng M. , 2006) should be extended to the firm’s 
financial actions as well.  
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VII Limitations, Contributions & Directions for Future Research  
VII.1) Limitations  
As with any research, the results of this study have to be interpreted with regards to the 
sample analyzed. While the sample size for the free cash flow hypothesis test is (to the best of the 
author’s knowledge) the largest currently extant in literature, the sample size for the determinants 
of overinvestment is not. This is partly rooted in the limited availability of corporate governance 
score data for emerging market firms as well as the methodology, which requires the exclusion of 
negative residuals in the third phase of the analysis. Consequently, in order to be considered in the 
sample, the firm had to simultaneously have a firm year observation where the residual from the 
first regression was positive and a corporate governance score (and ownership concentration 
measure) available.  Accordingly, the results for the final phase of the analysis were derived from 
a much smaller sample. When making inferences about emerging market firms as a whole this has 
to be considered.  
Additionally, the timeframe of this analysis is different from many of the extant studies. 
This has to be kept in mind as time specific effects (such the external shock of the 2008 financial 
crisis) as well as the period of analysis can introduce bias in regards to the comparability of results. 
Most of the existing research on this topic has focused on sample periods in the early 2000s, while 
this study encompasses a timeframe from 2000 to 2015. This study therefore includes a time period 
of external shock (2008) while the ones from the early 2000s do not.  
Some of the observed differences to extant studies can thus, in part, result from the 
difference in the period of analysis. This is particular important when comparing the outcomes 
from this research to those of developed market firms. The largest study for developed markets 
(Richardson, 2006), which was most often used to compare the results from this study against, 
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covers a time period from 1988 to 2002. Since firm behavior and external environment can change 
over time the comparison of results has to be considered in light of the different analysis period. 
Finally, despite the fact that all firms are classified as emerging markets by the MSCI, it 
has to be acknowledged that there are still differences in the development level of the respective 
markets. As section II.3.4 shows there continue to be considerable differences between the 
emerging markets in regards to the development level of their institutional environment. 
Furthermore, the size of the individual markets and consequently number of firms included in the 
sample are not equal, particularly in regards to the determinants of overinvestment (the third phase 
of the analysis). Here South Africa, India, Korea, and Taiwan make up about 52% of the sample. 




This study contributes to the current literature by complementing and expanding extant 
research on free cash flow-overinvestment in emerging market firms. It addresses previous 
limitations by providing an encompassing evaluation of the free cash flow-overinvestment 
relationship for a large sample of emerging market firms; thereby employing a methodology 
developed by Richardson (2006) to particularly evaluate overinvestment of free cash flow as an 
agency problem, as opposed to simply testing for a relationship between cash flow and investment.   
Moreover, in regards to factors potentially influencing overinvestment of free cash flow, 
existing literature is completement in the following ways:  
1) The study applies a consistent approach over all emerging market firms from MSCI 
emerging market countries focused specifically on overinvestment (and factors potentially 
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affecting it). This allows inferences about a larger group of firms and helps to explain and 
evaluate extant – in part – contradicting results.  
2) The research also provides empirical data to evaluate the “call” for an extension of current 
theory. It has previously been argued that agency theory needs to be extended as it cannot 
fully provide an understanding of observed phenomena. This is because firm behavior 
cannot be disconnected from its context, particularly its institutional environment. 
Consequently, institutional theory and agency theory might have to be integrated (Zalina 
& Yusof, 2016; Bowe, Filatotchev, & Marshall, 2010). The study specifically addresses 
this by establishing that there is in fact a moderating effect of institutional environment via 
corporate governance and ownership concentration on free cash flow overinvestment and 
its determinants attestable. The results are therefore (with the mentioned limitations) 
supportive of the argument that agency theory is not invariant to the institutional setting of 
the specific issue investigated.  
At the company level the findings show firm owners (equity holders) that overinvestment 
exists and thus has the potential to affect the firm value and the ability to obtain external financing. 
Through the confirmation (corporate governance and ownership concentration) and rejection 
(debt) of certain moderators of the free cash flow-overinvestment relationship shareholders can 
also gain a better understanding on how to align their interests with those of managers and majority 
shareholders to secure efficient investment allocation. This, to a degree, also justifies often costly 
monitoring activities to reduce overinvestment.  
Finally, from an investor’s perspective, the results help to evaluate investment in emerging 
markets. They show that overinvestment is present in emerging market firms and thus has the 
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potential to affect shareholder value. This can be helpful for the investor’s risk assessment and for 
fund allocation decisions.  
 
VII.3) Directions for Future Research  
This study has revealed that free cash flow-overinvestment is a phenomenon that seems to 
persist over time and across developed and emerging market firms. Furthermore, it showed that 
there are certain moderators of this relationship. Hence, the results provide a useful basis for future 
research. Possible directions of further analysis are outlined below: 
 
A) Increased sample size to assess moderators  
As previously described (see section VII.2), the second part of the analysis, assessing the 
moderators of the free cash flow - excess investment relationship, is based on a comparatively 
smaller sample because of limited data availability. Forthcoming research could therefore extend 
the results presented here when additional composite corporate governance scores and ownership 
concentration measures become available for emerging market firms. The amount of data 
generated for the Asset4 ESG dataset for instance has been steadily increasing since the early 
2000s and currently covers more than 7000 firms, with about 25% located in emerging markets19.   
Furthermore, the classification of a market as emerging followed the MSCI classification. 
This was done in accordance with extant research and to ensure the highest possible level of 
comparability. Nevertheless, there are other, widely accepted, classifications of markets from e.g. 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)20 and the World Bank21, which do not completely mirror 
                                                 
19 https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/gl/en/documents/methodology/esg-scores-methodology.pdf 
20 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/groups.htm 
21 The World Bank does not classify as emerging (or not emerging) but rather by its gross national income per capita. 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114958-what-are-emerging-markets 
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the one from the MSCI. Future research could therefore extend the analysis to other emerging or 
developing markets. In addition, little attention has been paid to other African, Eastern European, 
Asian, and Middle Eastern countries, which have not yet been classified as emerging (titled as 
frontier markets by MSCI for instance22). Several of these countries have experienced continued 
growth over the past decade (Worldbank, 2018). Consequently, research on those markets could 
provide further useful insights on the relationship between free cash flow and overinvestment in a 
different institutional environment setting.   
For this study corporate governance was approximated via a composite score over four 
main pillar categories (board function, board structure, executive compensation, and shareholder 
rights). Other studies have measured corporate governance over slightly different dimensions. It 
would therefore be interesting to see if the results remain the same when different types of 
composite measures are applied. Literature has, for instance, previously used the Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA) Corporate Governance Scores and Standard & Poor’s Transparency 
Ranking (see e.g. Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan, 2011) or the ISS Governance QualityScore to 
approximate firm governance. The former measures governance over seven categories: financial 
discipline, financial transparency, board independence, board accountability, responsibility & 
measures in case of mismanagement, treatment of minority shareholders, and social awareness, 
the latter over four: board structure, compensation/renumeration, shareholder rights & takeover 
defenses, and audit & risk oversight. Despite availability limitations in regards to time and region, 
these measurements are interesting because they assess corporate governance over somewhat 
different or broader categories. This allows for an extended test of how mechanisms can affect free 
                                                 
22 https://www.msci.com/market-classification 
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cash flow overinvestment, but also a further confirmation of the moderating effect of corporate 
governance on excess investment.  
Moreover, this analysis was limited to the formal institutional environment (i.e. 
government effectiveness, government intervention, and market development). Firms however 
also operate in a socio-cultural environment that consists of informal norms. Developing and 
emerging countries have previously been found to differ in their informal environment (Kogut & 
Singh, 1998). Emerging research (Estrin & Prevezer, 2010) suggests that there is an interaction 
between formal and informal institutions and that informal institutions are essential in creating 
firm characteristics, such as effective corporate governance mechanisms. It has therefore been 
argued that informal institutions play a particularly important role in emerging markets, where the 
development level of formal governance is still comparatively low and laws are not well enforced. 
In such an environment they have a special function as either a catalyst or inhibitor of formal 
institutions (Estrin & Prevezer, 2010). Furthermore, as argued in the theoretical section, there is a 
central role of formal institutions in strategy (Peng, 2006). The same argument made previously 
can therefore be extended to the informal firm environment as well. Consequently, there appears 
to be some theoretical support for a direct or indirect effect of the social or cultural environment 
on firm investment efficiency. More research is however necessary to assess the specific informal 
factors as well as the potential paths of influence.   
Finally, the effects of excess investment on firm valuation provide room for additional 
study. While several studies on developed market firms suggest a negative relationship between 
volume of investment (triggered via available free cash flow) and value, as well as investment 
opportunity and value (see e.g. Dechow, Richardson, & Sloan, 2008; Titman, Wei, & Xie, 2004; 
Del Brio, De Miguel, & Pindado, 2003), research on emerging market firms is however still in its 
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initial stages. Results from e.g. Cheung, Stouraitis, & Tan (2011) indicate that there is a general 
relationship between firm investment and firm value via interaction with corporate governance for 
Asian emerging market firms. More examination is however necessary to specifically determine 
the effect of excess investment on firm market valuation in emerging markets.   
In this regard it would also be interesting to compare the valuation effects of developed 
and emerging market firms; particularly because the results of this study propose that emerging 
market firms, compared to developed market firms (Richardson, 2006), tend to overinvest less of 
their free cash flow and consequently their asset base. The question that therefore arises is whether 




This study examined the investment behavior of a group of 25 emerging market firms over 
a period of 15 years. The empirical results indicate a significant relationship between free cash 
flow and excess investment in the sample firms analyzed, thus providing empirical support for 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. The outcomes confirm previous findings for firms in 
developed as well as in select emerging markets and consequently suggest that overinvestment of 
free cash flow is a phenomenon that persists over time and regardless of the firm’s environment.  
The analysis of the moderators of the free cash flow overinvestment relationship revealed 
that corporate governance as well as ownership concentration can be effective ways of reducing 
excess investment. Furthermore, the study specifically included an evaluation of the interaction 
effects of those firm characteristics with free cash flow overinvestment. This allowed for a better 
test of the agency-based explanation of their moderating effects. The attested significant 
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interactions therefore suggest that the two measures are particularly suited to affect free cash flow 
driven overinvestment.  
Contrary to previous studies, debt as a “traditional” way to mend overinvestment could not 
be confirmed. The observed, positive relationship between debt and excess investment, could be a 
result of the firm environment (high growth environment) or of the overall level of debt. The results 
therefore provide some empirical support that some of the “traditional” ways to mend 
overinvestment might not similarly work in emerging market firms. 
Finally, the results also suggest that the institutional environment can influence a firm’s 
free cash flow - overinvestment behavior via its firm characteristics. The findings show that the 
effect of corporate governance on excess investment is lower in weaker legal environments (and 
vice versa) and that concentrated ownership has a stronger negative effect on overinvestment in 
lower developed financial markets as opposed to higher developed markets. Collectively, these 
results propose that a firm’s financial behavior is related to its environment and that agency theory 
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Appendix A)  
List of countries and their respective region - according to the MSCI emerging market index23 - 








                                                 
23 https://www.msci.com/market-classification (accessed June 13th, 2018). Saudi Arabia is included because it was categorized as 
an emerging market at the time of the study and will be included in the index starting 2019 



























Europe, Middle East 
& Africa
Asia
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Appendix B) 
Overview of the regression variables and their respective sources 
 
 
Variables INPUT SOURCE 
Investment New CAPEX, Acquisitions, Research & Development, 
(Gain / Loss from) Sale of Property, Plant, & 
Equiptment, Depreciation & Amortization
Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Growth Opportunities Value of the Firm / Stock Price, where Firm Value 
inputs are Risk Free Rate, Book value of Equity, 
Operating Income, and Dividends
Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope & CIA 
Factbook




Stock Return Change in Stock Value (Year to Year) Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope 
Cash Cash and Short Term Securities Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Firm size Book Value of Total Assets Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Firm age Years since inception Bureau van Dijk 
OSIRIS
Industry Indicator Industry Code (NAICS) Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Change in Debt Long term Debt reduction minus, Long term Debt 




Change in Equity Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, Cash 




Change in Financial 
Assets
Cash & Cash Equivalents, Short term Investment 
Changes (Cash Flow Statement)
Compustat & 
Capital IQ




Other Uses / Sources of 
Cash
Exchange Rate Effect, Other Investing and 
Financing Activities (Cash Flow Statement)
Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Year Indicator Years of Reporting Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Free Cash flow Cash Flow from Operations, Maintenance 
Investments, Research & Development
Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Debt Short and Long Term Debt Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Operating Income Operating Income after Depreciation Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Dividends Dividends (Balance Sheet) Compustat & 
Capital IQ
Risk Free Rate (U.S.) US Treasury Bond (10years) Investing.com
Expected Inflation (U.S. 
and Emerging Countries)
Change in Consumer Price Index CIA World Factbook 
Ownership 
Concentration




Corporate Governance Overall Corporate Governance score (it is the 
composite score of the subcategory scores for 
board structure and compensation policy, as well 
as board functions and shareholders rights)




Economic Freedom Index Heritage Foundation
Government 
Effectiveness
Governance Indicator World Bank
Market Development Market Development Index World Bank
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Appendix C)  
 
Regression output for persistence parameter estimation 
 
 
This regression was run in excel. 
 
The output shows a coefficient (and thus persistence parameter) of .305 with a p-value of 0.00, 



















df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 2.80084E+18 2.8E+18 35095.08 0
Residual 180057 1.43698E+19 7.98E+13
Total 180058 1.71707E+19
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -71693.96037 21055.09646 -3.40506 0.000662 -112961.4685 -30426.45221 -112961.4685 -30426.45221
X Variable 1 0.305635831 0.001631478 187.3368 0 0.302438172 0.30883349 0.302438172 0.30883349




Firm breakdown by country  
 
Country  Number Firms 
ARE Count 40 
BRA Count 250 
CHL Count 146 
CHN Count 2230 
COL Count 33 
CZE Count 17 
EGY Count 119 
GRC Count 224 
HUN Count 25 
IDN Count 368 
IND Count 2183 
KOR Count 1342 
MEX Count 93 
MYS Count 968 
PAK Count 250 
PER Count 74 
PHL Count 159 
POL Count 415 
QAT Count 20 
RUS Count 210 
SAU Count 99 
THA Count 293 
TUR Count 265 
TWN Count 1645 
ZAF Count 280 
 
The above table includes the number of firms included in the analysis of stage 1 (and stage 2) 
broken down by country. There is a total of 11,748 firms included in the sample.  The countries 
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E.1) Skewness and Kurtosis Test  
 




























Mean       1328.144
Median   1.20e-05
Maximum  58904720
Minimum -8.119576
Std. Dev.   237993.2
Skewness   196.5692
Kurtosis   41707.43
Jarque-Bera  8.45e+12











Mean       0.000201
Median   1.20e-05
Maximum  0.002018
Minimum  4.68e-07
Std. Dev.   0.000507
Skewness   2.877603
Kurtosis   9.944504
Jarque-Bera  395309.7
Probability  0.000000
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Mean       0.043171
Median   0.013169
Maximum  296.2173
Minimum -1.842224
Std. Dev.   0.793300
Skewness   334.1061
Kurtosis   122627.8
Jarque-Bera  9.97e+13











Mean       0.035521
Median   0.013169
Maximum  0.416121
Minimum -0.089112
Std. Dev.   0.071448
Skewness   1.897813
Kurtosis   7.615131
Jarque-Bera  231901.4
Probability  0.000000
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Mean       0.508786
Median   0.421705
Maximum  1704.333
Minimum -9744.090
Std. Dev.   28.21176
Skewness  -287.7896
Kurtosis   98373.65
Jarque-Bera  5.89e+13











Mean       0.521629
Median   0.421705
Maximum  3.747525
Minimum -1.158107
Std. Dev.   0.494502
Skewness   1.860759
Kurtosis   9.338901
Jarque-Bera  322288.1
Probability  0.000000
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Mean       0.293241
Median   0.000000
Maximum  1065.526
Minimum -1.000000
Std. Dev.   6.630736
Skewness   127.3297
Kurtosis   17763.38
Jarque-Bera  1.66e+12














Mean       0.173378
Median   0.000000
Maximum  3.900000
Minimum -0.850435
Std. Dev.   0.680523
Skewness   1.949786
Kurtosis   8.215467
Jarque-Bera  218859.4
Probability  0.000000
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E.2) Correlation Test  
 
 
The correlations shown in the above table are those between the trimmed / winsorized variables 
(see section Skewness and Kurtosis of this Appendix). The Pearson correlation values displayed 
suggest that there is no strong positive or negative correlation between variables. All values are 
below .5, with the largest values showing for INV NEWt and INV NEW t-1 (.47) as well as 
GROWTH and SIZE (.47).  
Variable codes:  
Investment New t (INV NEWt) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH t-1) is coded in the above table as GROWTHT_1_W1P to 
signify the winsorizing 
Investment New t-1 (INV NEWt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_1_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Leverage (LEVt-1) is coded in the above table as LEVT_1_T01P to signify the trimming 
Stock Return (STOCKt-1) is coded in the above table as AGET_1 to signify the trimming 
Company Age (AGEt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the variable 
was not transformed 
Cash holding (CASH t-1) is coded in the above table as CASHT_1 to signify the variable was not 
transformed 

















AGET_1 CASHT_1 SIZET_1 
                  INVNEWT_
T01P 
 1.000000 -0.026406  0.471466 -0.046273  0.118134 -0.072052  0.118884  0.039585 
GROWTHT
_1_W1P 
-0.026406  1.000000 -0.025618  0.018223 -0.038239  0.090337 -0.030356  0.478774 
INVNEWT_
1_T01P 
 0.471466 -0.025618  1.000000 -0.024917  0.051796 -0.094275  0.023690  0.055348 
LEVT_1_T
01P 
-0.046273  0.018223 -0.024917  1.000000 -0.025951  0.020267 -0.116120  0.055090 
STOCKT_1
_T01P 
 0.118134 -0.038239  0.051796 -0.025951  1.000000  0.006728  0.036116  0.013200 
AGET_1 -0.072052  0.090337 -0.094275  0.020267  0.006728  1.000000 -0.137085  0.175009 
CASHT_1  0.118884 -0.030356  0.023690 -0.116120  0.036116 -0.137085  1.000000  0.018216 
SIZET_1  0.039585  0.478774  0.055348  0.055090  0.013200  0.175009  0.018216  1.000000 
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E.3) Multi – Collinearity Test 
 
VIF Factor Analysis  
 
Variance Inflation Factors 
 
 
Sample: 1 182215  
Included observations: 87935 
         Coefficient Uncentere
d 
Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
        
C  4.87E-06  135.7884  NA 
GROWTHT_1_W1P  0.024178  1.656140  1.474338 
INVNEWAST_1_T0
1P 
 4.61E-05  1.957919  1.185207 
LEVT_1_T01P  2.74E-08  1.333688  1.033203 
STOCKT_1_T01P  1.28E-07  1.249965  1.198427 
AGET_1  5.54E-07  29.55468  1.130698 
CASHT_1  4.75E-06  2.736870  1.099116 
SIZET_1  5.04E-08  22.36283  1.646421 
         
The table above displays the collinearity statistics (Variance inflation factor - VIF) for all variables 
included in the final model. The VIF factor analysis shows that the centered values for all variables 
are below the 2.5 threshold, suggesting that there is no multi-collinearity. 
Variable codes:  
Investment New t (INV NEWt) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH t-1) is coded in the above table as GROWTHT_1_W1P to 
signify the winsorizing 
Investment New t-1 (INV NEWt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_1_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Leverage (LEVt-1) is coded in the above table as LEVT_1_T01P to signify the trimming 
Stock Return (STOCKt-1) is coded in the above table as AGET_1 to signify the trimming 
Company Age (AGEt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the variable 
was not transformed 
Cash holding (CASH t-1) is coded in the above table as CASHT_1 to signify the variable was not 
transformed 
Size (SIZE t-1) is coded in the above table as SIZET_1 to signify the variable was not 
transformed 
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E.4) Heteroskedasticity – Test 
 
The above table reports the results from the Preusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity test. The 
results show that the B score has a significant p-value. Consequently, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity has to be rejected, suggesting heteroskedasticity is present in the dataset.  
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Null hypothesis: Homoskedasticity  
     
     F-statistic 133.5671     Prob. F(29,87905) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 3711.236     Prob. Chi-Square(29) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 46200.40     Prob. Chi-Square(29) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/18/18   Time: 21:46  
Sample: 15 182105   
Included observations: 87935  
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
        errors and covariance  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.005012 0.000732 6.843040 0.0000 
GROWTHT_1_W1P 0.341746 0.041612 8.212652 0.0000 
INVNEWAST_1_T01P 0.049019 0.002006 24.43294 0.0000 
LEVT_1_T01P 7.51E-06 5.19E-05 0.144693 0.8850 
STOCKT_1_T01P 0.000708 0.000107 6.630125 0.0000 
AGET_1 -6.22E-05 0.000252 -0.247276 0.8047 
CASHT_1 0.002723 0.000802 3.396273 0.0007 
SIZET_1 -0.001096 7.56E-05 -14.49302 0.0000 
ANNUAL_2 0.000850 0.000446 1.906350 0.0566 
ANNUAL_3 0.000475 0.000302 1.575108 0.1152 
ANNUAL_4 0.000754 0.000393 1.916690 0.0553 
ANNUAL_5 0.000823 0.000333 2.470634 0.0135 
ANNUAL_6 0.001466 0.000405 3.622066 0.0003 
ANNUAL_7 0.001045 0.000343 3.041644 0.0024 
ANNUAL_8 0.002568 0.000506 5.073278 0.0000 
ANNUAL_9 0.000599 0.000276 2.167661 0.0302 
ANNUAL_10 0.000326 0.000273 1.191427 0.2335 
ANNUAL_11 0.000984 0.000296 3.326649 0.0009 
ANNUAL_12 0.000834 0.000316 2.635664 0.0084 
ANNUAL_13 8.42E-05 0.000236 0.356736 0.7213 
ANNUAL_15 0.000410 0.000252 1.630870 0.1029 
ANNUAL_16 0.000632 0.000314 2.010725 0.0444 
INDUSEFF_2 -0.001159 0.000950 -1.220230 0.2224 
INDUSEFF_3 -0.000992 0.000550 -1.802707 0.0714 
INDUSEFF_4 -0.000289 0.000527 -0.549512 0.5827 
INDUSEFF_5 0.002610 0.000845 3.090009 0.0020 
INDUSEFF_6 -7.18E-05 0.000699 -0.102789 0.9181 
INDUSEFF_7 0.002156 0.000630 3.421213 0.0006 
INDUSEFF_8 0.001908 0.000581 3.285284 0.0010 
INDUSEFF_9 -0.000431 0.000664 -0.649484 0.5160 
     
     R-squared 0.042204     Mean dependent var 0.004251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041888     S.D. dependent var 0.021220 
S.E. of regression 0.020771     Akaike info criterion -4.910184 
Sum squared resid 37.92499     Schwarz criterion -4.906982 
Log likelihood 215918.5     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.909206 
F-statistic 133.5671     Durbin-Watson stat 1.567372 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Variable codes:  
Investment New t (INV NEWt) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH t-1) is coded in the above table as GROWTHT_1_W1P to 
signify the winsorizing 
Investment New t-1 (INV NEWt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_1_T01P to signify 
the trimming 
Leverage (LEVt-1) is coded in the above table as LEVT_1_T01P to signify the trimming 
Stock Return (STOCKt-1) is coded in the above table as AGET_1 to signify the trimming 
Company Age (AGEt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the variable 
was not transformed 
Cash holding (CASH t-1) is coded in the above table as CASHT_1 to signify the variable was not 
transformed 
Size (SIZE t-1) is coded in the above table as SIZET_1 to signify the variable was not 
transformed 




F.1) Descriptive Statistics for Country Mean Investment 
 




CAPEX DEP INV NEW ACQ and 
R&D 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean  
ISO ARE (United Arab Emirates) 0.0848 0.0681 0.0308 0.0535 0.0167 
  BRA (Brazil) 0.0618 0.0535 0.0357 0.0322 0.0083 
  CHL (Chile) 0.0602 0.0529 0.0375 0.0242 0.0073 
  CHN (China) 0.0868 0.0712 0.0261 0.0617 0.0156 
  COL (Colombia) 0.0512 0.0411 0.0267 0.0276 0.0101 
  CZE (Czech Republic) 0.0648 0.0602 0.0533 0.0169 0.0046 
  EGY (Egypt) 0.0463 0.0420 0.0276 0.0316 0.0044 
  GRC (Greece) 0.0474 0.0371 0.0291 0.0203 0.0103 
  HUN (Hungary) 0.0937 0.0735 0.0575 0.0483 0.0202 
  IDN (Indonesia) 0.0695 0.0642 0.0404 0.0316 0.0054 
  IND (India) 0.0712 0.0616 0.0298 0.0517 0.0096 
  KOR (Korea, South) 0.0666 0.0530 0.0373 0.0293 0.0136 
  MEX (Mexico) 0.0688 0.0570 0.0408 0.0309 0.0118 
  MYS (Malaysia) 0.0574 0.0443 0.0315 0.0265 0.0131 
  PAK (Pakistan) 0.0673 0.0619 0.0356 0.0350 0.0054 
  PER (Peru) 0.0615 0.0554 0.0431 0.0188 0.0061 
  PHL (Philippines) 0.0624 0.0466 0.0332 0.0331 0.0158 
  POL (Poland) 0.0768 0.0642 0.0409 0.0428 0.0126 
  QAT (Qatar) 0.0898 0.0774 0.0259 0.0647 0.0124 
  RUS (Russia) 0.0856 0.0761 0.0380 0.0545 0.0095 
  SAU (Saudi Arabia) 0.0829 0.0767 0.0362 0.0497 0.0062 
  THA (Thailand) 0.0704 0.0614 0.0446 0.0263 0.0090 
  TUR (Turkey) 0.0602 0.0476 0.0292 0.0364 0.0126 
  TWN (Taiwan) 0.0837 0.0494 0.0379 0.0461 0.0343 
  ZAF (South Africa) 0.0848 0.0622 0.0366 0.0522 0.0226 
 
The above table shows the descriptive statistics for the mean values of firm investment 
composition broken down by country.  
  




G.1) Full regression outputs for all models run for Phase 1 of the analysis (Regression 1)  
 
Model 1 Output: 
This model includes only the variables Investment New t (INV NEW t) and Growth 
Opportunities (GROWTH t-1).  
 
Dependent Variable: INVNEWAST_T01P  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/10/18   Time: 22:04  
Sample (adjusted): 4 182180  
Included observations: 111483 after adjustments 
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
        errors and covariance  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.035478 0.000248 142.8340 0.0000 
GROWTHT_1_W1P -1.558518 0.131516 -11.85038 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.010005     Mean dependent var 0.034836 
Adjusted R-squared 0.009915     S.D. dependent var 0.079512 
S.E. of regression 0.079472     Akaike info criterion -2.226797 
Sum squared resid 704.0978     Schwarz criterion -2.226625 
Log likelihood 124127.0     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.226745 
F-statistic 111.6430     Durbin-Watson stat 0.992030 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Wald F-statistic 140.4314 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Variable codes:  
Investment New t (INV NEWt) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH t-1) is coded in the above table as GROWTHT_1_W1P to 
signify the winsorizing 
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Model 2 output: 
This model includes only industry and year effects. The industries are grouped according to the 





Sample (adjusted): 2 182209
Included observations: 158738 after adjustments
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard
        errors and covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0109 0.00157 6.92868 0.00000
ANNUAL_2 -0.0078 0.00128 -6.07093 0.00000
ANNUAL_3 -0.0113 0.00117 -9.67137 0.00000
ANNUAL_4 -0.0045 0.00117 -3.84404 0.00010
ANNUAL_5 0.0064 0.00118 5.42256 0.00000
ANNUAL_6 0.0134 0.00122 11.00095 0.00000
ANNUAL_7 0.0173 0.00124 13.97810 0.00000
ANNUAL_8 0.0209 0.00126 16.57416 0.00000
ANNUAL_9 0.0161 0.00114 14.21584 0.00000
ANNUAL_10 -0.0023 0.00100 -2.29974 0.02150
ANNUAL_11 0.0062 0.00102 6.11294 0.00000
ANNUAL_12 0.0104 0.00102 10.12887 0.00000
ANNUAL_13 0.0043 0.00096 4.49631 0.00000
ANNUAL_15 0.0026 0.00093 2.83869 0.00450
ANNUAL_16 0.0059 0.00101 5.85402 0.00000
INDUSEFF_2 0.0183 0.00233 7.85376 0.00000
INDUSEFF_3 0.0089 0.00176 5.08010 0.00000
INDUSEFF_4 0.0228 0.00149 15.37737 0.00000
INDUSEFF_5 0.0328 0.00219 15.00717 0.00000
INDUSEFF_6 0.0227 0.00189 12.00888 0.00000
INDUSEFF_7 0.0276 0.00174 15.85735 0.00000
INDUSEFF_8 0.0273 0.00170 16.02348 0.00000
INDUSEFF_9 0.0057 0.00170 3.34462 0.00080
R-squared 0.01221     Mean dependent var 0.038987
Adjusted R-squared 0.01207     S.D. dependent var 0.090707
S.E. of regression 0.09016     Akaike info criterion -1.97436
Sum squared resid 1290.11500     Schwarz criterion -1.97291
Log likelihood 156725.700     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.97393
F-statistic 89.13671     Durbin-Watson stat 1.03858
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 93.27339
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000
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Model 3 output: 
 
The model includes all control variables. It excludes the growth opportunities (GROWTH t-1)  
and the industry and year indicators.  
 
 
Variable codes:  
Investment New t (INV NEWt) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH t-1) is coded in the above table as GROWTHT_1_W1P to 
signify the winsorizing 
Investment New t-1 (INV NEWt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_1_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Leverage (LEVt-1) is coded in the above table as LEVT_1_T01P to signify the trimming 
Stock Return (STOCKt-1) is coded in the above table as AGET_1 to signify the trimming 
Company Age (AGEt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the variable 
was not transformed 
Dependent Variable: INVNEWAST_T01P
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 10 182105
Included observations: 96822 after adjustments
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard
        errors and covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.01470 0.00120 12.24847 0.00000
INVNEWAST_1_T01P 0.42682 0.00644 66.28900 0.00000
LEVT_1_T01P -0.00154 0.00017 -9.15021 0.00000
STOCKT_1_T01P 0.00777 0.00034 22.92814 0.00000
AGET_1 -0.00521 0.00075 -6.95279 0.00000
CASHT_1 0.05873 0.00213 27.55061 0.00000
SIZET_1 0.00046 0.00019 2.45359 0.01410
R-squared 0.234004     Mean dependent var 0.032987
Adjusted R-squared 0.233956     S.D. dependent var 0.078112
S.E. of regression 0.068367     Akaike info criterion -2.52778
Sum squared resid 452.5183     Schwarz criterion -2.52709
Log likelihood 122379.30     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.52757
F-statistic 4929.3290     Durbin-Watson stat 1.902725
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 1222.504
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000
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Cash holding (CASH t-1) is coded in the above table as CASHT_1 to signify the variable was not 
transformed 
Size (SIZE t-1) is coded in the above table as SIZET_1 to signify the variable was not transformed 
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Model 4 Output: 
 
This model includes the growth opportunities (GROWTH t-1) as well as all control variables and 





Sample (adjusted): 15 182105
Included observations: 87935 after adjustments
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard
        errors and covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.00253 0.00221 -1.14531 0.25210
GROWTHT_1_W1P -0.68976 0.15549 -4.43592 0.00000
INVNEWAST_1_T01P 0.42656 0.00679 62.80517 0.00000
LEVT_1_T01P -0.00141 0.00017 -8.51282 0.00000
STOCKT_1_T01P 0.00683 0.00036 19.08051 0.00000
AGET_1 -0.00326 0.00074 -4.38335 0.00000
CASHT_1 0.06413 0.00218 29.42629 0.00000
SIZET_1 0.00147 0.00022 6.52997 0.00000
ANNUAL_2 -0.00122 0.00155 -0.79092 0.42900
ANNUAL_3 -0.00353 0.00140 -2.52978 0.01140
ANNUAL_4 0.00205 0.00134 1.52774 0.12660
ANNUAL_5 0.00506 0.00119 4.24086 0.00000
ANNUAL_6 0.00790 0.00124 6.39282 0.00000
ANNUAL_7 0.00772 0.00115 6.68828 0.00000
ANNUAL_8 0.01232 0.00123 10.00796 0.00000
ANNUAL_9 0.00556 0.00108 5.13671 0.00000
ANNUAL_10 -0.00475 0.00099 -4.82354 0.00000
ANNUAL_11 0.00376 0.00101 3.74055 0.00020
ANNUAL_12 0.00544 0.00098 5.55481 0.00000
ANNUAL_13 0.00146 0.00090 1.62528 0.10410
ANNUAL_15 0.00275 0.00086 3.20884 0.00130
ANNUAL_16 0.00079 0.00095 0.82684 0.40830
INDUSEFF_2 0.00820 0.00241 3.40222 0.00070
INDUSEFF_3 0.00015 0.00184 0.08138 0.93510
INDUSEFF_4 0.00736 0.00165 4.46580 0.00000
INDUSEFF_5 0.01158 0.00246 4.69967 0.00000
INDUSEFF_6 0.00687 0.00203 3.37748 0.00070
INDUSEFF_7 0.00436 0.00190 2.28868 0.02210
INDUSEFF_8 0.00908 0.00182 4.97707 0.00000
INDUSEFF_9 0.00128 0.00190 0.67394 0.50040
R-squared 0.24694     Mean dependent var 0.03223
Adjusted R-squared 0.24669     S.D. dependent var 0.07514
S.E. of regression 0.06521     Akaike info criterion -2.62198
Sum squared resid 373.8354     Schwarz criterion -2.61878
Log likelihood 115311.8     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.621
F-statistic 993.9826     Durbin-Watson stat 1.935005
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 285.9218
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000
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Variable codes:  
Investment New t (INV NEWt) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH t-1) is coded in the above table as GROWTHT_1_W1P to 
signify the winsorizing 
Investment New t-1 (INV NEWt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_1_T01P to signify the 
trimming 
Leverage (LEVt-1) is coded in the above table as LEVT_1_T01P to signify the trimming 
Stock Return (STOCKt-1) is coded in the above table as AGET_1 to signify the trimming 
Company Age (AGEt-1) is coded in the above table as INVNEWT_T01P to signify the variable 
was not transformed 
Cash holding (CASH t-1) is coded in the above table as CASHT_1 to signify the variable was not 
transformed 
Size (SIZE t-1) is coded in the above table as SIZET_1 to signify the variable was not transformed 
  




H.1) Regression Output 20th percentile 
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108__1 
   
Method: Quantile Regression (tau = 0.2) 
  
     
Sample (adjusted): 15 182105 
   
Included observations: 78985 after adjustments 
  
Huber Sandwich Standard Errors & Covariance 
  
Sparsity method: Kernel (Epanechnikov) using residuals 
 
Bandwidth method: Hall-Sheather, bw=0.013325 
  
Estimation successfully identifies unique optimal solution 
 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C -0.0309 0.000123 -251.8508 0.0000 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0328 0.001345 24.4133 0.0000      
Pseudo R-squared 0.0075     Mean dependent var -4.97E-03 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0074     S.D. dependent var 0.0333 




Quantile dependent var -0.0310     Restr. objective 617.7966 
Sparsity 0.0860     Quasi-LR statistic 669.349 
Prob(Quasi-LR stat) 0.0000 
   
 
Variable Codes: 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV) is coded as UE_M108_1 above. It is the residual from model 4 
from the new investment estimation (see appendix G) 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) is coded as FCF_M108)_1_t01p above to signify that the variable was 
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H.2) Regression Output 40th percentile 
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108__1 
   
Method: Quantile Regression (tau = 0.4) 
   
     
Sample (adjusted): 15 
182105 
    
Included observations: 78985 after adjustments 
  
Huber Sandwich Standard Errors & Covariance 
  
Sparsity method: Kernel (Epanechnikov) using residuals 
  
Bandwidth method: Hall-Sheather, bw=0.02129 
  
Estimation successfully identifies unique optimal solution 
  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-
Statistic 
Prob.   
     
C -0.0170 0.0001 -
160.895 
0.0000 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0318 0.0012 26.5953 0.0000      
Pseudo R-squared 0.0061     Mean dependent var 
 
-4.97E-03 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0061     S.D. dependent var 
 
0.0333 
S.E. of regression 0.0352     Objective 
 
905.8145 
Quantile dependent var -0.0169     Restr. objective 
 
911.3653 
Sparsity 0.0605     Quasi-LR statistic 
 
764.559 
Prob(Quasi-LR stat) 0.0000 
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H.3) Regression Output 60th percentile 
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108__1 
   
Method: Quantile Regression (tau = 0.6) 
  
     
Sample (adjusted): 15 182105 
   
Included observations: 78985 after adjustments 
  
Huber Sandwich Standard Errors & Covariance 
  
Sparsity method: Kernel (Epanechnikov) using residuals 
 
Bandwidth method: Hall-Sheather, bw=0.02129 
  
Estimation successfully identifies unique optimal solution 
 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C -0.0043 0.00013 -33.1642 0.0000 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0343 0.00142 24.2072 0.0000      
Pseudo R-squared 0.0055     Mean dependent var -4.97E-03 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0055     S.D. dependent var 0.0333 




Quantile dependent var -0.0041     Restr. objective 1002.195 
Sparsity 0.0736     Quasi-LR statistic 622.1641 
Prob(Quasi-LR stat) 0.0000 
   
 
























H.4) Regression Output 80th percentile 
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108__1 
   
Method: Quantile Regression (tau = 0.8) 
   
     
Sample (adjusted): 15 
182105 
    
Included observations: 78985 after adjustments 
  
Huber Sandwich Standard Errors & Covariance 
  
Sparsity method: Kernel (Epanechnikov) using residuals 
  
Bandwidth method: Hall-Sheather, bw=0.013325 
  
Estimation successfully identifies unique optimal solution 
  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-
Statistic 
Prob.   
     
C 0.0179 0.0003 72.19165 0.0000 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0434 0.0023 18.99138 0.0000      
Pseudo R-squared 0.0048     Mean dependent var 
 
-4.97E-03 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0048     S.D. dependent var 
 
0.0333 
S.E. of regression 0.0403     Objective 
 
834.8418 
Quantile dependent var 0.0182     Restr. objective 
 
838.8953 
Sparsity 0.1741     Quasi-LR statistic 
 
291.0327 
Prob(Quasi-LR stat) 0.0000 
   
 
 




















H.5) Slope Equality Tests 
 
Quantile Slope Equality Test 
   
     
Specification: UE_M108__1 C FCF_M108_1_T01P 
  
Estimated equation quantile tau = 0.8 
   
User-specified test quantiles: 0.2 
   
Test statistic compares all coefficients 
  





Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
Wald Test 
 
20.24837 1 0.000      
     
Restriction Detail:  b(tau_h) - b(tau_k) = 0 
  
     
Quantiles Variable Restr. Value Std. Error Prob.       
0.2, 0.8 FCF_M108_1_T01P -0.0105 0.0023 0.000 
 
 
Quantile Slope Equality Test 
    
     
Specification: UE_M108__1 C FCF_M108_1_T01P 
  
Estimated equation quantile tau = 0.8 
   
User-specified test quantiles: 0.4 
    
Test statistic compares all coefficients 
   
     
Test Summary 
 
Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.       
Wald Test 
 
30.51904 1 0.000      
     
Restriction Detail:  b(tau_h) - b(tau_k) = 0 
   
     
Quantiles Variable Restr. Value Std. Error Prob.       













Quantile Slope Equality Test 
   
     
Specification: UE_M108__1 C FCF_M108_1_T01P 
  
Estimated equation quantile tau = 0.8 
   
User-specified test quantiles: 0.6 
   
Test statistic compares all coefficients 
  





Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
Wald Test 
 
24.97561 1 0.000      
     
Restriction Detail:  b(tau_h) - b(tau_k) = 0 
  
     
Quantiles Variable Restr. Value Std. Error Prob.       
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ARE Count 3 
BRA Count 27 
CHL Count 18 
CHN Count 44 
COL Count 7 
CZE Count 2 
EGY Count 4 
GRC Count 11 
HUN Count 3 
IDN Count 14 
IND Count 67 
KOR Count 99 
MEX Count 22 
MYS Count 41 
PER Count 1 
PHL Count 22 
POL Count 25 
QAT Count 5 
RUS Count 37 
SAU Count 8 
THA Count 7 
TUR Count 15 
TWN Count 86 
ZAF Count 81 
 
The above table includes a breakdown by country of the number of firms included in the analysis 
of stage 3. There is a total of 649 firms included in the sample.  The countries are identified by 
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I.1) Table of descriptive statistics 
 
I.1.A) Individual Samples 
Sample: 1 182215         
           










LOG_DEBT GOV_EFF GOV_INT MKT_DEV L_SIZE L_AGE 
           
           
 Mean  0.049778 -0.002362  0.266765  0.536183  2.345156  0.636777  0.585450  0.404031  3.347140  1.259265 
 Median  0.029427 -0.001246  0.189100  0.550599  2.282544  0.587379  0.552000  0.394888  3.207012  1.278754 
 Maximum  0.367315  0.601971  0.971000  1.388835  9.212328  0.913462  0.790000  0.853855  10.48504  3.304060 
 Minimum  0.000319 -0.715441  0.001700  3.00E-07 -3.000000  0.201923  0.474000  0.106951 -3.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.057821  0.101552  0.235072  0.228965  1.449879  0.145582  0.074109  0.179305  1.205093  0.361477 
 Skewness  2.187770 -0.299136  0.966850 -0.217139  0.210369 -0.026925  0.812192  0.805214  0.612819 -0.391041 
 Kurtosis  8.570694  7.356209  2.955738  2.364044  3.539814  2.499584  2.458178  2.928556  4.277012  4.580302 
           
 Jarque-Bera  65430.00  70822.23  861.5566  2064.091  2493.591  1923.248  20255.49  19308.22  22861.15  19917.98 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
           
 Sum  1557.805 -207.6335  1474.410  44789.00  299621.8  116030.4  97062.36  72049.69  586178.0  193620.8 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 104.6259  906.6130  305.3609  4379.159  268572.5  3861.844  910.5413  5733.248  254328.1  20090.64 
           
 Observations  31295  87912  5527  83533  127762  182215  165791  178327  175128  153757 
           
 
Variable codes:  
Unexpected Investment (UEINV) is coded in the above table as UE_M108_1LT0 to signify that only positive values of unexpected 
investment were included in the  
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Free Cash Flow (FCF) is coded in the above table as FCF_M108_1_T01P to signify the variable was trimmed at .1% to reduce the 
effect of outliers 
Corporate Governance Score (CGSCORE) is coded in the above table as CVG_N0_H_PRCT to signify the that the score obtained 
was transformed into a percentage by dividing it over 100 
Concentration (CONCEN) is coded in the above table as CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT to signify the that the score obtained was 
transformed into a percentage by dividing it over 100 
Debt (DEBT) is coded in the above table as LOG_DEBT to  signify that the log of debt variable was used. 
Government Effectiveness (GOV_EFF) is coded as GOV_EFF 
Government Intervention (GOV_INT) is coded as GOV_INT 
Market Development (MKT_DEV) is coded as MKT_DEV 
Size (SIZE) is coded as L_SIZE to signify that the log of assets was taken (see appendix H) 
Age (AGE) is coded as L_AGE to signify that the log of assets was taken (see appendix H) 
 
The above table shows the values of skewness and kurtosis for all variables included in the model. For Debt, the displayed values are 
after the natural log of the original values were taken.  
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I.1.B) Common Sample 
 
           
Sample: 1 182215         









LOG_DEBT GOV_EFF GOV_INT MKT_DEV L_SIZE L_AGE 
                       Mean  0.045651  0.042403  0.240154  0.524532  3.888342  0.635039  0.609537  0.421124  4.795967  1.387001 
 Median  0.029171  0.036952  0.172650  0.540501  3.798233  0.587379  0.583500  0.427369  4.734417  1.380211 
 Maximum  0.320537  0.528784  0.919900  0.999998  7.529683  0.894231  0.790000  0.688434  8.152843  2.096910 
 Minimum  0.000351 -0.275116  0.011800  4.20E-06 -1.585027  0.208531  0.498000  0.116566  1.494906  0.301030 
 Std. Dev.  0.050293  0.083041  0.207918  0.228086  1.253026  0.152361  0.082272  0.155047  1.066070  0.326562 
 Skewness  2.250493  0.618768  1.101115 -0.362933 -0.153190  0.202163  0.468365 -0.033722  0.276038 -0.201717 
 Kurtosis  9.435962  6.881624  3.490237  2.469472  3.800147  1.779847  1.989312  1.844924  3.313448  2.695321 
           
 Jarque-Bera  2698.521  726.1844  222.6942  35.36494  32.11708  72.28603  83.07917  58.57024  17.63288  11.18200 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000148  0.003731 
           
 Sum  47.93371  44.52327  252.1621  550.7586  4082.759  666.7913  640.0140  442.1804  5035.765  1456.351 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 2.653279  7.233681  45.34829  54.57232  1647.008  24.35122  7.100409  25.21748  1192.195  111.8682 
           
 Observations  1050  1050  1050  1050  1050  1050  1050  1050  1050  1050 
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LOG_DEBT GOV_EFF GOV_INT MKT_DEV L_SIZE L_AGE 
UE_M108_1LT0  0.002527  0.000190 -0.000368  0.000887  0.001595 -0.000835 -0.000403  0.000400 -0.001534 -0.002005 
FCF_M108_1_T
01P 
 0.000190  0.006889  0.000327  0.000255 -0.017857  8.15E-05 -8.09E-06  0.000183 -0.002896  0.000776 
CVG_N0_H_PR
CT 
-0.000368  0.000327  0.043189 -0.002787  0.032866 -0.006453 -0.003617  0.006563  0.027174  0.003950 
CONCEN_REDO
_N0_PRCT 
 0.000887  0.000255 -0.002787  0.051974  0.042903 -0.012664 -0.004751  0.008131  0.024148 -0.005073 
LOG_DEBT  0.001595 -0.017857  0.032866  0.042903  1.568579 -0.039156 -0.002012 -0.017296  1.181893  0.039063 
GOV_EFF -0.000835  8.15E-05 -0.006453 -0.012664 -0.039156  0.023192  0.010496 -0.004935 -0.033164  0.007971 
GOV_INT -0.000403 -8.09E-06 -0.003617 -0.004751 -0.002012  0.010496  0.006762 -0.001835 -0.003057  0.007314 
MKT_DEV  0.000400  0.000183  0.006563  0.008131 -0.017296 -0.004935 -0.001835  0.024017 -0.032468  0.003624 
L_SIZE -0.001534 -0.002896  0.027174  0.024148  1.181893 -0.033164 -0.003057 -0.032468  1.135424  0.041498 
L_AGE -0.002005  0.000776  0.003950 -0.005073  0.039063  0.007971  0.007314  0.003624  0.041498  0.106541 
 
Unexpected Investment (UEINV) is coded in the above table as UE_M108_1LT0 to signify that only positive values of unexpected 
investment were included in the  
Free Cash Flow (FCF) is coded in the above table as FCF_M108_1_T01P to signify the variable was trimmed at .1% to reduce the 
effect of outliers 
Corporate Governance Score (CGSCORE) is coded in the above table as CVG_N0_H_PRCT to signify the that the score obtained 
was transformed into a percentage by dividing it over 100 
Concentration (CONCEN) is coded in the above table as CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT to signify the that the score obtained was 
transformed into a percentage by dividing it over 100 
Debt (DEBT) is coded in the above table as LOG_DEBT to  signify that the log of debt variable was used. 
Government Effectiveness (GOV_EFF) is coded as GOV_EFF 
Government Intervention (GOV_INT) is coded as GOV_INT 
Market Development (MKT_DEV) is coded as MKT_DEV 
Size (SIZE) is coded as L_SIZE to signify that the log of assets was taken (see appendix H) 
Age (AGE) is coded as L_AGE to signify that the log of assets was taken (see appendix H) 
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The table above shows the covariance values of all variables included in the model. The values suggest that there is no covariance 
between the variables.  
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I.3) Heteroskedasticity Test 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Null hypothesis: Homoskedasticity  
     
     F-statistic 3.069685     Prob. F(6,1448) 0.0055 
Obs*R-squared 18.27470     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0056 
Scaled explained SS 374.7443     Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/30/18   Time: 16:30  
Sample: 64 181823   
Included observations: 1455  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.014808 0.004146 3.571956 0.0004 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.015630 0.007480 2.089476 0.0368 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.003171 0.002628 -1.206452 0.2278 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT -0.001476 0.002619 -0.563447 0.5732 
LOG_DEBT 0.003566 0.001109 3.216830 0.0013 
L_SIZE -0.004694 0.001234 -3.802414 0.0001 
L_AGE -0.000850 0.001842 -0.461201 0.6447 
     
     R-squared 0.012560     Mean dependent var 0.003610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008468     S.D. dependent var 0.023240 
S.E. of regression 0.023141     Akaike info criterion -4.689583 
Sum squared resid 0.775443     Schwarz criterion -4.664168 
Log likelihood 3418.672     Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.680101 
F-statistic 3.069685     Durbin-Watson stat 0.141089 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005464    
     
      
Variables are coded as before (see I.1) 
 
The above table reports the results from the Preusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity test. The 
results show that the B score has a significant p-value. Consequently, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity has to be rejected, suggesting heteroskedasticity is present in the dataset.  
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Appendix J) 
J.1) Full regression outputs for all models run for Phase 3 of the analysis (Regression 3a and 
3b)  
 
Model 3.a.1 Firm Variables Only: 
 
Model before variable transformation  
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after 
adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
 
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.0970 0.0123 7.8900 0.0000 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0924 0.0290 3.1907 0.0014 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.0007 0.0064 0.1079 0.9141 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.0137 0.0059 -2.3452 0.0192 
LOG_DEBT 0.0141 0.0030 4.6528 0.0000 
L_AGE -0.0124 0.0043 -2.8607 0.0043 
L_SIZE -0.0182 0.0036 -5.0135 0.0000      
R-squared 0.04165     Mean dependent var 0.04551 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03768     S.D. dependent var 0.06140 
S.E. of regression 0.06023     Akaike info criterion -2.77648 
Sum squared resid 5.25290     Schwarz criterion -2.75107 
Log likelihood 2026.891     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.76700 
F-statistic 10.48899     Durbin-Watson stat 0.74228 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 7.09500 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
   
Variable codes:  
Unexpected Investment (UEINV) is coded in the above table as UE_M108_1_w1p to signify the 
winsorizing at 1% 
Positive Free Cash Flow (FCF>0) is coded in the above table as FCFGT0_N0_H to signify the 
that only firm year observations with positive free cash flow values were included 
Corporate Governance Score (CGSCORE) is coded in the above table as CGV_N0_PRCT to 
signify the that the score obtained was transformed into a percentage by dividing it over 100 
Concentration (CONCEN) is coded in the above table as CONCEN_REDO_N0_N0_PRCT to 
signify the that the score obtained was transformed into a percentage by dividing it over 100 
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Debt (DEBT) is coded in the above table as Log_DEBT to  signify that the log of the leverage 
value was used. 
Size (SIZE) is coded as L_SIZE to signify that the log of assets was used 
Age (AGE is coded a L-AGE to signify that the log of years since inception was used  
 
 
Variance Inflation Factors 
   
    
Sample: 1 182215 
   
Included observations: 1455 
   
    
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF     
C 0.0002 92.8501  NA 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0008 2.0906 1.4760 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT 0.0000 2.9919 1.2439 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.0000 6.4548 1.2044 
LOG_DEBT 0.0000 110.0784 10.8175 
L_SIZE 1.32E-05 243.5694 10.31996 
L_AGE 0.00002 25.41061 1.04374 
 
The VIF analysis above shows that the variation in debt (LOG_DEBT) and size (L_SIZE) are 
highly collinear  (VIF over 10). They are therefore transformed into one variable 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE, the below output shows that the VIF is subsequently reduced (see below).  
 
Variance Inflation Factors 
   
    
Sample: 1 182215 
   
Included observations: 1455 
   
    
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF     
C 0.000116 55.90671 NA 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.00079 1.93664 1.318703 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT 3.12E-05 2.563022 1.094661 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 3.99E-05 5.196861 1.160149 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.000103 28.45053 1.21812 
L_AGE 1.96E-05 22.1043 1.029391     
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Model after transformation and correction for collinearity  
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.035564 0.010749 3.308675 0.001 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.084254 0.028106 2.997711 0.0028 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.009942 0.00559 -1.778572 0.0755 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.004057 0.006319 0.642059 0.5209 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.034871 0.010144 3.437691 0.0006 
L_AGE -0.014397 0.004426 -3.252802 0.0012      
R-squared 0.027203     Mean dependent var 0.045505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023846     S.D. dependent var 0.061398 
S.E. of regression 0.060662     Akaike info criterion -2.762891 
Sum squared resid 5.332101     Schwarz criterion -2.741107 
Log likelihood 2016.003     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.754763 
F-statistic 8.103769     Durbin-Watson stat 0.734811 
Prob(F-statistic) 0     Wald F-statistic 6.433733 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000006 
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Model 3.a.2 Firm Variables & Interactions: 
 
Model before variable transformation  
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after adjustments 
    
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 0.0262 0.0113 2.3207 0.0204 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.2454 0.0818 2.9996 0.0027 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.0020 0.0059 -0.3474 0.7283 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.0157 0.0068 2.2989 0.0217 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0374 0.0103 3.6438 0.0003 
L_AGE -0.0147 0.0044 -3.3586 0.0008 
FCF_M108_1_T01P*CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.1483 0.0638 -2.3241 0.0203 
FCF_M108_1_T01P*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT -0.2345 0.1098 -2.1363 0.0328      
R-squared 0.0376     Mean dependent 
var 
0.0455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0330     S.D. dependent var 0.0614 
S.E. of regression 0.0604     Akaike info 
criterion 
-2.7709 
Sum squared resid 5.2751     Schwarz criterion -2.7418 
Log likelihood 2023.83     Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-2.7601 
F-statistic 8.08     Durbin-Watson stat 0.7382 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00     Wald F-statistic 4.9094 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000 
   
 
The variables codes are as before, there are interactions terms between free cash flow and 
corporate governance and free cash flow and concentration included 
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Variance Inflation Factors 
   
    
Sample: 1 182215 
   
Included observations: 1455 
   
    
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF     
C 0.000128 61.95434  NA 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.006696 30.41924 23.49744 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT 3.43E-05 2.823885 1.225483 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 4.68E-05 6.123438 1.433311 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.000105 29.02912 1.250766 
L_AGE 1.93E-05 21.6757 1.0552 
FCF_M108_1_T01P*CVG_N0_H_PRCT 0.004073 5.526039 4.879011 
FCF_M108_1_T01P*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.012047 18.09766 15.48431 
 
The VIF analysis shows that the variation in free cash flow and it interaction terms with corporate 
governance and concentration are highly collinear  (VIF over 2.5). They are therefore centered 
(i.e. the mean of the series is subtracted from each observation), the below output shows that the 
VIF is subsequently reduced.  
Variance Inflation Factors 
   
    
Sample: 1 182215 
   
Included observations: 1455 
   
    
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF     
C 0.000115 55.87901  NA 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.000617 2.869751 2.16502 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT 3.50E-05 2.881948 1.25068 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 4.87E-05 1.64919 1.491461 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.000105 29.02912 1.250766 
L_AGE 1.93E-05 21.6757 1.0552 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED 0.004073 2.226249 2.157862 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.012047 1.873286 1.788985 
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Model after transformation and correction for collinearity  
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after adjustments 
    
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     




Prob.   
     
C 0.0344 0.0107 3.2030 0.0014 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.0802 0.0248 3.2271 0.0013 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.0017 0.0059 -0.2847 0.7759 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0163 0.0070 2.3331 0.0198 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0374 0.0103 3.6438 0.0003 
L_AGE -0.0147 0.0044 -3.3586 0.0008 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.1483 0.0638 -2.3241 0.0203 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.2345 0.1098 -2.1363 0.0328      
R-squared 0.03761     Mean 
dependent var 
0.04551 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03295     S.D. 
dependent var 
0.06140 
S.E. of regression 0.06038     Akaike info 
criterion 
-2.77089 
Sum squared resid 5.27508     Schwarz 
criterion 
-2.74185 
Log likelihood 2023.825     Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-2.76006 
F-statistic 8.07743     Durbin-
Watson stat 
0.73817 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000     Wald F-
statistic 
4.90936 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.00002 
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Model 3.a.3 Firm Variables & Interaction Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
 
        errors and covariance 
    
     




Prob.   
     
C 0.034078 0.010694 3.186778 0.0015 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.080352 0.024787 3.241672 0.0012 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.00277 0.007041 -
0.393446 
0.694 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.016587 0.006913 2.399576 0.0165 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.037278 0.010267 3.630964 0.0003 
L_AGE -0.014878 0.004398 -
3.382789 
0.0007 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.147126 0.063885 -
2.302995 
0.0214 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.234081 0.110055 -
2.126951 
0.0336 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.008708 0.02054 -
0.423956 
0.6717 
     
R-squared 0.037676     Mean dependent 
var 
0.045505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.032352     S.D. dependent 
var 
0.061398 
S.E. of regression 0.060397     Akaike info 
criterion 
-2.769592 
Sum squared resid 5.274694     Schwarz criterion -2.736915 
Log likelihood 2023.878     Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-2.7574 
F-statistic 7.076582     Durbin-Watson 
stat 
0.738148 
Prob(F-statistic) 0     Wald F-statistic 4.32186 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000037 
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Model 3b.1.1 Firm Variables and Government Effectiveness (no interaction) 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after 
adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
 
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.0735 0.0133 5.5241 0.0000 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0839 0.0282 2.9745 0.0030 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT -0.0079 0.0071 -1.1165 0.2644 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.0190 0.0062 -3.0684 0.0022 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0344 0.0101 3.4088 0.0007 
L_AGE -0.0114 0.0046 -2.5097 0.0122 
GOV_EFF -0.0502 0.0124 -4.0364 0.0001      
R-squared 0.03871     Mean dependent var 0.0455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03473     S.D. dependent var 0.0614 
S.E. of regression 0.06032     Akaike info criterion -2.7734 
Sum squared resid 5.26902     Schwarz criterion -2.7480 
Log likelihood 2024.661     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.7639 
F-statistic 9.7184     Durbin-Watson stat 0.7454 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 8.4922 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Variance Inflation Factors 
   
    
Sample: 1 182215 
   
Included observations: 1455 
   
    
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF     
C 0.000177 98.28559  NA 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.000795 1.980277 1.360259 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 5.04E-05 7.215794 1.486689 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT 3.83E-05 3.34657 1.368704 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.000102 33.02505 1.248343 
L_AGE 2.08E-05 27.38806 1.129595 
GOV_EFF 0.000155 45.50986 1.658226 
 
The VIF analysis suggests that no multicollinearity between variables is present in the model, all 
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Model 3b.1.2 Firm Variables and Government Effectiveness (Simple Interaction) 
For all of the following models the variables that interact were centered. This reduced the VIF to 
an acceptable level below 2.5. Furthermore, the regression was run with Huber White robust 
standard errors.  
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after adjustments 
    
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.030882 0.010779 2.864958 0.0042 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.078342 0.024754 3.164802 0.0016 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.01145 0.006735 -1.70003 0.0893 
CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED 3.65E-05 7.75E-05 0.471455 0.6374 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.036724 0.010186 3.605445 0.0003 
L_AGE -0.01163 0.004601 -2.526772 0.0116 
GOV_EFF_CENTERED -0.05107 0.014079 -3.627589 0.0003 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.12983 0.063477 -2.045356 0.041 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED -0.00212 0.001035 -2.048968 0.0406 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_EFF_CENTERED 0.061498 0.143533 0.428456 0.6684      
R-squared 0.04837     Mean dependent var 0.045505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.042443     S.D. dependent var 0.061398 
S.E. of regression 0.060081     Akaike info criterion -2.779392 
Sum squared resid 5.216079     Schwarz criterion -2.743085 
Log likelihood 2032.008     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.765846 
F-statistic 8.160786     Durbin-Watson stat 0.748222 
Prob(F-statistic) 0     Wald F-statistic 5.806715 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0 
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Model 3b.1.3 Firm Variables and Government Effectiveness (Triple Interaction) 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after adjustments 
    
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
   
        errors and covariance 
    
     




Prob.   
     
C 0.031277 0.010705 2.921687 0.0035 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.052719 0.023129 2.279343 0.0228 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.01322 0.006588 -2.00696 0.0449 
CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED 3.30E-05 7.77E-05 0.423989 0.6716 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.035585 0.010001 3.558066 0.0004 
L_AGE -0.01099 0.004606 -2.38557 0.0172 
GOV_EFF_CENTERED -0.0537 0.014009 -3.83311 0.0001 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED -0.05969 0.063446 -0.94085 0.3469 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.00153 0.00089 -1.71363 0.0868 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_EFF_CENTERED 0.053268 0.136785 0.389425 0.697 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED*GOV_EFF_CENTERED -0.00444 0.004641 -0.95687 0.3388 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_CENTERED*GOV_EFF_CENTERED -0.01102 0.005906 -1.86518 0.0624      
R-squared 0.052725     Mean dependent 
var 
0.045505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045504     S.D. dependent 
var 
0.061398 
S.E. of regression 0.059985     Akaike info 
criterion 
-2.78123 
Sum squared resid 5.192209     Schwarz criterion -2.73766 
Log likelihood 2035.345     Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-2.76497 
F-statistic 7.30152     Durbin-Watson 
stat 
0.74596 
Prob(F-statistic) 0     Wald F-statistic 5.205181 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0 
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Model 3b.1.4 Firm Variables and Government Effectiveness (Triple Interaction, controlling for corporate governance & 
concentration interaction) 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Sample (adjusted): 64 181823 
    
Included observations: 1455 after adjustments 
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.032624 0.011234 2.903967 0.0037 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.045056 0.022467 2.005434 0.0451 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.01597 0.008368 -1.907967 0.0566 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.000141 0.008538 0.016562 0.9868 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.036751 0.010505 3.498533 0.0005 
L_AGE -0.01159 0.004902 -2.364324 0.0182 
GOV_EFF_CENTERED -0.04943 0.014116 -3.501556 0.0005 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.03858 0.082054 -0.470184 0.6383 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.13883 0.083272 -1.667229 0.0957 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_EFF_CENTERED 0.047187 0.143301 0.329287 0.742 
GOV_EFF_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED 0.039651 0.065116 0.608932 0.5427 
GOV_EFF_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.096537 0.055085 1.352518 0.1799 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED*GOV_EFF_CENTERED -0.64857 0.672745 -0.964068 0.3352 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED*GOV_EFF_CENTERED -1.48111 0.492177 -3.00931 0.0027      
R-squared 0.054888     Mean dependent var 0.045505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.046361     S.D. dependent var 0.061398 
S.E. of regression 0.059958     Akaike info criterion -2.780767 
Sum squared resid 5.180355     Schwarz criterion -2.729936 
Log likelihood 2037.008     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.761801 
F-statistic 6.4374     Durbin-Watson stat 0.7490 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Model 3b.2. Firm Variables and Government Intervention 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1063 after 
adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
 
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.0696 0.0163 4.2727 0.0000 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0550 0.0227 2.4217 0.0156 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.0021 0.0084 0.2485 0.8038 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.0164 0.0087 -1.8867 0.0595 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0474 0.0125 3.7979 0.0002 
L_AGE -0.0136 0.0062 -2.1805 0.0294 
GOV_INT -0.0653 0.0249 -2.6189 0.0089      
R-squared 0.0300     Mean dependent var 0.0484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0245     S.D. dependent var 0.0651 
S.E. of regression 0.0643     Akaike info criterion -2.6435 
Sum squared resid 4.3678     Schwarz criterion -2.6108 
Log likelihood 1412.0420     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.6311 
F-statistic 5.4398     Durbin-Watson stat 0.6790 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 6.7386 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Variance Inflation Factors 
   
    
Sample: 1 182215 
   
Included observations: 1063 
   
    
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF     
C 0.0003 91.6887  NA 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0005 1.4707 1.1472 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.0001 7.5325 1.2492 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT 0.0001 2.9005 1.1964 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0002 31.3791 1.3592 
L_AGE 0.0000 30.6408 1.3736 
GOV_INT 0.0006 89.0270 1.6968 
 
The VIF analysis shows no sign of collinearity between variables 
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Model 3b.2.2 Firm Variables and Government Intervention (Simple Interaction) 
For all of the following models the variables that interact were centered. This reduced the VIF to 
an acceptable level below 2.5. Furthermore, the regression was run with Huber White robust 
standard errors.  
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1063 after adjustments 
  
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
 
        errors and covariance 
    





t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 0.0281 0.0140 2.0029 0.0454 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.0552 0.0243 2.2672 0.0236 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0021 0.0084 0.2476 0.8045 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0164 0.0088 -1.8730 0.0613 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0474 0.0125 3.7986 0.0002 
L_AGE -0.0136 0.0063 -2.1530 0.0315 
GOV_INT_CENTERED -0.0650 0.0283 -2.2950 0.0219 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_INT_CENTERE
D 
-0.0061 0.2337 -0.0260 0.9792 
     
R-squared 0.02998     Mean dependent var 0.0484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.02355     S.D. dependent var 0.0651 
S.E. of regression 0.06434     Akaike info criterion -2.6417 
Sum squared resid 4.36781     Schwarz criterion -2.6043 
Log likelihood 1412.042     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.6275 
F-statistic 4.6583     Durbin-Watson stat 0.6790 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 5.8250 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Model 3b.2.3 Firm Variables and Government Intervention (Triple Interaction) 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1063 after adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     




Prob.   
     
C 0.0265 0.0141 1.8819 0.0601 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.0483 0.0266 1.8189 0.0692 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0147 0.0091 -1.6103 0.1076 
CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED 0.0001 0.0001 0.8050 0.4210 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0486 0.0126 3.8633 0.0001 
L_AGE -0.0131 0.0063 -2.0726 0.0385 
GOV_INT_CENTERED -0.0601 0.0284 -2.1150 0.0347 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0092 0.1057 0.0867 0.9309 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED -0.0005 0.0010 -0.5251 0.5996 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_INT_CENTERED -0.1915 0.2538 -0.7546 0.4506 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED*GOV_INT_CENTERED -1.0901 1.0395 -1.0487 0.2946 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED*GOV_INT_CENTERED -0.0120 0.0096 -1.2556 0.2095      
R-squared 0.0328     Mean 
dependent var 
0.0484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0227     S.D. 
dependent var 
0.0651 
S.E. of regression 0.0644     Akaike info 
criterion 
-2.6371 
Sum squared resid 4.3550     Schwarz 
criterion 
-2.5810 
Log likelihood 1413.606     Hannan-Quinn 
criter. 
-2.6158 
F-statistic 3.2435     Durbin-
Watson stat 
0.6753 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0002     Wald F-
statistic 
4.3355 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Model 3b.2.3 Firm Variables and Government Intervention (Triple Interaction, controlling for corporate governance & concentration 
interaction) 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1063 after adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.0280 0.0141 1.9923 0.0466 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.0451 0.0266 1.6962 0.0901 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0164 0.0099 -1.6550 0.0982 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0032 0.0098 0.3246 0.7455 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0489 0.0127 3.8643 0.0001 
L_AGE -0.0140 0.0064 -2.1800 0.0295 
GOV_INT_CENTERED -0.0514 0.0280 -1.8340 0.0669 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0271 0.1057 0.2566 0.7975 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0407 0.1030 -0.3951 0.6929 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_INT_CENTERED -0.2398 0.2611 -0.9185 0.3586 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_INT_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -1.3345 1.1464 -1.1640 0.2447 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*GOV_INT_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -1.9084 1.0152 -1.1800 0.1604 
GOV_INT_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0539 0.1017 0.5296 0.5965 
GOV_INT_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.1418 0.0957 1.4820 0.1387      
R-squared 0.0340     Mean dependent var 0.0484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0221     S.D. dependent var 0.0651 
S.E. of regression 0.0644     Akaike info criterion -2.6346 
Sum squared resid 4.3495     Schwarz criterion -2.5691 
Log likelihood 1414.275     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.6098 
F-statistic 2.8443     Durbin-Watson stat 0.6748 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0005     Wald F-statistic 3.8203 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Model 3b.3.1 Firm Variables and Market Development 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1285 after 
adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
 
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.0337 0.0118 2.8625 0.0043 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.1001 0.0328 3.0493 0.0023 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.0085 0.0071 1.1936 0.2329 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT -0.0081 0.0074 -1.0925 0.2748 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0433 0.0120 3.6049 0.0003 
L_AGE -0.0184 0.0051 -3.6395 0.0003 
MKT_DEV -0.0062 0.0068 -0.9174 0.3591      
R-squared 0.0334     Mean dependent var 0.0461 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0289     S.D. dependent var 0.0629 
S.E. of regression 0.0620     Akaike info criterion -2.7174 
Sum squared resid 4.9154     Schwarz criterion -2.6893 
Log likelihood 1752.9040     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.7068 
F-statistic 7.3627     Durbin-Watson stat 0.6952 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 6.2582 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
   
 
Variance Inflation Factors 
   
Sample: 1 182215 
   
Included observations: 1285 
   
    
 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF     
C 0.0001 56.7176  NA 
FCF_M108_1_T01P 0.0011 2.0993 1.4793 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT 0.0001 5.9273 1.1420 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT 0.0001 2.2763 1.0529 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0001 35.0396 1.4274 
L_AGE 0.0000 23.8987 1.1084 
MKT_DEV 0.0000 5.8909 1.2439 
The VIF analysis shows no significant collinearity between variables 
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Model 3b.3.2 Firm Variables and Market Development (Simple Interaction) 
For all of the following models the variables that interact were centered. This reduced the VIF to 
an acceptable level below 2.5. Furthermore, the regression was run with Huber White robust 
standard errors.  
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1285 after adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.0323 0.0123 2.6303 0.0086 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.0690 0.0223 3.0880 0.0021 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0017 0.0077 -0.2176 0.8278 
CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED 0.0002 0.0001 2.8330 0.0047 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0441 0.0117 3.7626 0.0002 
L_AGE -0.0170 0.0049 -3.4635 0.0006 
MKT_DEV_CENTERED -0.0119 0.0071 -1.6803 0.0932 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.1416 0.0954 -1.4854 0.1377 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CON_REDO_NO_CENTERED -0.0026 0.0012 -2.2821 0.0226 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED 0.1532 0.1427 1.0735 0.2833      
R-squared 0.0459     Mean dependent var 0.0461 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0391     S.D. dependent var 0.0629 
S.E. of regression 0.0617     Akaike info criterion -2.7257 
Sum squared resid 4.8520     Schwarz criterion -2.6855 
Log likelihood 1761.2460     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.7106 
F-statistic 6.8124     Durbin-Watson stat 0.7042 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000     Wald F-statistic 4.8212 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Model 3b.3.3 Firm Variables and Market Development (Triple Interaction) 
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
     
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1285 after adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.0338 0.0125 2.7097 0.0068 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.0779 0.0248 3.1369 0.0017 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0019 0.0098 -0.1953 0.8452 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0208 0.0085 2.4434 0.0147 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0423 0.0120 3.5275 0.0004 
L_AGE -0.0170 0.0053 -3.2064 0.0014 
MKT_DEV_CENTERED -0.0118 0.0090 -1.3102 0.1904 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0970 0.1206 -0.8047 0.4211 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0198 0.0880 -2.2543 0.0243 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED 0.0236 0.1173 0.2011 0.8407 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.4139 0.5119 -0.8086 0.4189 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0061 0.3494 -1.7332 0.0833      
R-squared 0.0489     Mean dependent var 0.0461 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0406     S.D. dependent var 0.0629 
S.E. of regression 0.0616     Akaike info criterion -2.7257 
Sum squared resid 4.8369     Schwarz criterion -2.6775 
Log likelihood 1763.2580     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.7076 
F-statistic 5.9453     Durbin-Watson stat 0.7123 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Model 3b.3.4 Firm Variables and Market Development  
(Triple Interaction, controlling for corporate governance & concentration interaction term)  
Dependent Variable: UE_M108_1LT0 
   
Method: Least Squares 
    
Sample (adjusted): 64 178174 
    
Included observations: 1285 after adjustments 
   
Huber-White-Hinkley (HC1) heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
  
        errors and covariance 
    
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.        
C 0.0335 0.0125 2.6820 0.0074 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED 0.0782 0.0250 3.1327 0.0018 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0016 0.0107 -0.1455 0.8844 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED 0.0196 0.0090 2.1817 0.0293 
LOG_DEBT/L_SIZE 0.0425 0.0120 3.5370 0.0004 
L_AGE -0.0170 0.0053 -3.1988 0.0014 
MKT_DEV_CENTERED -0.0103 0.0111 -0.9200 0.3578 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0992 0.1225 -0.8094 0.4184 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0192 0.0894 -2.1458 0.0321 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED 0.0187 0.1204 0.1555 0.8765 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED*CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED -0.3832 0.5628 -0.6810 0.4960 
FCF_M108_1_T01P_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED*CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED -0.0067 0.3854 -1.7458 0.0811 
CVG_N0_H_PRCT_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED -0.0053 0.0493 -0.1084 0.9137 
CONCEN_REDO_N0_PRCT_CENTERED*MKT_DEV_CENTERED 0.0171 0.0417 0.4094 0.6823 
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R-squared 0.0490     Mean dependent var 0.0461 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0393     S.D. dependent var 0.0629 
S.E. of regression 0.0617     Akaike info criterion -2.7227 
Sum squared resid 4.8362     Schwarz criterion -2.6665 
Log likelihood 1763.3500     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.7016 
F-statistic 5.0376     Durbin-Watson stat 0.7137 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
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